

Vol. LXXX, 2

8
WHOLE No. 318
UNIVERSITY
OF MICHIGAN

JUN 16 1959

PERIODICAL
READING ROOM

AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY

Founded by B. L. GILDERSLEEVE

Edited by
HENRY T. ROWELL

LUDWIG EDELSTEIN, JAMES H. OLIVER
JAMES W. POULTNEY, JOHN H. YOUNG
EVELYN H. CLIFT: Secretary

Honorary Editors
KEMP MALONE
BENJAMIN D. MERITT

APRIL, 1959

BALTIMORE 18, MARYLAND
THE JOHNS HOPKINS PRESS

CONTENTS

	PAGE
On the Date and Interpretation of the <i>Bellum Civile</i> . By JOHN H. COLLINS, - - - - -	113
The Superstitions about the <i>Nundinae</i> . By VAN L. JOHNSON, -	133
The Spiritual Itinerary of Virgil's Aeneas. By FRANCIS A. SULLIVAN, S. J., - - - - -	150
<i>Pro Isaeo</i> , 11, 50. By NAPHTALI LEWIS, - - - - -	162
The Earliest Rhetorical Handbooks. By GEORGE A. KENNEDY, -	169
Venetic Isoglosses. By ERIC P. HAMP, - - - - -	179
What was the <i>Linea Dives</i> (Martial, VIII, 78, 7)? By J. F. KILLEEN, - - - - -	185
The Name of Sophokles. By BENJAMIN D. MERITT, - - - - -	189
REVIEWS: - - - - -	190

Havelock's The Liberal Temper in Greek Politics (EDWIN L. MINAR, JR. and DAVID W. MINAR).—*Wycheley's* Literary and Epigraphical Testimonia. Results of Excavations Conducted by the American School of Classical Studies at Athens, Vol. III (STERLING DOW).—*De Sanctis'* Storia dei Romani. Volume IV: La fondazione dell'impero. Parte II: Vita e pensiero nell'età delle grandi conquiste, Tomo II (J. F. GILLIAM).—*Beare's* Latin Verse and European Song. A Study in Accent and Rhythm (PHILIP WHALEY HARSH).—*Méautis'* Sophocle: Essai sur le héros tragique (RICHMOND LATTIMORE).—*Clark's* Rhetoric in Greco-Roman Education (HARRY CAPLAN).—*Harmand's* Le patronat sur les collectivités publiques des origines au Bas-Empire: un aspect social et politique du monde romain (CHESTER G. STARR).—*Schmitt's* Rom und Rhodos. Geschichte ihrer politischen Beziehungen seit der ersten Berührung bis zum Aufgehen des Inselstaates im römischen Weltreich (E. T. SALMON).—*Moritz'* Grain-Mills and Flour in Classical Antiquity (ELIAS J. BICKERMAN).—*Michell's* The Economics of Ancient Greece. Second edition (JOHN DAY).—*Hengsberg's* De ornatu rhetorico quem Basilus Magnus in diversis homiliarum generibus adhibuit (HARRY M. HUBBELL).—*Lefherz'* Studien zu Gregor von Nazianz: Mythologie, Überlieferung, Scholiasten (GLANVILLE DOWNEY).

BOOKS RECEIVED, - - - - -	222
---------------------------	-----

The American Journal of Philology is open to original communications in all departments of philology, and especially in the field of Greek and Roman studies. It is published quarterly. Four numbers constitute a volume, one volume each year. Subscription price, \$6.00 a year, payable in advance (foreign postage 50 cents, Canadian postage 25 cents, extra); single numbers, \$2.00 each.

Claims for replacement of missing numbers must be received within 8 months (6 months in the case of foreign subscribers) following publication of the number.

Articles intended for publication in the Journal, books for review, and other editorial communications should be addressed to the editor, Henry T. Rowell, The Johns Hopkins University; proof should be returned to the secretary, Evelyn H. Clift, The University of Delaware, Newark, Delaware.

Contributors are entitled to receive twenty-five copies of their respective contributions free of charge. Additional copies will be supplied at cost.

Subscriptions, remittances, and business communications should be sent to

THE JOHNS HOPKINS PRESS, Baltimore 18, Md.

The contents of the American Journal of Philology are indexed regularly in the International Index to Periodicals.

Entered as second-class matter October 16, 1911, at the postoffice at Baltimore, Maryland, under the Act of March 3, 1879.

Acceptance for mailing at special rate of postage provided for in Section 1103, Act of October 3, 1917. Authorized on July 3, 1918.

PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BY J. H. FURST COMPANY, BALTIMORE, MARYLAND

AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY

VOL. LXXX, 2

WHOLE No. 318

ON THE DATE AND INTERPRETATION OF THE *BELLUM CIVILE*.

I.

In a fundamental article in *Rheinisches Museum* nearly fifty years ago, A. Klotz,¹ summing up the evidence and earlier discussion and adding solid arguments of his own, showed with great probability that the *Bellum Civile* was not published in the lifetime of Caesar, nor from any finally revised copy, but was superficially edited and published shortly after his death by Aulus Hirtius, who had as his text the unfinished and unpolished manuscript from Caesar's literary remains. The view thus nailed down by Klotz, though attacked in the following decades by E. Kalinka² and others, may be considered the received doctrine on the matter down to 1938, when K. Barwick published his elaborate study, *Caesars Commentarii und das Corpus Caesarianum*.³ In 1951 Barwick again took up the problem in his *Caesars Bellum Civile. Tendenz, Abfassungszeit und Stil*, and with further argument based on intensive linguistic analysis and historical reconstruction, attempted to make good the thesis that the *B. C.* was written and published as part of Caesar's propaganda campaign during the war, and that it appeared in two parts, Books 1-2 as a unit at the end of the year 49, and Book 3

¹ "Zu Caesars *Bellum Civile*," *Rh. M.*, 1911, pp. 80 ff. Cf. *R.-E.*, X, col. 270.

² "Die Herausgabe des *Bellum Civile*," *Wien. Stud.*, 1912, pp. 203 ff. Cf. Bursian *Jahresberichte*, CCXXIV (1927); CCLXIV (1939), with citation of additional literature.

³ *Philol., Suppl.*, XXXI, 2 (1938).

at the end of 48 or early in 47. Klotz had in the meantime published his *Editio altera* of the *B. C.*,⁴ and in his *Praefatio* had answered Barwick's 1938 arguments and further fortified his own earlier position. Although Barwick has convinced some scholars,⁵ I believe the general view of Klotz still commands a majority agreement.⁶

The main arguments for Klotz' theory may be briefly summarized: (1) the "rough-draft" or "skizzenhafter Zustand" of the work as a whole, especially as compared with the balanced organization and artistic finish of the *Bellum Gallicum*; (2) the abrupt break-off at the end, indicating that it is unfinished; (3) the silence of Cicero, who never alludes to the *B. C.*;⁷ (4) the criticism of Asinius Pollio cited by Suetonius (*Caes.*, 56, 4): *parum diligenter parumque integra veritate compositos putat, cum Caesar pleraque et quae per alios erant gesta temere crediderit et quae per se, vel consulto vel etiam memoria lapsus perperam ediderit; existimatque rescripturum et correcturum fuisse*, which is apparently to be completed by the thought, "if he had lived to do it";⁸ (5) the express words of Hirtius (*B. G.*, VIII, *Praef.* 2): *novissimumque imperfectum ab rebus gestis Alexandriae confeci*, since *novissimum imperfectum* ap-

⁴ Teubner edition, Leipzig, 1950.

⁵ Lloyd W. Daly, *A. J. P.*, 1953, p. 195; F. E. Adcock, *Caesar as Man of Letters* (Cambridge, 1956), is doubtful; see note 40 below.

⁶ U. Knoche, "Caesars Commentarii, ihr Gegenstand und ihre Absicht," *Gymnasium*, 1951, Heft 2; P. Fabre, *Bellum Civile* (3rd Budé edition, Paris, 1947), pp. xxiii-xxiv; M. Rambaud, *L'art de la déformation historique dans les Commentaires de César* (Paris, 1953). I have myself tried to show the insufficiency of some of Barwick's arguments in an appendix to my Frankfurt dissertation, *Propaganda, Ethics, and Psychological Assumptions in Caesar's Writings* (1952).

⁷ The passage of *Brut.*, 262 has since Nipperdey been generally recognized as applying only to the *B. G.*, and Barwick has not shaken this *res iudicata*; the attempt to find echoes of the *B. C.* in Cicero's *Pro Ligario*, 18 is also unsuccessful, in that the catch-words (*dignitas*, *contumelia*) and arguments by which Caesar justified his war-making were in common circulation long before the *B. C.* Cicero was already complaining of Caesar's sensitive *dignitas* in January 49 (*Att.*, VII, 11, 1).

⁸ Cf. Knoche, *op. cit.* (note 6 above), p. 155, n. 30: "Das stärkste Argument für die postume Edition des BC sind m. E. die worte des Asinius Pollio."

parently refers to *B. C.*, III.⁹ It should perhaps be added that the older arguments, based on the phrases *bello confecto* (*B. C.*, III, 57, 5; 60, 4) and *bello perfecto* (*B. C.*, III, 18, 5) have long been discounted as of no weight.

The cumulative force of this evidence is overwhelming, nor have the counter arguments of Kalinka and Barwick been able to weaken it significantly. Barwick's case is built mainly upon his concept of the *B. C.* as timely propaganda requiring immediate publication for its effectiveness, but his strongest arguments indicate only that the *B. C.* was *written* during the progress of the war, or directly after Pharsalus, and prove nothing regarding the time of publication.¹⁰ Kalinka was even driven to the astonishing theory of an *unauthorized* or pirated publication in his attempt to meet Klotz' arguments based on the unevenness of the text.

In 1952 I reasoned¹¹ that it was incredible that Caesar should have written the *B. C.* in, say, 48 or 47, and then let it lie for years without completing or publishing it. Believing further that posthumous publication had been proved by Klotz, I concluded that the work was written in the last months of Caesar's life, after the return from Spain in the late summer of 45, and was left incomplete at his death. Further reflection on the whole problem in the last few years has convinced me that this view is incorrect, and I now believe with P. Fabre¹² that the *B. C.* was written in late 48 or early 47 in Egypt at odd intervals during the so-called Alexandrian War, that it was laid aside incomplete for reasons which are speculative but which I hope to make plausible, and that it was found among Caesar's papers after his death in approximately the condition in which we now have it.

⁹ Cf. Klotz, *Cäsarstudien* (Leipzig, 1910), pp. 155-6; Rice Holmes, *Caesar de Bello Gallico* (Oxford, 1914), p. 362, n. 2.

¹⁰ F. Lossmann, "Zur literarischen Kritik Suetons," *Hermes*, LXXXV (1957), pp. 47-58, analyzes the meaning of Suetonius' version of Pollio's criticism (it is important to note that we do not have Pollio's exact words), and its bearing on the problem of date, with great sharpness and detail. His final conclusion supports Klotz' theory of posthumous publication. See also his careful review of Barwick, *Gnomon*, 1956, pp. 355-62.

¹¹ *Op. cit.* (note 6), pp. 55-6.

¹² Budé edition, p. xxi. Fabre believes the *B. C.* was written before Thapsus. See citation at note 30 below.

In other words, I believe that Barwick is correct in fixing an early date of composition, and that Klotz is correct in fixing a posthumous date of publication. I wish here to set this view forth with such evidence as I can bring, and to indicate certain wider consequences bearing on the historical interpretation and credibility of the work itself.

II.

What ultimate plans for the organization of the Roman *Imperium* Caesar may have formed or entertained in his last months will doubtless always be discussed and can never be satisfactorily settled.¹³ But there can be no doubt about one thing—he had no intention of imitating Sulla by resigning the dictatorship. His own words as reported by Titus Ampius in Suetonius' account (*Caes.*, 77): *nihil esse rem publicam, appellationem modo sine corpore ac specie. Sullam nescisse litteras, qui dictaturam deposuerit* fit together with his acts and omissions to act, and leave no doubt of his determination to maintain his despotic position. That he consciously intended to found a Hellenistic God-kingdom on the model of Alexander has been powerfully argued by Meyer and others;¹⁴ that he had the slightest intention of "re-establishing the republic" as Cicero publicly called upon him to do (*Pro Marc.*, 26-7), and as Sallust also urged (*Ep. ad Caes.*, I, 6, 3), or even of re-establishing some sort of shadow republic as Augustus later found expedient, is believed, as far as I am aware, by no one. His government after Thapsus was a humane but quite naked absolutism, conducted with conspicuous contempt for the *mos maiorum*,¹⁵ and the assumption of the lifetime dictatorship in early 44, against the whole weight of constitutional tradition, was an open declaration that he had done, finally and deliberately, with the old republican ideology.

¹³ Cf. R. Syme, *The Roman Revolution* (Oxford, 1939), p. 53.

¹⁴ Ed. Meyer, *Caesars Monarchie und das Principat des Pompeius* (Stuttgart-Berlin, 1918); W. Steidle, *Sueton und die antike Biographie, Zetemata*, Heft 1 (Munich, 1951), pp. 60 ff.

¹⁵ In "Caesar and the Corruption of Power," *Historia*, 1955, pp. 445-65, I have tried to show this contempt in some detail; here I may summarily refer to chapters 76-80 of Suetonius' *Caesar*, recalling their importance as a Roman moral judgment recently stressed by Steidle, *op. cit.* (note 14).

With this post-Thapsus, monarchial Caesar clearly in mind (it matters little whether he laid great stress on the title *Rex*; his regal bearing and arrogation of royal power made mere titles of minor importance), let us turn to the *B. C.*, and ask how well it fits the character of its author as that character reveals itself in its last phase. We shall find, I think, that the *B. C.* does not fit at all; that it is a work *republican* through and through; that it neither contains the spirit nor the foreshadowing of the "monarchial" or "imperial" idea; that even interpreted as propaganda, it is not propaganda for monarchy nor for any projected reform or re-organization of the Roman governmental system. As a product of the mind of the "late" Caesar, known to us from Suetonius, from Cicero's correspondence of the years 45-44, and from the miscellaneous anecdotes in Plutarch, Dio Cassius, Appian, and other writers, of the Caesar driving for the possession of absolute power, and in visible ways corrupted by power in the sense of Lord Acton's aphorism, the republican *Gedankenwelt* of the *B. C.* is hardly thinkable.

Since the above statements will appear radical to many, and have indeed been specifically denied,¹⁶ it is necessary to support them here by a somewhat detailed collection of the evidence.

That the *B. C.* does not contain any clear political "slogan" or announcement of the "imperial idea" has often been noted. U. Knoche writes:¹⁷ "Sieht man Caesars Schriften durch . . . so ist es bemerkenswert, wie häufig von der *Fortuna* die Rede ist und wie der Gedanke an ein römisches Schicksal ganz zurücktritt. Geradezu erstaunlich und erschreckend ist es aber, eine wie geringe Rolle dort überhaupt in Wirklichkeit der Reichsgedanke spielt; und es ist sonderbar, dass Caesar, der Meister der Propaganda, sich diese Parole hat entgehn lassen." The sole instance in the *B. C.* of an expression that may be thought in some sense to announce a "program" or overall political plan is a phrase in a letter to Metellus Scipio urging as objectives to be sought, *quietem Italiae, pacem provinciarum, salutem imperi*

¹⁶ Among better company, by me, who thought I could find evidence in the *B. C.* of Caesar's desire to appear as the *patronus* of the Roman state, *op. cit.* (note 6), p. 76; cf. citation from L. Wickert, note 20 below.

¹⁷ "Die geistige Vorbereitung der augusteischen Epoche," in *Das neue Bild der Antike*, ed. H. Berve (Leipzig, 1942), II, p. 213.

(*B. C.*, III, 57, 4). These words do sum up, with remarkable accuracy and insight, the great needs of the Roman world, and Gelzer¹⁸ has repeatedly cited them to show Caesar's statesmanly grasp of the problems before him, and his vision beyond the limited horizon of the old *res publica* incorporating merely the city-state of Rome, or at most, the citizen body of Italy. But these words in their actual context cannot be taken as a program or even as a slogan, whatever may be their value as proof of Caesar's understanding and statesman's concern. The message in which they occur is an offer of peace on the principle of return to the *status quo ante bellum*, that is, re-establishment of the senatorial oligarchy and the rest of the legal and customary *res publica*.

At no time in the *B. C.* does Caesar indicate a desire or intention of altering or reforming, to say nothing of revolutionizing, the old constitution. The propaganda of the work has, in fact, the exactly opposite tendency of emphasizing Caesar's defense of the old constitution. His expressed reasons for invading Italy are (1) to support the rights of the tribunes (*B. C.*, I, 5, 1-2; 22, 5; 32, 6); (2) to free the Roman people from the *factio paucorum* (I, 22, 5; 85, 4); (3) to preserve his personal *dignitas* against the *iniuriae* and *contumeliae* of his *inimici* (I, 7, 1; 7-8; 22, 5; 32, 2; cf. Cic., *Att.*, VII, 11, 1). His conditions of peace, as stated in the *B. C.*, never require any constitutional change, but stress on the contrary his constant desire and willingness to submit to the republican laws. He is prepared to suffer all for the good of the state (I, 9, 3; 5). He asks only free elections and personal security (I, 9, 5; 85, 11; III, 10, 8-10). This picture of his demands and intentions is supplemented but not altered by the strictly contemporary evidence of the Ciceronian correspondence (note especially, *Att.*, VIII, 9, 4: *aiebat* (Balbus the Younger) *nihil malle Caesarem quam ut Pompeium adsequeretur . . . et rediret in gratiam; . . . Balbus quidem maior ad me scribit nihil malle Caesarem quam principe Pompeio sine metu vivere*). It is the Pompeians who are accused of innovation: *novum in rem publicam introductum exemplum* (*B. C.*, I, 7, 2); *in se* (i. e., Caesar) *novi generis imperia constitui* (I, 85, 8). Still more specifically the Pompeians are

¹⁸ Caesar, *der Politiker und Staatsmann* (4th ed., Munich, 1942), p. 262; *Vom römischen Staat* (Leipzig, 1943), I, p. 137; II, p. 178.

charged with contemptuous disregard for law and custom: *Consules, quod ante id tempus accidit numquam, ex urbe profisciscuntur . . . contra omnia vetustatis exempla . . . omnia divina humanaque iura permiscentur* (I, 6, 7-8).

The question of the sincerity or truth of this presentation is at the moment irrelevant; the point to be noted is that Caesar is at pains to appear as the loyal son of the republic, forced to take arms in the republic's defense, and wishing nothing as reward but the restoration of the old state of things, *otium* (I, 5, 5), and peace. There is not a sentence in the *B. C.* the *political tendency* of which could not be approved by Cicero, or for that matter, by Cato; there is no threat of innovation (those of Caesar's followers who entertained radical hopes of confiscation and *novae tabulae* were quickly disillusioned; cf. Caelius Rufus, *Fam.*, VIII, 17, 2; *hic nunc praeter faeneratores paucos nec homo nec ordo quisquam est nisi Pompeianus*), and no expression of dissatisfaction with the former condition of the *res publica* except that the selfishness and ambition of a few men, of the *factio paucorum*, was preventing the system from functioning. Caesar reduces the whole political question to the level of a personal quarrel in which Pompey, supported and egged on by Caesar's *inimici*, preferred to throw the state into a turmoil rather than permit Caesar his well-earned place of equal *dignitas* (*B. C.*, I, 4, 4. Lucan's well-known *nec quemquam iam ferre potest Caesarve priorem / Pompeiusve parem* does not misrepresent Caesar's own statement). The modern idea that there was a general crisis, economic and political, in the Mediterranean world that could be resolved only by a fundamental change in the governmental organization, with one-man rule replacing the old rivalry of the *potentes*¹⁹ for money and *honores*, is not remotely suggested, not even darkly hinted by Caesar.

We find this so hard to believe that we read into Caesar what we cannot find explicit in his work. L. Wickert writes of the peace propaganda of the *B. C.* thus:²⁰ "Caesars Absicht war, nachzuweisen, nicht nur, dass er den Frieden gewollt habe, sondern auch, dass er im Kampfe mit den Pompeianern und im Gegensatz zu ihnen alles getan habe, um die alte *res publica* zu retten" (a correct and excellent statement); "dass aber das

¹⁹ *certamina potentium*, Tacitus, *Ann.*, I, 2.

²⁰ "Zu Caesars Reichspolitik," *Klio*, 1937, pp. 232 ff.

Verhalten der Gegner und die Ereignisse selbst es ihm unmöglich gemacht hätten, diese Plan durchzuführen" (partly correct, but one sees here the beginning of subjective addition); "dass er Schritt für Schritt gegen seinen ursprünglichen Willen mit zwingender Notwendigkeit dazu geführt worden sei, die Verfassung in der Weise umzugestalten, dass die Monarchie und—können wir hinzufügen—der Reichsstaat das Ergebnis sein mussten" (for this last view there is in the *B. C.* no trace; it is a modern and wholly subjective interpretation based on knowledge of the actual later imperial development). The only passage in the *B. C.* that gives the slightest color to the last part of Wickert's sentence is that of Caesar's speech to his rump senate of 1 April 49 (*B. C.*, I, 32, 7): *Pro quibus rebus hortatur ac postulat, ut rem publicam suscipiant atque una secum administrarent. Sin timore defugiant, illis se oneri non futurum et per se rem publicam administraturum.* There is no announcement here of a coming Reichsstaat, or of any general constitutional reform; there is, as Gelzer²¹ has pointed out, a threat to act independently, and thus an attempt to force co-operation by the reluctant senate, but again there is nothing that a Cicero or a Cato could not have approved in principle. The idea of a temporary dictatorship to deal with a public emergency, whether formally tendered by a vote of the senate or taken in hand *de facto* by a strong consul, was one of the oldest traditions of the Roman constitution. In Caesar's words there is no break with the *res publica*, but rather the use of the *res publica* as a slogan.

In conformity with his striving to appear as the *bonus civis, rei publicae natus*, Caesar continually implies that his march into Italy in 49 (the touchiest point of his case: note Mommsen's struggle to justify it in the *Rechtsfrage*) was supported by almost universal consent. Towns and soldiers are again and again represented as eager to yield themselves, and as submitting with great impatience to control by Pompeians. A monotonous parade of surrenderers and collaborationists is set forth in *B. C.*, I, 12-18. At Iguvium, *Caesar certior factus . . . omnium esse . . . optimam erga se voluntatem.* Thermus, who was holding the town for the Pompeians, flees, and *militēs in itinere ab eo discedunt . . . Curio summa omnium voluntate Iguvium recipit*

²¹ "Caesar," in *Das neue Bild der Antike*, II, p. 188 = *Vom römischen Staat*, I, p. 126.

(I, 12, 1-3; note the tendentious *recipit* for *capit* or *occupat*). Practically the same formula describes the seizure of Auximum, with the addition of an honorary citation: *neque se neque reliquos municipales pati posse C. Caesarem imperatorem, bene de re publica meritum, tantis rebus gestis oppido moenibusque prohiberi* (I, 13, 1). In Picenum, Pompey's special stronghold, *cunctae earum regionum praefecturae libentissimis animis eum recipiunt exercitumque eius omnibus rebus iuvant* (I, 15, 1; a cynic may wonder how many peremptory requisitions helped the help); *Etiam Cingulo, quod oppidum Labienus constituerat . . . ad eum legati veniunt quaeque imperaverit se cupidissime facturos pollicentur* (I, 15, 2). Never was conquering army so enthusiastically greeted. If there was a sullen citizen or two who with Cicero was wondering *utrum de imperatore populi Romani an de Hannibale loquimur* (*Att.*, VII, 11, 1), we should never learn the fact from Caesar.

This "bandwagon propaganda" is extended and emphasized throughout the *B. C.*²² In some passages it is given a definite political, even legal connotation. At Oricum *L. Torquatus . . . conatus portis clausis oppidum defendere cum Graecos murum ascendere atque arma capere iuberet, illi autem se contra imperium populi Romani pugnaturos esse negarent* (*B. C.*, III, 11, 3-4). Again at Apollonia, where L. Staberius attempted like Torquatus to defend the town and secure hostages from the inhabitants, *illi vero daturos se negare, neque portas consuli praeclusuros, neque sibi iudicium sumpturos contra atque omnis Italiae populusque Romanus iudicavisset* (III, 12, 2). In Syria the soldiers of Metellus Scipio threatened mutiny, *ac non nullae militum voces . . . sese contra civem et consulem arma non laturos* (III, 31, 4). Caesar urged the Massilians: *debere eos Italiae totius auctoritatem sequi potius quam unius hominis voluntati obtemperare* (I, 35, 1). As factual reports of words actually spoken these passages are obviously strongly colored and "stylized," but they prove beyond cavil Caesar's keen wish to *legitimate* his victory in conformity with republican principles. Of similar tendency is the ostentatious deference to the *comitia* advertised in III, 1, 5: *Statuerat enim prius hos* (those exiled during Pompey's domination) *iudicio populi debere restitui*

²² A full citation of passages with sharply critical discussion is given by Rambaud, *op. cit.* (note 6), pp. 277-83.

quam suo beneficio videri receptos, ne aut ingratus in referenda gratia aut arrogans in praeripiendo populi beneficio videretur. In his last months Caesar treated the *comitia* with sovereign contempt, ordering mock elections at his personal pleasure, and outraging republican feelings: *Incredibile est quam turpiter mihi facere videar, qui his rebus intersim*, wrote Cicero to Curius. *Ille autem* (i. e., Caesar), *qui comitiis tributis esset auspicatus, centuriata habuit, consulem hora septima renuntiavit, qui usque ad K. Ian. esset quae erant futurae mane postridie. Ita Caninio consule scito neminem prandisse* (*Fam.*, VII, 30, 1, January 44).²³

Caesar's anxiety to placate republican opinion is shown less conspicuously, but none the less significantly, in his omissions. Rambaud²⁴ has with great plausibility suggested that the reason the name of Cicero does not appear in the *B. C.* is that it was precisely Caesar's failure to win Cicero to his side that made his claim to represent the old republic look thin. "D'un côté, elle [i. e., the unsuccessful sollicitation of Cicero] aide à comprendre que le *Bellum Civile* n'ait pas nommé Cicéron à qui César accordait tant d'importance en 49; l'abstention prudente de ce politique, son absence au sénat le premier avril, démentaient l'argumentation césarienne." Cicero's defiance of Caesar at the interview of 28 March 49 (*Att.*, IX, 18) was unquestionably a serious setback for Caesar's policy, and all the more painful that it was unexpected. "Menschlich gesehen ist es vielleicht die erstaunlichste Niederlage, die Caesar erlitten hat."²⁵ Caesar passed it over in silence in the *B. C.* not only because it was a psychological defeat, but because it damaged the picture of republicanism he was striving to paint. There was perhaps not another man in Italy whose judgment of the political rightness of his conduct Caesar so much valued, or whose approval would in fact have been more valuable to him.

No phase of Caesar's conduct in the civil war impressed his contemporaries (and indeed posterity) more strongly than his

²³ Cf. further discussion of the "Legalitätstendenz" in Barwick, *Caesars Bellum Civile*, pp. 109-114. The preceding two paragraphs have been adapted with minor revision from my dissertation, *op. cit.* (note 6), pp. 78-80.

²⁴ *Op. cit.* (note 6), p. 151.

²⁵ O. Seel, *Cicero* (Stuttgart, 1953), p. 199.

clementia. In the *B. C.* this policy is given a very prominent place and is unquestionably one of the major strands of the Caesarian propaganda. But it has often been noted that Caesar, though he rings the changes on the idea so tirelessly that a modern scholar has facetiously suggested that the book should be titled *Bellum Civile, sive de Caesaris clementia*,²⁶ deliberately avoids the word; he speaks instead of *lenitas*, and of *incolumes dimittere* or *incolumes conservare*; his supporters speak of *temperantia* and *humanitas* (Caelius, *Fam.*, VIII, 15, 1; Dolabella, *Fam.*, IX, 9, 3). The reason is not far to seek. *Clementia* is the virtue of the legitimate monarch, not of the *primus inter pares*.²⁷ It was exactly because he was unwilling to accept Caesar's *clementia*, unwilling to recognize any right of Caesar to exercise *clementia*, that Cato preferred death, and Caesar's avoidance of the word shows in striking fashion his care to stay inside the republican tradition of equality. He similarly avoids the word in his famous letter on the capitulation of Corfinium (*Att.*, IX, 7-c), but speaks of *miseriordia* and *liberalitas*, and it is his opponent Cicero who writes bitterly of *insidiosa clementia* (*Att.*, VIII, 16, 2).²⁸

All this conspicuous, not to say ostentatious republicanism of the *B. C.* is incompatible with the Caesar of 46-44, "the crony of Quirinus stepping down from his place among the gods" (*Quid? tu hunc de pompa Quirini contubernalem his nostris moderatis epistulis laetaturum putas? Cic., Att., XIII, 28, 2*). It is

²⁶ P. Fabre, Budé edition, p. xxx.

²⁷ Seneca, *De Clem.*, II, 3, 1: *Clementia est temperantia animi in potestate ulciscendi vel lenitas superioris adversus inferiorem in constituendis poenis*. Cf. Rambaud, *op. cit.* (note 6), pp. 289-93.

²⁸ M. Treu, "Zur Clementia Caesaris," *M. H.*, 1948, pp. 197 ff., and Rambaud, *op. cit.* (note 6), pp. 289 ff., have strongly attacked the sincerity of Caesar's professions, and have developed the view given contemporary expression by young Curio: *ipsum autem non voluntate aut natura non esse crudelem, sed quod popularem putaret esse clementiam* (*Att.*, X, 4, 8). It would require a second article to give in detail my reasons for disagreeing with this view; briefly, I may remark that Cicero, although he wrote of *insidiosa clementia* at the time, did not later doubt its genuineness, despite the hatred he felt for Caesar. But the question of sincerity is quite secondary here to the estimate of Caesar's "republicanism" in the *B. C.* Sincere or Machiavellian, Caesar presents his *clementia* or *liberalitas* as the good will of a republican *nobilis*, not as the condescension of a monarch.

equally discordant and unfitting whether read as apologetic or as preparatory propaganda. As apologetic, it is too grossly contradicted by the events of 46-44, too easily turned to ridicule, to be effective; as preparatory propaganda, it prepares for the wrong thing. When one considers the deep-cutting change that took place in Caesar's character and outlook in his last phase,²⁹ the conclusion is strongly suggested that the *B. C.* is a product of his earlier period.

The argument of Barwick, based on considerations of the timely character of the propaganda and *tendance*, and on the time-conditioned judgments of men (note especially the rather severe criticism of M. Varro, *B. C.*, II, 17-20), reinforces the above line of thought, and points to late 48 or early 47 as the date of composition. To Barwick's evidence may be added the remarks of P. Fabre,³⁰ who cites the fine saying of Louis XII: "Le roi de France ne venge pas les injures du duc d'Orléans," and asks whether Caesar would have carried on his quarrel with the dead: "Après la guerre d'Espagne, et déjà même après la guerre d'Afrique, quel intérêt eût trouvé le maître absolu de Rome, le tout-puissant dicateur . . . à dessiner en traits satiriques et mordants des ennemis que la mort ou la soumission avait réduits à l'impuissance?" We know, indeed, that he did pursue Cato beyond the grave, but this is to be explained by Cato's special position as a symbol of continuing resistance. Is it not more likely that the persiflage with Metellus Scipio (*His temporibus Scipio detrimentis quibusdam circa montem Amanum acceptis imperatorem se appellaverat*, *B. C.*, III, 31, 1) was written while this contemptible Pompeian leader was still in active opposition? The disparaging observations on Afranius (*B. C.*, I, 84, 4; 85, 1) and Petreius (I, 75, 2) are also more fitting if written before Thapsus and the deaths of these men.

One of the remarks of Caesar quoted earlier, *omnia divina humanaque iura permiscetur* (*B. C.*, I, 6, 8), inspired a comment by Eduard Meyer:³¹ "Caesar hat sich die schöne Schlussphrase nicht entgehen lassen" (he used it again, *B. C.*, I, 32, 5!) "die er ebensogut auf seine eignen, ganz gleichartigen Massregeln

²⁹ Cf. my "Caesar and the Corruption of Power."

³⁰ Budé edition, 1947, p. xxi. Fabre, however, agrees with Klotz in assigning a posthumous date of publication.

³¹ *Op. cit.* (note 14), p. 289, n. 1.

als Monarch hätte anwenden können." Meyer might have added that Cicero actually did apply virtually this formula to Caesar's conduct: *omnia iura divina et humana pervertit propter eum quem sibi ipse opinionis errore finxerat principatum* (*De Off.*, I, 26). I suggest that what was obvious to Cicero and Meyer was probably obvious also to Caesar, and that it is unlikely that he would have allowed "die schöne Schlussphrase" to appear had he been writing at a date when it could so easily and effectively be turned to scorn.

None of these indications of the time of writing of the *B. C.* is decisive, but the ease with which they may be individually discounted must not be permitted to obscure the fact that they are parallel, not linked indications, so that their cumulative force is not to be despised. But it may well be asked why, if Caesar wrote the *B. C.* in 48-47 for political ends, did he not publish it at once? This question seemed to me unanswerable when I first considered the problem, and led me to suppose that the work could only have been written toward the end of Caesar's life, at the earliest after Thapsus. But if it can be shown that events interrupted the writing and made the original purpose obsolete, the natural objection to a widely separated date of writing and publication disappears, and the arguments of Barwick and Klotz are no longer opposed, but point together to the same conclusion: *writing* in 48-47; *publication* in 44-43.

III.

When Caesar arrived at Alexandria some seven weeks after Pharsalus, and was shown the head of Pompey, who had been murdered a few days before, he very probably believed, with that sanguine temperament that had led him to write of the condition of Gaul at the end of 56, *omnibus de causis Caesar pacatam Galliam existimaret* (*B. G.*, III, 7, 1), that the civil war was virtually over, and that he needed but show himself in Italy to find all opposition broken: *Caesar confisus fama rerum gestarum infirmis auxiliis proficisci non dubitaverat aequè omnem sibi locum tutum fore existimans* (*B. C.*, III, 106, 3). The objects for which he had fought the civil war were attained; he had recovered his *dignitas*, and his soldiers might now expect to recover their *libertas* (*B. C.*, III, 91, 2). In this spirit of

optimistic self-satisfaction he had marched around the Aegean to the Hellespont, and had sailed thence to Ephesus and Rhodes, hearing and recording, with harmless pride, the stories of prodigies that circulated through the East in the wake of his victory (*B. C.*, III, 105). From Rhodes he had crossed the Mediterranean to Alexandria. It is quite possible that he dictated part if not most of the *B. C.* at intervals of this journey, as we know was his custom in traveling (cf. the *De Analogia* and the *Iter*, Sueton., *Caes.*, 56, 5). He was nominally in pursuit of Pompey, but he did not press the matter with Caesarian *celeritas*. For a Pompeius Magnus was hardly a fit subject for *liberalitas sive misericordia*.

Immediately after his arrival at Alexandria on approximately 2 October 48 (27 July by the corrected calendar), two unforeseen developments combined to turn his adventurous life to a new course: he met Cleopatra and he became involved in the dangerous struggle for the control of Egypt known as the Alexandrian war.

Our firm knowledge of the events at Alexandria rests mainly on the account of Hirtius, who was not, however, present himself, but put together his narrative from Caesar's private conversations (*quae bella . . . ex parte nobis Caesaris sermone sunt nota*, *B. G.*, VIII, *Praef.* 8) supplemented no doubt by other reports written or oral. He tells us nothing of Caesar's personal life, prudently suppressing, in deference to Roman "Victorianism" and xenophobia, what he knew of Caesar's liaison with the woman he had recognized as the legitimate Egyptian queen. To eke out the purely military history of Hirtius we have some 500 lines of the tenth book of Lucan's *Pharsalia*, based in all probability on Livy, but of course heavily loaded with poetical invention, exaggeration, and bitter anti-Caesar partisanship. At a hardly higher level of reliability stand the brief and contradictory notices in Suetonius, Plutarch, Dio Cassius, and Appian. In the nature of the case, rumor and speculation must have embroidered the known facts. Yet there can be no question whatever that Cleopatra gained a powerful influence over Caesar, or that she continued for the rest of Caesar's life to hold a place of major importance in his plans. The failure of our main source to discuss the psychological and moral background of the Alexandrian war must not lead us to ignore, or treat as trivial

gossip, the decisive importance of the Egyptian period in Caesar's personal development. With good reason has Cleopatra been called "die genialste Frau der Weltgeschichte,"³² and with good reason did the Romans fear her "as they had feared no other but Hannibal."³³

Caesar remained in Egypt some eight months, the last two of which were spent in a pleasure-trip up the Nile with Cleopatra.³⁴ He then departed to take up again the affairs of empire, which had assumed a seriously threatening form during his period of neglect. But a year later we find Cleopatra in Rome, living in Caesar's own sumptuous residence across the Tiber, where she remained until after the murder of the dictator, caring for Caesar's son Caesarion and "playing the queen" to the rage of republican Romans (Cicero, *Att.*, XV, 15, 2). Caesar had her statue publicly set up next to that of Venus Victrix (Genetrix), his own patron goddess, and much of the intrigue and scheming of the last months of his life—the plan to assume the title *Rex* outside Italy, the rumor that he intended to remove the seat of government to Alexandria, and the astonishing law which Helvius Cinna was charged with introducing to enable Caesar to marry *uxores liberorum quaerendorum causa quas et quot vellet* (Suet., *Caes.*, 52, 3)—is unquestionably closely connected with his serious involvement with the Egyptian enchantress.³⁵

³² Title of book by Otto van Wertheimer (1930). Cf. also Th. Birt, *Frauen der Antike* (Leipzig, 1932), and F. Stähelin's *R.-E.* article (1921).

³³ W. W. Tarn, *Oxford Classical Dictionary* (1949), article "Cleopatra."

³⁴ Louis E. Lord, "The Date of Julius Caesar's Departure from Alexandria," *J. R. S.*, 1938, pp. 19-40, discredits, perhaps correctly, the alleged pleasure-trip. The point is not essential to the matter of this article.

³⁵ Full citation of sources and of the most important modern literature in Stähelin, *R. E.*, XI, col. 755. F. E. Adcock, *C. A. H.*, IX, p. 724, n. 1, rejects, without good reason, the account of the proposed law to permit polygamy. Correct view in Meyer, *op. cit.* (note 14), p. 518. From an obscure reference in Cicero (*Att.*, XIV, 20, 3) it may reasonably be inferred that Cleopatra was pregnant with Caesar's second child at the date of the assassination. Cf. J. Carcopino, *Cicero: the Secrets of his Correspondence* (London, 1951), II, pp. 314-17, who believes, however, that the reference is to the birth of Caesarion. No one else that I know doubts that Caesarion was born in 47.

It is of course impossible to know the precise manner in which the fabulous luxury and display, the excesses of power and pleasure that Caesar found at the Alexandrian court worked upon his mind, but there are many proofs that the post-Alexandrian, post-Cleopatra Caesar is a very different man from the Caesar of Corfinium and Ilerda.³⁶ The imagination of Lucan has painted the scene in florid rhetoric, and a greater than Lucan was inspired by his description³⁷ to write:

High on a throne of royal state, which far
Outshone the wealth of Ormus and of Ind,
Or where the gorgeous East, with richest hand,
Showers on her kings barbaric pearl and gold,
Satan exalted sat.

All circumstances united to turn the Roman *Imperator* into the oriental *Rex*, to harden his contempt for the stupid oligarchy that had rejected him, and to fill his soul with that *superbia* and delusion of grandeur which three years later made him so hateful that his old friends and camp comrades combined to murder him.

If, as has been suggested, Caesar wrote the *B. C.* in the period immediately following Pharsalus, partly during his leisurely journey to Egypt and partly during intervals in the palace at Alexandria (when one considers that the so-called "Alexandrian war" lasted some six months, but that the actual fighting took up only a few days, it is clear that many free intervals must have been available), it is easy to understand both the republican tone and ideology of the work and its propaganda of self-justification. It is Caesar's *apologia* for his conduct of the civil war, addressed to Romans; to Romans first of all of the aristocracy that had fought against him (other than the irreconcilable leaders). Its *tendance* is open and straightforward: to clear Caesar of any charge of attacking the republic, to set forth his deeds in the best light, to destroy the moral credit of his adversaries, to be admired, to triumph. One may see in it not unjustly a certain spirit of self-satisfied exuberance, a tempered repetition of the *fiducia* of 59: *Quo gaudio elatus non temperavit, quin paucos post dies frequenti curia iactaret, invitis et gementibus adversariis adeptum se quae concupisset, proinde ex*

³⁶ Cf. my "Caesar and the Corruption of Power."

³⁷ Of course I do not *know* this; let Milton scholars speak.

eo insultaturum omnium capitibus (Suet., *Caes.*, 22, 2). It contains no subtle double-talk looking toward monarchy; the ideals and standards of conduct to which it appeals are the ideals and standards of the old republic, of Cicero and of Cato. It contains no "Caesarism" in the sense which that word has assumed in modern times, but is throughout the work of a Roman republican aristocrat, successful in the lawful game that the Roman aristocracy played, the game of competition for honors and position. Having swept the board in this game, Caesar might well say *Satis diu vel naturae vixi, vel gloriae*.

In Egypt, however, falling increasingly under the influence of Cleopatra and of the atmosphere of oriental despotism and oriental luxury, Caesar gradually lost interest in the Roman ideal of aristocratic *libertas*, and became convinced that Sulla had been a simpleton when he resigned the dictatorship. When he finally returned to Italy from the East at the end of 47, he came determined to hold power in perpetuity, and to increase the pomp and splendor of his position in ways that would have seemed frivolous to the Caesar who had given his bed to Oppius and had slept on the ground.

But it was not alone the corrupting influence of refined and exotic luxury that worked upon Caesar's character during the Egyptian interlude. He visited the tomb of the great Macedonian conqueror, whose career had stimulated his imagination since his youth, and he saw in active operation the most complex and developed administrative bureaucracy of the ancient world. "Ganz gewiss hat Caesar seinen Aufenthalt in Ägypten nach der glücklichen Beendigung des Alexandrinischen Krieges nicht bloss zum Tändeln mit Kleopatra benutzt, sondern ausser anderm auch zum Studium einer Verwaltung, von der die römische unendlich viel lernen konnte."³⁸ A new Caesar developed in Egypt, perhaps for both better and worse, for it was in Egypt that Caesar decided not only on personal monarchy, but on many of those schemes of reform and re-organization to which his modern admirers have appealed as evidence of his statesmanship. We know that the calendar reform came from Egypt, and we may guess that many another project (one thinks of the dream of piercing the Isthmus of Corinth with a canal in imitation of the

³⁸ H. Willrich, "Caligula," *Klio*, 1903, p. 89.

great Pharaoh) was likewise the product of the fertile Nile and its ripe civilization.

In Dio Cassius' history (XLIII, 15-18) stands a speech allegedly delivered *ad Quirites* on the occasion of Caesar's victorious return from Africa (and his visit to his Sardinian "farm," *Fam.*, IX, 7, 2). Dio's habit of manufacturing rhetorical speeches is too well known to permit anyone to accept this piece as representing with accuracy an original documentary source, but it is not probable that it is fabricated out of hand. In it Caesar announces a program of general reform under the principle that the eighteenth century called "enlightened despotism." For what it may be worth, this doubtless garbled speech may be taken as the herald of the new Caesar, the Caesar who has given his name to "Caesarism."

By this time the manuscript of the *Bellum Civile* was a forgotten paper of the past. It no longer corresponded to the psychology of its author. It remained untouched in Caesar's archives until the summer of 44, when it was resurrected by Hirtius and given over to the copyists.³⁹ Thus the arguments of both Barwick and Klotz have their respective validity. We need assume neither that Caesar published a work in a "skizzenhafter Zustand," nor that he pursued propaganda objectives that were long obsolete.⁴⁰

IV.

If the foregoing discussion is correct in its main outlines and conclusion, consequences of no small importance to the understanding of the events of 50-49 must be reckoned with. First of all, we must not attribute to Caesar the fixed intention at the beginning of the civil war, or even after the struggle at Dyr-

³⁹ Rambaud, *op. cit.* (note 6), p. 367, supposes that the *B. C.* was published after Caesar's death by Antony and Faberius.

⁴⁰ F. E. Adcock, *Caesar as Man of Letters*, declines to commit himself definitely, but follows Barwick's general argument. His most interesting remark in connection with this paper is his suggestion that, after Pharsalus, "though Caesar did not cease to be a man of letters, he had come to care less for self-justification once he had the supreme justification of success. He seems to have become willing to leave to others the narratives of his victories. And the less he came to care for the conventions of the republic, the less he was anxious to maintain that he had preserved them."

rachium and the victory of Pharsalus, of destroying the republic and establishing a personal *regnum*. We must take more seriously than recent scholarship has done his comparatively modest professions of objectives as stated in the conditions given to L. Roscius and L. Caesar (*B. C.*, I, 9, 5-6).⁴¹ We must not give a Machiavellian or even a Hitlerian twist to his claims of peaceful intentions, or to his announcement of a *nova ratio vincendi, ut misericordia et liberalitate nos muniamus* (*Att.*, IX, 7-c, 1).⁴² His letters in the Ciceronian collection (*Att.*, IX, 6-a; 7-c; 16, 2), and the letters of his agents Balbus and Oppius (*Att.*, VIII, 15-a; IX, 7-a; 13-a) must be taken as more sincere and more "republican" than they have frequently been judged. We must not re-interpret the plain words of our sources with modern diplomatic subtlety, or in the light of modern knowledge of an imperial development that no man could foresee in 49 B. C. When Caesar held his famous interview with Cicero at Formiae on 28 March 49, he really meant what he said: *Veni igitur et age de pace* (*Att.*, IX, 18, 1). He wanted civil peace, *dignitas* and *otium*, and he did not demand dictatorial powers for himself as their price.

The large-scale plans of reform (*lex Iulia municipalis*), of colonization, of vast engineering projects, and of personal government, with the striving for excessive honors and semi-divine titles, are all products of the later Caesar, and cannot be safely appealed to as evidence for his purposes in 49, to say nothing of his purposes in 59 or 60.⁴³ One may guess that had he been granted his second consulship for the year 48, he would not have attempted to revolutionize the state, but would have been content with a proconsulship thereafter to take vengeance on the Parthian for Carrhae.

It was the stubbornness, suspiciousness, and vindictiveness of

⁴¹ K. von Fritz, "The Mission of L. Caesar and Roscius," *T. A. P. A.*, 1941, pp. 125 ff., refuses to take these proposals as offering a serious basis of peaceful compromise.

⁴² As M. Treu, *op. cit.* (note 28).

⁴³ As is well known, Mommsen's brilliant portrait attributes to Caesar a conscious aiming, from his earliest youth, at the goal of statesmanly reform through the establishment of monarchy. Cicero, *Phil.*, II, 116, says of Caesar *multos annos regnare meditatus*, but this, and similar attributions by opponents, need not be taken too seriously.

the Pompeian-Catonian opposition—Marcus Bibulus, Lucius Domitius, Metellus Scipio, Faustus Sulla, Lentulus Crus, and their *amici*—unwilling and temperamentally unable to believe in a moderate Caesar, a Caesar *bonus civis*—that drove matters to civil war, and brought to naught the peace efforts of Cicero and other reasonable men. Pompey himself, as Cicero expressly says (*Victa est auctoritas mea non tam a Pompeio [nam is movebatur] quam ab iis qui duce Pompeio freti peropportunam et rebus domesticis et cupiditatibus suis illius belli victoriam fore putabant*, to A. Caecina, *Fam.*, VI, 6, 6), and as Caesar implies (*Ipse Pompeius, ab inimicis Caesaris incitatus*, *B. C.*, I, 4, 4), could probably have been brought to a second Luca agreement, which would by no means necessarily have involved a despotic or “unrepublican” rule by Caesar. There was room within the constitution for orderly reform, and it is a tragedy of world history that Rome could not use for orderly reform the services of her greatest son. Through civil war the way led to military dictatorship and totalitarianism. It was the way chosen by a stiff-necked aristocracy unable to forget and unable to learn. As Caesar truly said as he gazed at the desolation of Pharsalus: *Hoc voluerunt; tantis rebus gestis Gaius Caesar condemnatus essem, nisi ab exercitu auxilium petissem* (Suet., *Caes.*, 30, 4). Perhaps after all, if we could really look into the wheels and levers of history, we should find that it was not Caesar, but Cato and Cleopatra, who founded the Roman empire!

JOHN H. COLLINS.

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY.

ADDENDUM: After this article was submitted, there came into my hands an article by Karlhans Abel, “Zur Datierung von Cäsars Bellum Civile,” *Museum Helveticum*, XV (1958), pp. 56-74, who argues sharply that the so-called “Legalitätstendenz” of the *B. C.* cannot be used as evidence of the date of composition. His entire article should be read in connection with the line of argument offered in section II above.

THE SUPERSTITIONS ABOUT THE *NUNDINAE*.

Mommsen's publication¹ of the imperial calendars and later on Mancini's reconstruction of the Fasti of Antium² have given us abundant epigraphic evidence for study of the Roman calendar; and the earlier calculations of Niebuhr³ and others, based only on arithmetic and literary evidence, have naturally fallen into neglect or even disrepute. At the same time we have learned from Sir James Frazer and his disciples to take seriously certain irrationalities attested by our literary sources and normally unapparent in the epigraphic material. Prehistorically—and sometimes historically—man is an irrational animal whose infatuations reveal, as they conceal, a certain rationale in his behavior. Using the empirical evidence now available but without scorning the authority of ancient texts, I propose to re-examine largely by statistical methods—which still seem appropriate in a subject of this kind—those notorious superstitions about the *nundinae* or Roman market-days recorded by Macrobius.⁴

Macrobius tells us that the Romans took steps to avoid the coincidence of *nundinae* with the first Kalends of any year and with the Nones of any month, because each concurrence of this nature was thought *perniciosum rei publicae*. The whole year was *luctuosus*, he says, if the first Kalends fell on a market-day—a belief strengthened *tumultu Lepidiano* in the year 78 B. C.; while the market-day falling on any Nones created a revolutionary situation by bringing out the whole populace on a day always celebrated as the birthday of king Servius Tullius: the day, but not the month of his birth was known, continues Macrobius, so his *dies natalis* was observed on every Nones. He had been a popular monarch, and well-attended ceremonies in his honor contained the seeds of revolution *ob desiderium regis*. Now the first superstition is not really explained at all; while our author's explanation of the second superstition, though con-

¹ *C. I. L.*, I².

² G. Mancini, *Not. Scav.* (1921), pp. 10-141.

³ See W. Smith and C. Anthon, *Dictionary of Greek and Roman Antiquities*, s. v. "calendar" for a good resumé.

⁴ *Saturnalia*, I, 13, 16-19.

taining hints of its great antiquity, involves legendary elements which it is difficult to accept as facts. But I would suggest that these authenticated superstitions reflect both change and fear of change in the Roman calendar; moreover, they yield two implications about the concurrences in question: (1) that occasionally the *nundinae* did fall *primis Kalendis* or on some Nones—a fact for which we have other evidence;⁵ and (2) that at one time the *nundinae* did not coincide with either one of these days—a contingency thus far unexamined for its bearing on the origin and development of the Roman calendar. It is to such an examination that I shall address myself in the course of this paper.

To begin with, I cannot accept Nilsson's view⁶ that the "market-week" has no real connection with the Roman calendar: the superstitions cited are themselves evidence of some connection; and there is abundant evidence in the published calendars:⁷ the year is divided into eight-day weeks, with the letters A to H carefully inscribed against the appropriate days, on a fixed system which always makes January 1 a day marked A. The inscriptions are late, of course, and do not prove the antiquity of this system; but they certainly establish a well-developed connection between the eight-day week and the calendar by the end of the first century B. C. Mommsen⁸ argued against the antiquity of nundinal letters on the ground that G was not introduced into the Roman alphabet until the third century B. C.; but Gellius⁹ clearly indicates that *nundinae* were mentioned in the XII Tables; and the course of my argument¹⁰ will reveal another objection to Mommsen's reasoning in this

⁵ Dio Cassius, XL, 47; XLVIII, 33 records *nundinae* falling on Jan. 1, 52 B. C., and intercalation to avoid a similar coincidence on Jan. 1, 40 B. C.

⁶ Martin P. Nilsson, *Primitive Time Reckoning* (Lund, Gleerup, 1920), p. 329.

⁷ C. I. L., I^a and Mancini, *op. cit.*

⁸ See article by M. Besnier, in Daremberg-Saglio, *Dictionnaire des antiquités grecques et romaines*, s. v. "*nundinae*"; also W. Kroll in *R.-E.*, XVII, 2, s. v. *nundinae*.

⁹ XX, 1, 49.

¹⁰ Until the market-day shifted, there was no need for lettering any other day of the week; and the nundinal letter, as I shall suggest, was fixed for some time.

matter. In any case, the eight-day market-week is a recorded fact and, as such, integrated with the calendar in historical times. Assuming, therefore, that it must somehow "mesh" with the number of days in a year, one of two things is required: a year of total days divisible by 8, with a *fixed* nundinal letter; or a year of total days not divisible by 8, with a *shifting* nundinal letter.

Now the only Roman year mentioned by our authorities¹¹ as having a number of days divisible by 8 is the so-called calendar of Romulus, which is said to consist of 304 days constituting 4 months of 31 days (March, May, July, and October) and 6 months of 30 days (April, June, August, September, November, and December). Scholars¹² have been prone to regard this calendar as a fiction since it corresponds neither with a lunar nor with a solar year; but more than three hundred years ago a Dutch scholar, Hendrik van Put, noticed¹³ that 304 was an exact multiple of 8, suggesting that the year of Romulus consisted of 38 eight-day market-weeks. But why 38? Why not 37 or 45, numbers which would have brought this calendar into closer conformity either with ten moons or with a solar year? The answer is to be found, I think, in what anthropologists¹⁴ call a permutation cycle of 8-day weeks and 30-day lunations covering, as Ovid guessed,¹⁵ the gestation period in cows and human beings: to fill out the last week of such a year, 4 days were added to the sum of 10 lunations, and in such a way that only March, the first month, begins with A. (Consult Table I for an abridgement of the calculations used throughout the following argument.) This last fact—not hitherto discerned, I think—is highly important for two reasons: (1) it proves the calendar of Romulus consistent with the tradition of always beginning a year with A—confirming the age of that tradition and, conversely, the plausibility of this 10-month calendar; (2) it brings out the real meaning of the Roman word for year, *annus*,

¹¹ Macrobius, *op. cit.*, I, 12 and Censorinus, *De Die Natali*, 20.

¹² Cf. W. Fowler, *Roman Festivals* (Macmillan, 1899), p. 2, and J. G. Frazer, *Fasti of Ovid* (Macmillan, 1929), II, p. 10.

¹³ See Frazer, *op. cit.*, II, pp. 11-12.

¹⁴ E. g. A. L. Kroeber, *Anthropology* (Harcourt, Brace, 1948), pp. 485-6; 548-50.

¹⁵ *Fasti*, III, 121-33.

which properly signifies a cycle¹⁶ and nothing more: a new year begins whenever a month starts with A, and that is always March in the calendar of Romulus. This in turn suggests that, as the calendar was perpetual,¹⁷ the year was continuous—a fact celebrated in the interesting festival of Anna Perenna, the “circling ring” of lunations, on the Ides of March. There was no “gap” of uncounted days¹⁸ in the winter; and seasonal festivals fell in various months depending on the relation of calendar to sun’s course—something indicated by their duplication in later calendars.¹⁹

If we accept this calendar as authentic and examine the superstitions about the *nundinae* in relation to it, we discover, reckoning the Nones as 3 Roman weeks from the last day in each month—a principle inherent in the later calendars—that *only days marked C and F do not coincide with the Nones of some month in Romulus’ calendar.*

Our authorities agree that the calendar of Romulus was superseded by the so-called calendar of Numa,²⁰ which was intended to be a true lunar calendar of 354 days; but an extra day was added, they say, either through ignorance or through superstition against even numbers. Censorinus²¹ describes the mistake as occurring at once; Macrobius²² regards the mistake as a development, so in his account we can distinguish two phases of Numa’s calendar. First, says Macrobius, Numa added 50 days to the

¹⁶ Macrobius, *op. cit.*, I, 14, 4-5.

¹⁷ See Besnier, *loc. cit.*, and Smith-Anthon, *Dictionary, loc. cit.*

¹⁸ The “gap” theory is well stated by H. J. Rose, *Primitive Culture in Italy* (Methuen, 1926), pp. 91 ff., and by Frazer, *op. cit.*, II, pp. 15 ff. But even Rose in the *Encyclopedia Britannica*, s. v. “calendar,” admits that such a theory does not fit the Mediterranean climate, and speculates that the 10-month calendar was brought into Italy by northern invaders. For his derivation of Anna Perenna, see *Ancient Roman Religion* (Hutchinson’s University Library, 1948), p. 83.

¹⁹ Note especially the repetition of the Tubilustrum on March 23 and May 23, and incidence of the associated ceremonies, Fordicidia and October Horse on April 15 and October 15: in a 10-month calendar seasonal festivities would occur in cycles of odd-numbered or even-numbered months.

²⁰ Or Tarquin: see Censorinus, *loc. cit.*

²¹ *Loc. cit.*

²² *Op. cit.*, I, 13, 1-4.

304 days of Romulus' year; then he subtracted 1 day from each of the six 30-day months, added these 6 days to the new period of 50 days, and divided the sum, 56, into 2 additional months of 28 days each, viz. January and February. Now this is interesting because 56 is a multiple of 8 and makes possible a very neat transition from the last December of Romulus' calendar to the first March of Numa's calendar: in this transitional year, both the first of January and the first of March will be lettered A²³ in the nundinal scheme. For later years, however, difficulties would ensue since 354 is not divisible by 8: unless some precaution were taken, a 4-year cycle of nundinal letters, HFDB, would result. *If the year of Numa begins with January, only F NUNDINAE will not fall on some Nones; if the year begins with March, each of the four possible nundinal letters, HFDB, will strike some Nones, but it is noteworthy that F does so only in January.*

It is therefore this superstition, I think—and not the one about even numbers—which added a day to the calendar and produced the second phase of Numa's calendar, i. e. a year of 355 days. Macrobius, in fact, supports this suggestion by contradicting himself: after telling²⁴ us of Numa's attempts to preserve the *impar numerus*, he proceeds²⁵ to discuss the superstitions about the *nundinae*, states that an intercalary day was added in February to avoid the coincidence of market-day and Nones, then identifies²⁶ this intercalary day with "*dies ille quo abundare annum diximus*," i. e. January 29! An intercalary day in February would accomplish nothing in the way of correction, but *adding a day to January moves the Nones from January 4 to January 5, and a nundinal F no longer strikes the Nones of any month.*

But something else happens: adding an extra day to the year changes the 4-year cycle to an 8-year cycle of nundinal letters, HEBGDAFC, so that March 1 is nundinal in year VI and January 1 in year VII of such a cycle. One can only suppose that "Numa" intended his year to begin with January and run for 354 days, but not daring to offend tradition, he yielded to sentiments about March 1, allowed January and February to

²³ This introduces for the first time a real uncertainty in regard to the beginning of the year, since July and November also start with A.

²⁴ *Op. cit.*, I, 13, 5. ²⁵ *Op. cit.*, I, 13, 16-19. ²⁶ *Op. cit.*, I, 13, 19.

follow December, then added a day to January to prevent a nundinal Nones in that month. This interpretation also implies that he took measures²⁷ to fix the *nundinae* and to forestall either a 4-year or an 8-year cycle of nundinal letters. These methods were perhaps inadequate, as we shall see.

Now the Republican calendar differs from this second phase of Numa's calendar in only one²⁸ respect: in keeping with "Numa's" first intention, it begins with January. Unless measures are taken, it produces the same 8-year cycle of nundinal letters, with *nundinae* on January 1 in year VI and on March 1 in year III. *G is the only letter which does not strike a Nones; but again it is interesting that F does so only in November.*

Caesar's reformed calendar of 365 days produces an 8-year cycle of nundinal letters, HCFADGBE, with *nundinae* falling on January 1 in year IV; March 1, of course, had ceased to be regarded as New Year's Day. *The only nundinal letter which avoids a Nones is F.*

There is then in all the calendars known to us abundant evidence for regarding F as the original nundinal letter, if the superstitions about the *nundinae* have any historical value. Huschke and Soltau thought it was H: Mommsen, to begin with, thought it was A.²⁹ Marquardt³⁰ first introduced the notion of a shifting letter, and we have seen how this would come about in years with a total number of days not divisible by 8, unless precautions were taken against it. It appears to me, however, that F was at least meant to be the nundinal letter, and that measures, however inadequate, were taken to fix it.

The Roman year always ended either in December or in February, and the two festivals most conspicuous near the end of these months are, respectively, the Saturnalia and the Terminalia—in fact, Varro³¹ says that the Terminalia marked the end of a year, and the Fasti of Antium support this statement by putting the Regifugium (commonly dated February 24) in

²⁷ See below, pp. 138-40.

²⁸ Except for the intercalary month which was a later development; see below, p. 140.

²⁹ See Besnier, *loc. cit.*

³⁰ J. Marquardt, *Römische Staatsverwaltung* (Leipzig, 1885), pp. 289 ff.

³¹ *De Lingua Latina*, VI, 13.

the intercalary month of Mercedonius. Frazer³² noted analogies between the Saturnalia and the Regifugium: the mock kings³³ associated with both festivals may be sacerdotal monarchs who were driven from the market-place at the end of an intercalary period. Plutarch³⁴ and Verrius Flaccus³⁵ support this interpretation of the Regifugium; and a close inspection of the two phases of Numa's calendar provides pretty good mathematical evidence that the Saturnalia and the Terminalia-Regifugium had similar functions.

In the first phase of Numa's calendar, with the year beginning on January 1, the first day of the Saturnalia, i. e. December 17, coincides with an F. In the displaced calendar of Romulus, the associated festival of the Opalia (December 20 in the calendar of Romulus, December 19 in the calendar of Numa) had been marked F. Augustus eventually limited the Saturnalia to 3 days³⁶ on the grounds of ancient precedent; and I would suggest that this refers to a period when December 17, 18, and 19 were all designated F, constituting a sort of 3-day fair which integrated the Saturnalia and Opalia, and postponed December 29, the ultimate day of such a year, to one marked H. January 1 of the new year then coincides with A, and F is retained as the fixed nundinal letter. This conjecture may explain the odd statement of Plutarch³⁷ that the *nundinae* were sacred to Saturn.³⁸ This method of meshing Roman weeks with a 354-day year was unsuccessful, I imagine, because people still refused to accept January 1 as the beginning of a new year, and extended the Saturnalia to their eventual 7 days,³⁹ thus confounding Numa's intentions. It would not be unnatural to prolong festivities which yielded both joy and profit.

In the second phase of Numa's calendar, where we have an

³² *Op. cit.*, II, pp. 501-2; cf. pp. 41 ff.

³³ Tacitus, *Ann.*, XIII, 15; Lucian, *Saturae*, 4 and 9.

³⁴ *Quaestiones Romanae*, 63.

³⁵ Paulus, 279.

³⁶ *Op. cit.*, I, 10, 4.

³⁷ *Op. cit.*, 42.

³⁸ The *nundinae* were sacred to Jupiter (Macrobius, I, 16, 30). However, Macrobius (I, 11, 49) mentions *venalia* at the Saturnalia, and the situation of Saturn's altar and temple in the forum may indicate some old connection between Saturn and the market.

³⁹ Cf. Macrobius, I, 10, 1-6.

extra day in January and a year beginning with March 1, December 17 no longer coincides with F; but February 23, the day of the Terminalia, does so, a fact which may establish the true origin of intercalation in the Roman calendar. The later practice of not counting the last five days of February when an intercalary month intervened before March may well be the vestige of intercalating five days between the Terminalia and the Regifugium (all lettered in the normal way as days of a week but not counted as days of a month), thus postponing February 28, the ultimate day of such a year, to one marked H and starting another true *annus* or cycle with March 1 as A. The mock king would flee on the seventh day of such a period, exactly as he may have done at the end of the corrupted 7-day Saturnalia, making possible an easy transition from the first to the second phase of Numa's calendar. It is my belief, therefore, that intercalation originated as a permutation device of this sort, and not as an effort to make the lunar fit the solar year—a problem of no concern to the primitive mind.⁴⁰

Once more, of course, the device did not work, this time because March eventually (153 B. C.?) gave way to January as the first month in the Republican calendar, and because Roman priests, learning the subtleties of Greek astronomy, used the intercalary period for scientific purposes. These alterations put an F on the Nones in November or introduced a shifting nundinal letter which fell on some Nones seven times in eight years, on the first Kalends once every eight years, and removed the possibility of regular corrections to prevent such coincidences.

It is interesting to observe that in Caesar's reformed calendar, with the intercalary period (if we may call it that) reduced to one day in every four years, February 23, the day of the Terminalia, is again marked F. Is this an accident or the reminiscence of an old tradition going back to the second phase of Numa's calendar? In any case, a shifting nundinal system had come to stay, for the Romans were plagued by these same superstitions after 46 B. C.; and in Caesar's calendar there is no permutation device unless the reformer envisaged a long week at the end of the year. But few would, and no one did, apparently, accept

⁴⁰ Cf. Nilsson, *op. cit.*, p. 359.

the economic consequences of that, viz. the deletion of a market-day.

According to this reconstruction of the evidence, then, *nundinae* fell on F-days or were so intended to fall in the early calendars; and permutation devices, eventually corrupted for other uses, were invented to achieve this. But a serious question arises: why the awkward incidence of a market-day on the sixth day of a Roman week, if there was no other purpose in lettering the eight days? The word *nundinae* itself refers to something which happens on the ninth day, i. e. the eighth day in our method of reckoning, so that only A or H would appear to satisfy the real sense of the term. But once more an answer may be found, I think, in one of the superstitions about the *nundinae*, viz. that they were not to fall on the Nones: this suggests, as we have seen, that they never did in the earliest calendars; but it suggests also that some deliberate effort was made to distinguish Nones from *nundinae*. Why was this necessary?

Let us return to the problem of meshing an 8-day week with a 30-day lunation: the simplest way to do it is not the way of "Romulus," but the creation of a 4-month year with 30 days in each month, yielding a total of 120 days or exactly 15 Roman weeks. This sounds like a bold hypothesis, but there may be traces of such a calendar in the fact that, before the addition of January and February, we have, down to Imperial times, only four named months, March, April, May, and June; the rest were simply numbered from fifth to tenth. There is also good reason⁴¹ for regarding the Vestalia and related ceremonies of June 7-15 as year-terminating festivities; while the four-sided shape of the rural calendars, the *Menologia rustica*,⁴² suggests antecedents in the calendar of a quadripartite year.

Now in such a calendar there is no need for the Kalends-Nones-Ides system of dating, since each month has the same number of days and a Kalends or "calling" of the Nones as fifth, sixth,⁴³ or seventh of the month would have no purpose. The Nones, therefore, even if they exist to mark the moon's first quarter, do not have their later function in the calendar. I suggest, moreover, that *nundinae*—a word which has much the

⁴¹ See Fowler, *op. cit.*, pp. 151-4.

⁴² *C. I. L.*, I², 282.

⁴³ In 30-day months of pre-Caesarian calendars.

same meaning as Nones—were, to begin with, reckoned like the Nones in reference to a full moon which Ovid ⁴⁴ indicates was prominent in the early calendar. One suspects, however, that *nundinae*, unlike Nones, were reckoned progressively from the Ides, since Nundina, ⁴⁵ a goddess connected with the lustration and naming of infants, was worshipped on the ninth day after the birth of a male child. We have some indication of progressive dating from the Ides at least in the month of March, for the festival of Quinquatrus occurs five days after the Ides of that month, and Varro ⁴⁶ tells us that such was the significance of the word. Furthermore, Caesar's retention of the *ordo feriarum* after the Ides of each month ⁴⁷ indicates respect for an old tradition of dating *post Idus*.

Now the Ides of March is the date of the first great festival of the early Roman year, viz. that of Anna Perenna, which celebrates the conclusion of one cycle or *annus* and the beginning of another—in other words, it is the *dies natalis* of a Roman year. It is plausible, therefore, that the first *nundinae* of a Roman year should come eight days after the Ides of March as a sort of *dies lustricus* for the year itself; and it is no accident, I think, that this is the day of the first Tubilustrium, a festival which needs re-examination from this point of view. By normal reckoning ⁴⁸ the Ides would fall on March 14 and the Tubilustrium on March 22 of a 30-day month, i. e. on the sixth day of a Roman week; and all *nundinae* calculated from the Ides would likewise fall on the sixth day of every week in this 4-month year. Since 15 weeks mesh exactly with 4 lunations, March 6, the normal day for a Nones, is nundinal; but in this calendar there is no conflict since Nones, even if they exist, are invariable and meaningless for dating. But the introduction of Romulus' calendar, with its 304 days distributed over 10 months of unequal length, would require a "calling" of the Nones ⁴⁹ and some attempt to

⁴⁴ *Fasti*, III, 121.

⁴⁵ Macrobius, I, 16, 36.

⁴⁶ *Op. cit.*, VI, 14; cf. Festus, 254.

⁴⁷ Macrobius, I, 14, 9-12.

⁴⁸ I. e. with a *trinundinum* between the Ides and the last day of the month.

⁴⁹ Macrobius (I, 15, 12-13) states that the people assembled on the Nones to learn the *feriae* of that month, and adds that the Etruscans observed several Nones in a month because they saluted their king on

distinguish *nundinae* from Nones. This is accomplished by adding one day to March, thereby promoting the Nones from the sixth to the seventh day of the month. The *nundinae*, however, remain fixed as the sixth day of the first month and the sixth day of each week thereafter, and they are successfully distinguished from Nones of all later months by adding three more days to the year, two in alternate months, May and July, and one in October—not in September, the next alternate month, because doing so would create a nundinal Nones in that month! Once the distinction between Nones and *nundinae* has been so firmly established, it is natural that a superstition should arise against their coincidence in later calendars.

The market-day aspect of *nundinae* may well go back to the festival of Feronia⁵⁰ which fell on the Ides of November in later calendars, but, in a projection of this 4-month year, exactly on the Ides of March, i. e. contemporary with the festival of Anna Perenna, the starting-point of nundinal reckoning in such a calendar.⁵¹

One should also note what appears to be a significant coincidence of *nundinae* and *feriae* in this hypothetical calendar: not only the important festivals of Anna Perenna, Feronia,⁵² and Tubilustrium, but nine other festivals, all marked in the later

this day. Later on (I, 16, 33) he may be confusing Nones with *nundinae* when he says that people sacrificed to king Servius Tullius on the *nundinae*. All this, plus the statement about celebrating Servius Tullius' birthday on the Nones, may mean that the Kalends-Nones-Ides system of reckoning, along with the calendar of Romulus, was actually introduced from Etruria at the time of the Etruscan dynasty.

⁵⁰ Livy, I, 30.

⁵¹ The Etruscan connections of Feronia (see F. Altheim, *History of Roman Religion* [Dutton, New York, 1937], pp. 255-62), the Etruscan form of Junius (see H. J. Rose, *Ancient Roman Religion*, p. 70), the consecration of *nundinae feriae* to Jupiter, and the probable Latinity of Anna and Tubilustrium suggest a fusion of Etruscan and Latin elements, i. e. an Etruscan market-week and a Latin lunar month, to produce this 4-month calendar. This hypothesis would support the view that Rome had Etruscan as well as Latin beginnings.

⁵² It is interesting that neither the festival of Anna Perenna nor the festival of Feronia is recorded in capital letters in the published calendars: this only supports what we already knew, viz. that the so-called *fasti antiquissimi* were very ancient festivals still observed in later times; other festivals whose functions were obsolete, forgotten, or corrupted may have been just as old or older.

calendars with capital letters, would fall on F-days in this 4-month calendar if projected over a solar year. (See Table II.) In addition, more than half of all the *fasti* "*antiquissimi*" would fall on F-days in some calendar or other. (See Table III.)⁵³ This certainly suggests that F stood originally for something more than the sixth day of the week or something different from it, probably for *feriae*, or even for *fasti*,⁵⁴ just as *F* stands for *fastus* in the other set of symbols which we find on the Roman calendars. The word *nundinae* is, of course, a substantive, indicating its earlier use as a modifier, perhaps in the phrase used by Macrobius, viz. *nundinae feriae*. There is a real possibility, it seems to me, that F was simply an abbreviation for this phrase in the earliest stages of Roman chronology. If F is a ferial as well as a nundinal letter, it is plausible too that festivals in general are as old as the calendar in which they first fall on F-days; so here we may have a new clue to the relative antiquity of Roman *feriae*.

In summary, the nundinal system, soberly considered, yields some interesting propositions; a coherent reconstruction of the evidence, statistical, literary, and epigraphic, gives us some reason to believe that:

1. the nundinal letter was originally fixed as F; this was also a ferial letter;
2. we must postulate a 4-month year older than the year of Romulus;
3. the Saturnalia, like the period following the Terminalia, was intercalary in origin;
4. intercalation, in the beginning, was a permutation device adding days to the market-week, not days to the year;
5. early Roman chronology was dominated by a cyclic year; an awareness of this may increase our knowledge of Roman festivals and improve our understanding of Roman religion.

VAN L. JOHNSON.

TUFTS UNIVERSITY.

⁵³ It is interesting that many such festivals fall on even-numbered days in the earlier calendars, suggesting that the prejudice for odd numbers was of later origin.

⁵⁴ Is this the source of the old dispute (see Macrobius, I, 16, 28-36) as to whether *nundinae* are *feriae* or *fastae*? Gellius (XX, 1, 42) indicates that *nundinae* were originally *dies fasti*.

TABLE I

CALENDAR	MONTH	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H
4-Month	March	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
		25	26	27	28	29	30		
	June	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30
Romulus	March	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
		25	26	27	28	29	30	31	
	December	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30
Numa I	January	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
	February	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28
	March	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
	December	12	13	14	15	16	17	20	21
							18		
							19		
		22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29
Numa Ia	January			1	2	3	4	5	6
		23	24	25	26	27	28		
Numa II	January			1	2	3	4	5	6
		23	24	25	26	27	28	29	
	February								1
		18	19	20	21	22	23	*	*
		*	*	*	24	25	26	27	28
Republican	January	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
	February	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27
	November		1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Caesar	January	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	
	February	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25

TABLE II
NUNDINAE FERIAE
4-Month Calendar

MARTIUS March		PROJECTED July November	
Nonis	Vediovi	Nonae Caprotinae Palibus duobus Sacrificium Conso	
Idibus	Annae Perennae		Feroniae in Campo Feriae Iovi Iovi Epulum
X Kal.	Tubilustrium	Neptunalia	
APRILIS April		PROJECTED August December	
XVI Kal.	Fordicidia		Consualia
VIII Kal.	Vinalia	Volcanalia	Larentalia
MAIUS May		PROJECTED September January	
V Idus	Lemuria II		Agonia
JUNIUS June		PROJECTED October February	
III Nonas	Bellonae in Circo Flaminio	Mundus patet	
III Idus	Matralia	Fontinalia	

NOTE: This table shows all important festivals which would fall on F-days in the 4-month calendar: the inclusion of some may prove to be accidental, but for the most part the festivals in March proper must have been contemporaneous with or even related to the festivals of March in projection, etc.

TABLE III
FASTI "ANTIQUISSIMI"

On F-Days				On Non-F-Days	
Calendar					
4-Month	Romulus	Numa I	Numa II	Republican	Caesar
March					
	EQUIRIA I	EQUIRIA I	EQUIRIA I		LIBERALIA AGONIA I
TUBILUSTRIUM I				QUINQUATRUS	
April					
FORDICIDIA		FORDICIDIA	FORDICIDIA		CEREALIA PARILIA ROBIGALIA
VINALIA I		VINALIA I	VINALIA I		
May					
LEMURIA II	LEMURIA I			LEMURIA I	LEMURIA III AGONIA II TUBILUSTRIUM II

TABLE III—Continued.

On F-Days				On Non-F-Days	
Calendar					
4-Month	Romulus	Numa I	Numa II	Republican	Caesar
June					
MATRALIA	VESTALIA				
	MATRALIA	MATRALIA			
July					
NEPTUNALIA			POPULIFUGIA		LUCARIA I
			LUCARIA II		
				FURBINALIA	
August					
VOLCANALIA					PORTUNALIA
					VINALIA II
					CONSUALIA I
					OPICONSIVIA
					VOLTURNALIA
September					
October					
FONTINALIA					MEDITRINALIA
	FONTINALIA	FONTINALIA		FONTINALIA	ARMILUSTRIUM

TABLE III—Continued.

TABLE III—Continued.

4-Month	On F-Days			On Non-F-Days	
	Calendar				
	Romulus	Numa I	Numa II	Republican	Caesar
November					
December					
AGONIA III					
CONSUALIA II		SATURNALIA	SATURNALIA		
OPALIA					DIVALIA
LARENTALIA					
January					
AGONIA IV					CARMENTALIA I
February					
	LUPERCALIA		QUIRINALIA	LUPERCALIA	
FERALIA		TERMINALIA		TERMINALIA	REGIFUGIUM EQUIRIA II

Note how "Numa's" calendar in five cases restores F-day celebrations of 4-month-calendar festivals, while the calendar of "Romulus" never does so. This would lead me to regard the latter as an intruding calendar; see note 49.

THE SPIRITUAL ITINERARY OF VIRGIL'S AENEAS.

The *Aeneid* is not only a great legendary and political epic. It is also a great religious poem and Aeneas is a religious hero. For "the character of Aeneas is pivoted on religion; religion is the one sanction of his conduct. There is no appeal in the *Aeneid* to knowledge or reason or pleasure—always to the will of God."¹ To Aeneas the mission with which he is charged appears first and foremost as a religious mission: *sacra deosque dabo* (XII, 192). "Énée," says J. Perret, "est bien un héros religieux au sens où l'entendra plus tard le christianisme."²

But what is a religious hero? He is a man who senses, beyond earthly things, a Being or Power on whom he depends, to whom he is bound, and without whom he feels lonely and afraid in the world. He is a man who desires to enter into intimate contact with this Being. He is devout (*pius*), for devotion is the will to do promptly and lovingly the will of God. And this devotion shows itself outwardly in prayer and sacrifice, inwardly in the resolution to conform one's entire life to the known will of God.³ A religious hero is a man who is all this to a heroic degree.

Does Virgil's Aeneas conform to this ideal? And if so, is his personal religion static, or does it grow and deepen in the course of the poem? And if this be true, as I believe, what are the chief stages of his spiritual itinerary? The purpose of this essay is not to make of Aeneas a Christian saint, but rather to show him as a pre-Christian religious hero. For there are heights and depths in the Christian religious experience which even Virgil did not divine.

There can be no doubt that Aeneas is a religious hero of great stature. True, in some respects he is like a Homeric hero. He is a mighty warrior and leader of men, and the aura of heroic prowess encircles him. But the differences between the two types are more profound. To perform his task (*Romanam condere gentem*), to carry his *moles*, Aeneas needed spiritual

¹ W. Warde Fowler, *The Religious Experience of the Roman People* (London, 1922), p. 412.

² J. Perret, *Virgile, l'homme et l'œuvre* (Paris, 1952), p. 136.

³ Cf. A. J. Festugière, *Personal Religion among the Greeks* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1954), pp. 1 f.

qualities of a high order, especially *pietas*, the steady fulfillment of his duty to god and man. So he is *pius* Aeneas, *Troius Aeneas, pietate insignis et armis* (VI, 403). He is not a Stoic, though at times his words have a Stoic ring. To quote Perret again, "La pensée des dieux pénètre infiniment plus profond dans l'âme d'Enée; une affection positive le lie à eux."⁴ Without the god's (or gods') help he feels perplexed in the extreme; with his aid, he gains new light and feels new power for future ordeals.

Virgil is careful from the outset to set his hero in a different order of experience from that of Homer's heroes (I, 8-11):

Musa, mihi causas memora, quo numine laeso
quidve dolens regina deum tot volvere casus
insignem pietate virum, tot adire labores
impulerit. Tantaene animis caelestibus irae?

This is the mystery at the heart of things—and in the heart of Aeneas—the mystery of the suffering which falls on good, god-fearing men engaged in a Heaven-blessed task. *Sum pius Aeneas* is "not a piece of smug complacency" but "a poignant cry wrung from a tortured heart."⁵ As Austin finely says, commenting on IV, 393: "*Pius* is a complex word, a sensitive symbol of adherence to a personal ideal of devotion, which may nevertheless bring pain and sorrow . . . the epithet is eloquent of struggle and bewilderment and submission."⁶ *Mens immota manet, lacrimae volvuntur inanes* (IV, 449) perhaps best sum up this struggle and submission in the heart of Aeneas. All through the poem Aeneas is shown as a man of prayer, an *Orans*, with hands uplifted to Heaven, and offering sacrifice to supplicate or thank the gods.

But Aeneas is no mere puppet of the gods. He is intensely human in his greatness and his frailty. Until he returns from the Underworld he doubts and hesitates and almost loses hope, as in Sicily (V, 700 ff.); at Carthage he even falls from grace. But his conscience gives him no rest, and he obeys the god's command *dulcis relinquere terras*. Duty overmasters desire, and once again he is *pius* Aeneas.

⁴ *Op. cit.* (note 2), p. 136.

⁵ W. B. Anderson, *C. R.*, XLIV (1930), p. 4.

⁶ *P. Vergili Maronis Aeneidos Liber Quartus* (Oxford, 1955), p. 122.

In the first half of the poem Aeneas is a man of memories, a homeless man, haunted by the tragic past.⁷ He has indeed, by the gods' help, found a new faith in his destiny and a new hope, but his faith is often clouded and his hope dashed by new trials which ever beset his path. He has no cloud by day or pillar of fire by night to guide him, but only occasional omens and prophecies at decisive moments. Through most of the *Aeneid* his character is in a constant state of tension, involved in a tug of war between his heroic sense of duty to the gods and his human sensibilities. He believes in a Providence which shapes his ends, rough hew them how he will, but the cost in human suffering to himself and others is always before his eyes, to be exorcised only by renewed faith and hope, with the grace of Heaven. The nimbus he wears was bought only at a great price.

Aeneas is then a religious hero. But was he so from the beginning, or does his personal religion, his *pietas*, deepen as the poem moves on? In other terms, was Aeneas always close to his gods, always in the attitude of one who says, like St. Paul: "Lord, what wilt thou have me to do?", or, like Cleanthes: "Lead me, O Zeus, and thou my Destiny, to that one post which you will have me fill. I will follow gladly."⁸ Book II shows us the Aeneas that was, before he shoulders his burden of destiny. It is a drama of conversion. But from what to what? For the most part, we see only a soldier like Achilles, with a lust for fighting and a thirst for vengeance.⁹ He is at the mercy of his natural temperament and his fiery disposition, driven along by blind *furor* and *ira* like a savage wolf (II, 355 ff.). *Quid furis?* asks his mother of him, as he makes ready to slay Helen. And all this despite Hector's warning in a dream, despite the sight of Troy in flames, and even, for a while, despite his mother's words of revelation.

What is wrong with this Aeneas of Book II?¹⁰ His *pietas*

⁷ V. Pöschl, *Die Dichtkunst Virgils* (Innsbruck-Wien, 1950), pp. 57 f.

⁸ *Stoic. Vet. Fragm.*, I, No. 527. The verses quoted will also be found in *The Oxford Book of Greek Verse* (Oxford, 1930), No. 484.

⁹ Virgil was anxious to show that Aeneas, the ancestor of the Romans, was no traitor to his country, as some old stories had said, but a fighter who resisted to the last.

¹⁰ Cf. R. Allain, "Le merveilleux dans un épisode crucial de l'Énéide" in *Les Études Classiques*, XVII (1949), pp. 321 ff.; *idem*, "Une nuit spirituelle d'Énée" in *R. E. L.*, XXIV (1946), pp. 189 ff.

towards the gods seems eclipsed by *furor*; his *pietas* towards his family is forgotten, and only for his *patria*, now doomed and in flames, does he show any thought. It is magnificent in its own way, but what does it achieve? If character is the sum total of a man's moral virtues, grouped round the axis of will; if, for great achievement, what is most needed is not so much a strong will as a good will, guided by right reason, then Aeneas is here flawed in character and a plaything of his natural temperament and disposition. Blind instincts and hot passions run riot in him; prudence and temperance are notably absent. But happily he has other natural gifts; he is a piece of raw marble out of which the gods, with Aeneas' cooperation, will hew a beautiful character, once the scales fall from his eyes and a calmer mood prevails. Blind *furor* must give way to a new faith, despair to a new hope before he can become a vessel of election for the great task ahead. And this is the work of the gods who alone can unveil the future and inspire hope in a crushed heart. How is it accomplished?

The night of Troy's fall was for Aeneas a spiritual dark night of the soul. He sorely needed light with which to pierce beyond appearances to the truth of things. So first the gods send him a dream in which Hector—*lux Dardaniae*—appears and enlightens him: Troy is doomed; Aeneas must save his penates and find them a new city beyond the seas. But when he is awakened by the din of battle and sees the fires, he thinks only of fighting: *arma amens capio, nec sat rationis in armis* (II, 314). He knows now that Troy's cause is hopeless, but nonetheless he plunges on: *moriamur et in media arma ruamus* (II, 353). But what he knows he must see and feel to the depths of his being; what he realizes dimly or not at all—his future destiny—must be revealed to him. So Venus appears to him and plucks away the veil which dulls his mortal vision: the gods, yes even *ipse pater*, are overthrowing Troy: *eripe nate fugam finemque impone labori*. His own task is not finished but only beginning. But where and how? Aeneas bows to the inevitable and goes home. There the refusal of Anchises to flee brings on another access of despair: *arma viri, ferte arma; vocat lux ultima victos*. Aeneas is once again kicking against the goad, a prey to his feelings. Then Jupiter sends a sign, a comet with fiery tail (*multa cum luce*), marking the way he is to go: *signan-*

temque vias . . . dat lucem. It is a symbol of enlightenment for Aeneas and his father. They depart with the penates but meanwhile Creusa is lost. At last she appears to Aeneas and reveals the secret: *non haec sine numine divum eveniunt.* Exile awaits him, Hesperia, a new kingdom and wife—and in the end happiness. Back he goes to his father and finds there a band of fugitives, *miserabile vulgus.* The morning star appears, his mother's star, a symbol of hope. Troy is smoking and beyond all saving. *Cessi et sublato montis genitore petivi.* At long last he gives in to Fate and quits Troy for the hills of hope.

For Aeneas it has been a titanic interior struggle between his instincts as a fighter and his *pietas* in all its fullness, between his natural self and his higher self in all its reaches. He has suffered a staggering psychological shock which shakes him to the roots of his being. And what does he reap after his submission? A new faith and a new hope in the future; a new sense of his own inadequacy which we call humility. And all this has come from the gods whose will is law, those gods who alone can write straight with crooked lines, and who in the end fulfill their will: *fata viam invenient.*

Of St. Paul's conversion, Daniel-Rops writes thus: "His transformation was radical and complete. . . . In a single second on the desert trail God had conquered his adversary and bound him to Himself forever."¹¹ Can we say the same of Aeneas at the end of Book II? Has he really put off the old man and put on the new? Books III to V will show him tested like gold in a furnace of trials. And when, at the beginning of Book III, he leaves the shores *ubi Troia fuit*, his spiritual itinerary has begun.

Speaking of Christian perfection, ascetical writers lay down the principle that God, as a rule, leads souls to perfection only gradually, and that by three ways, not parallel but successive. A man must first walk the Purgative Way by purifying himself of past sins and faults; then, reformed, he must walk the Illuminative Way by practising virtue and imitating Christ, the Light of the World; finally, and always with God's grace, he arrives at the Unitive Way, the way of union with God through love. *Mutatis mutandis*, we may apply this doctrine to Aeneas' spiritual itinerarium.

¹¹ *Saint Paul* (English translation by J. Martin [Chicago, 1953]), p. 31.

He is *fato profugus* and what he most needs now is light. For this he constantly prays, at Delos, in Crete, at Buthrotum: *quem sequimur? quove ire iubet? ubi ponere sedes* (III, 88)? And his *pietas* is rewarded by the gods; their light shines more and more clearly in the darkness of his soul. Book III is a book of farewells to the past and looking towards the future—but still with many a backward glance and lingering doubt: *si quando Thybrim vicinaque Thybridis arva intraro* (III, 500-1). All through the book Aeneas and his comrades are weary, *fessi*, of pulling the oar, landing, building, and putting to sea again, with frustration gnawing at their hearts. No wonder Aeneas tells Andromache: *vivo equidem vitamque extrema per omnia duco* (III, 215). But, despite discouragement, his faith and fortitude are strong enough to carry him to Sicily.

On leaving Sicily for Italy, he and his men are assailed by the storm described in Book I and finally cast ashore on Africa. Aeneas consoles his dispirited men (I, 204-7):

Per varios casus, per tot discrimina rerum
tendimus in Latium, sedes ubi fata quietas
ostendunt; illic fas regna resurgere Troiae.
Durate et vosmet rebus servate secundis.

It is a fine speech, full of apparent faith and hopefulness, but his real feelings belie the confident words (I, 208-9):

Talia voce refert curisque ingentibus aeger
spem vultu simulat, premit altum corde dolorem.

Troy still fills his mind with its bitter-sweet memories and his heart with spasms of homesickness. Somewhere ahead lie the promised shores of Italy and a home for him and his penates—if only faith and hope hold out. But Aeneas' faith is sagging, as his speech to his goddess mother shows (I, 378 ff.): *sum pius Aeneas*. . . . Following the *fata*, he is in search of a home in Italy and yet Heaven and earth and sea seem to conspire against him. Venus cheers him and directs him to Carthage. Jupiter meanwhile has seen to it that Dido is filled with peaceful thoughts, while Venus weaves her wiles in favor of her son.

The stage is now set for Book IV and Aeneas' greatest temptation. Carthage offers a homeless man all that his heart yearns for: a beautiful, masterly woman as wife, a home after his wanderings, peace and quiet after the storm. He yields to its

appeal. Mercury finds him *fundantem arces ac tecta novantem*—at Carthage! His rebuke strikes home: *heu, regni rerumque oblite tuarum!* In the heart and conscience of Aeneas a sharp struggle has been going on between desire and duty, that same tension between his human emotions and *pietas* which had begun the night of Troy's fall. He obeys, but his victory over his desires is hardly won and leaves deep scars. Virgil's words, *at pius Aeneas*, says Austin, "contain all the anguish of his resignation to the unexplained and unexplainable bidding of God."¹² Now, more acutely than ever, Aeneas is face to face with the problem of pain and suffering, not merely the pain he suffers but even more the pain he inflicts on others by following the path of duty marked out by the gods. And this new realization puzzles and torments him. He has fallen from grace and allowed his faith in his destiny to be forgotten. But in the end, *pietas* reasserts itself and something like peace of heart visits him again: *Aeneas celsa in puppi iam certus eundi/ carpebat somnos. . . .* (IV, 554-5).

Driven back to Sicily by the winds, he celebrates there the anniversary of Anchises' death with games. The spiritual atmosphere in which he moves is one of joy (*laetitia*) after the traumatic experience at Carthage. Faith and hope seem revived again. But the sudden burning of the ships shows how unsteady is his faith, how frail his hope. He prays an agonized prayer to Jupiter and his prayer is answered by a downpour of rain. Nonetheless, Aeneas tosses on a great tide of doubt: *Siculisne resideret arvis / oblitus fatorum, Italasne capesseret oras* (V, 702-3). The "Cloud of Unknowing," spoken of by the medieval writer, threatens to close round him and engulf him in its darkness. But Jupiter does not forget his charge; he sends the wraith of Anchises to comfort and counsel his son, comfort which Aeneas has merited by his *pietas* to his father and his prayer to Jupiter. He then makes for Italy, much chastened in heart.

As we look back over the route thus far traversed by Aeneas—his Purgative Way—let us size up his spiritual stature. Virgil might have made of him another Achilles or Odysseus, or a dashing conquistador carrying all before him. Instead, he made

¹² *Op. cit.* (note 6), p. xv.

of him a tired, dust-covered pilgrim, a hero by the sole adhesion of his will to the commands of the gods, but otherwise one much like ourselves. His *pietas* to the gods has been sorely tried and sometimes found wanting. But he always picks himself up and pushes on. He still needs a *second* conversion; he needs more light and hope to nerve him for the task ahead, more interior force to say, as did St. Paul: "Forgetting the things that are behind, and stretching forward to those that are before, I press towards the goal . . ." (*Phil.* 3, 13-14). And the gods will help him to reach his goal in their appointed times.

At Cumae he reaches the Promised Land and the Way of Light through a dark Underworld. As MacKay has written: "the primary importance of the journey is that it represents a spiritual purification and illumination that fit him for his mighty task."¹³ But before he is enlightened he must be purified; he must recall and then dismiss the searing experiences which most haunt his memory. So the persons he meets in the Underworld are also symbols: Palinurus recalls the sorrows of the recent voyage, Dido his fall from grace at Carthage, Deiphobus the horrors of the last night at Troy. The sense of guilt and inadequacy which at times lies heavy on his spirit is exorcised, as MacKay says, by something like confession and absolution. His purgation is now well nigh complete and he is ready to walk the Way of Light.

Arrived at Elysium, Aeneas deposits the Golden Bough on the threshold and enters the region of light: *largior hic campos aether et lumine vestit/ purpureo . . .* Anchises awaits him there and tells him of the *Anima Mundi*. They mount the Hill of Vision and, at long last, Aeneas learns the full meaning of his mission: *te tua fata docebo*. After the Alban Kings comes Rome: *hanc aspice gentem / Romanosque tuos*. Now finally the great "Cloud of Unknowing" which had clung to him so long is dispelled; now he sees. And with light come enthusiasm and courage unfelt before: *incenditque animum famae venientis amore*. Leaving the Underworld, he makes upshore towards his goal. He is ready, or almost ready, for all contingencies.

¹³ "Three Levels of Meaning in *Aeneid* VI" in *T. A. P. A.*, LXXXVI (1955), pp. 180 ff.

In Latium the gods have made all ready for him. King Latinus gives him a kindly welcome. The Trojan envoys return from their visit to the king *pacemque reportant*. But then, at the bidding of Juno, the awful powers of Hell break upon Aeneas in the shape of Allecto. She does her fiendish work all too well: peace is no more, only *scelerata insania belli*. As Pöschl remarks: "Wollte Virgil seine Auffassung des Krieges als eines Höllenwerks, eines gottlosen Frevels und verbrecherischen Wahnsinns symbolisch darstellen."¹⁴ And, at the head of the Latin allies, marches the ominous figure of Mezentius, *contemptor divum*.

When, at Cumae, the Sibyl had uttered her sombre prediction of *bella, horrida bella*, Aeneas had answered, undismayed: *omnia praecepi atque animo mecum ante peregi* (VI, 105). But the fearful reality is too much for him: *Aeneas, tristi turbatus pectora bello, / procubuit seramque dedit per membra quietem* (VIII, 29-30). But Heaven does not fail him in this crisis. The god of the Tiber appears to him and promises his guidance and aid. So Aeneas journeys up the Tiber to Pallanteum and makes his first personal contact with Roman soil and the Roman spirit. His Unitive Way has begun.¹⁵

At Carthage, Aeneas had been surrounded by oriental comforts and luxury, and he had yielded to their spell (I, 695 ff.; IV, 261 ff.). At Pallanteum, he will be initiated into lessons of poverty and simplicity by *pauper* Evander. Aeneas is a prince from the East and his foes taunt him with being a soft, effeminate oriental (IV, 215 ff.; IX, 614 ff., XII, 97). He must be purified of the taint of his eastern origin and filled with a Roman contempt for *luxuria*. But more than this awaits him: vital contact with the living memory and cult of Hercules, the toiling benefactor of mankind. Hercules, it was said, had made his choice between the Way of Pleasure and the Way of Virtue, and he had received a reward exceeding great (VIII, 301). He had become the ideal symbol of human energy operating in the cause of suffering humanity. And he had delivered Pallanteum of Cacus, a monster of darkness. So Aeneas takes part in the cult at the *Ara Maxima* and hears the praises of Hercules sung.

¹⁴ *Op. cit.* (note 7), p. 51.

¹⁵ Cf. A. M. Guillemin, *Virgile, poète, artiste et penseur* (Paris, 1951), pp. 274 ff.; Pöschl, *op. cit.* (note 7), pp. 97 f.

At sundown, Evander leads him to his humble palace on the Palatine and invites him to enter, in words which unite the two themes of simplicity and Herculean virtue (VIII, 361-5):

haec inquit limina victor
Alcides subiit, haec illum regia cepit.
Aude, hospes, contemnere opes et te quoque dignum
finge deo, rebusque veni non asper egenis.

And yet, on the morrow, even after Evander's promise of aid, Aeneas' heart is again flooded with despondent thoughts of the wars to come: *multaque dura suo tristi cum corde putabant* (VIII, 522). Virgil well knew, as Miss Guillemin observes, that the élan of conversion does not come from without merely, but from within the heart, and every genuine conversion supposes the miracle of a divine intervention.¹⁶ A sign comes from Heaven, given by Jupiter at the request of Venus: lightning and thunder, trumpet blasts, and armor glancing amid a miraculous cloud. *Of a sudden*, Aeneas is inwardly transformed: *ego poscor Olympo*, and now he sees the wars to come in the perspective of final victory. He is like one lifted out of and above his former self. By the grace of Heaven he has become in spirit a great Roman. To make all plain, Virgil ends the book with a symbolic gesture. Aeneas stands admiring the shield on which are pictured prophetic scenes of Roman history, culminating in the triumph of Augustus. Then he shoulders the shield, *attollens umero famamque et fata nepotum*. Now at last he is spiritually mature and, as it were, confirmed in grace.

In the light of this analysis, it is hardly true (as some have thought) that Aeneas' *spiritual* formation is completed by the end of Book VI.¹⁷ It is true that, when he leaves the Underworld, his *moral* character is firmly settled; he has achieved unity within himself. Moreover, he feels renewed faith and hope in his mission. On the surface, nothing more is wanting to him; he is now a heroic character who, by heroic deeds, will lay the foundations of eternal Rome. And yet Book VIII shows that Virgil felt that something *was* still wanting to Aeneas to make him a *religious* hero, endowed with *spiritual* energy equal

¹⁶ *Op. cit.* (note 15), p. 279.

¹⁷ This is more or less the opinion of C. M. Bowra, *From Virgil to Milton* (London, 1945), p. 63, and of Fowler, *op. cit.* (note 1), pp. 422 ff.

to his destined task. Despite the help of Heaven vouchsafed him up to now, he still feels at times terribly alone in a world that seems leagued against him (cf. VIII, 26 ff.); despite the example of Hercules and the assistance of Evander, he feels despondent in the face of perils ahead (VIII, 520 ff.). And what he needs he now receives from Heaven as a reward for his *pietas*: he is endued with power from above, filled with a spiritual élan which suddenly transforms him into a new man, a *nova creatura*, a Roman Hercules. Now, but not before, he can say: "When I am weak, I am strong," but only with a strength given him from on high. This new spiritual energy St. Paul will call *grace* ("By the grace of God I am what I am"), the power of the Spirit, dwelling and working *within* man. Virgil lacked a precise word for this new power and a precise idea of its workings, but in Book VIII he seems to be groping towards it. For centuries men had been feeling the need of God, the desire to be united with Him and to sense His presence and His power in their lives. Some had sought this union with the divine through the mystery cults, others through philosophy. Virgil, too, while writing the *Aeneid*, had evidently pondered long on this question of the relation between man and the divine, and, as Miss Guillemin says, "c'est merveille que Virgile ait fait preuve en ces matières délicates d'une telle sûreté. Son prechristianisme est encore pauvre, incomplet, mais rien n'y détonne; s'il manque quelque chose, il n'y a rien à en éliminer."¹⁸

During the rest of the poem Aeneas never fails in his task. His *pietas* and *humanitas* are sorely tried in the crucible of war; the old tension between his human feelings and sense of duty reappears momentarily at the deaths of the young Lausus and Pallas. But, after he bids a sad farewell to the corpse of Pallas, he turns his face to warfare again: *nos alias hinc ad lacrimas eadem horrida belli / fata vocant; . . . nec plura effatus ad altos / tendebat muros . . .* (XI, 96 ff.). Even when the truce is broken and he is wounded and all seems lost, he is *lacrimis immobilis*. Cured by the aid of Venus, he sets out for battle with a few last, sad words which sum up his life: *Disce puer virtutem ex me verumque laborem / fortunam ex aliis* (XII, 435-6), words which show, perhaps, to quote Perret, "du coeur

¹⁸ *Op. cit.* (note 15), p. 282.

humain la connaissance la plus profonde, l'existence de ces niveaux intérieurs, à peine communiquant, par où la certitude la plus radieuse n'exclut pas que règne aussi chez le même homme la confusion et les ténèbres."¹⁹

We may regret that Virgil had not behind him some centuries of Christian religious experience to give him a deeper knowledge of the *vie intérieure* of the spirit of man and a surer grasp of divine operations. The gods of Virgil are not the Christ of the New Testament, nor is *pious* Aeneas a Christian saint. But we may well be grateful for what we have from him: a profound and moving study, in magnificent poetry, of the mysteries of man's conscience and the labyrinthine ways of the human heart.

FRANCIS A. SULLIVAN, S. J.

ST. ANDREW-ON-HUDSON.

¹⁹ *Op. cit.* (note 2), p. 139.

Two and three generations ago the orations of Isaeus were widely studied by philologists as leading examples of a down-to-earth Attic style, and diligently combed by historians for their wealth of mundane data on Athenian legal and political institutions. If Isaeus is no longer in the forefront of classical studies,² the probable reasons for this neglect are not far to seek. In the first place, these wrangles over inheritances are too drearily materialistic to appeal to today's belletristic literary tastes; secondly, their intricacies and complexities are forbidding;³ and finally there is, I suspect, something of a feeling—a mixture of awe and relief—that Wyse's massive edition with its minute text criticism and exhaustive commentary has left little more to be done. This last feeling is reinforced when one observes how completely the subsequent editions of Isaeus are based upon Wyse.

Thus Wyse remains after more than half a century the standard edition of Isaeus, the starting point of all further discussion. That further discussion will sometimes lead to conclusions

¹ This paper is a by-product of a study undertaken with financial assistance from the Penrose Fund of the American Philosophical Society, which is here acknowledged with gratitude.

The following abbreviations will be used: Wyse = W. Wyse, *The Speeches of Isaeus* (Cambridge University Press, 1904). Roussel = P. Roussel, *Isée: Discours* (Paris, "Les Belles Lettres," 1922). Forster = E. S. Forster, *Isaeus, with an English Translation* (London, Heinemann, 1927 [Loeb Classical Library]).

² *L'année philologique* shows only five articles on Isaeus and a word-list of his orations in the last ten years.

³ For example, a basic issue in disputes over inheritances is, of course, nearness of kin. A glance at the ramose genealogical charts for Oration 5 and 11 in Wyse and Forster is enough to impress the reader with the complexity of the family relationships involved. In Oration 11 "twenty-three members of the family are referred to by name, and it is necessary to trace the family's ramifications through a large number of second cousins whose nearness of consanguinity is in some cases affected by the intermarriage of first cousins. The facts of the case are not easy to follow even on paper, and it appears that the judges on this occasion were puzzled into giving a wrong verdict"—J. F. Dobson, *The Greek Orators*, p. 107.

different from Wyse's inheres in the nature of the case: *humanum est errare*. As M. I. Finley, for example, appositely remarks in his recent monograph on land and credit in Athens, "The classic demonstration of the technique of argumentation in the orators is still Wyse, *Isaeus*, though one may question his firm belief that Isaeus never had a client who was in the right."⁴

Wyse makes his attitude on this point clear in the opening words of his Preface: "The character of Isaeus was regarded with suspicion in antiquity. . . . in the Augustan age the judgment of orthodox criticism was summed up by Dionysius of Halicarnassus in these words: *πρὸς μὲν τὸν ἀντίδικον διαπονηρέυεται, τοὺς δὲ δικαστὰς καταστρατηγεῖ, τοῖς δὲ πράγμασιν, ὑπὲρ ὧν ὁ λόγος, ἐκ παντὸς πειρᾶται βοηθεῖν*."⁵ The leading purpose of this edition is to show by analysis of the extant speeches that ancient scholars had a [just] appreciation of the orator's art. . . ." Wyse has carried out that purpose brilliantly, laying bare on page after page the orator's unscrupulousness, insincerity, fraud.⁶ But in his concentration on detecting every evidence of Isaeian deceit, his suspicious skepticism becomes so all-pervasive that he sometimes sees trickery or deception where none is involved.

An instance of this kind occurs at § 50 of the speech *On the Estate of Hagnias* (Oration 11). The speaker says *ἐλθούργων*, "I performed liturgies." Wyse argues in a lengthy footnote that "this is nothing but a *lusus verborum*."⁷ The editions of Rousset and of Forster, though they indulge in relatively few footnotes, both include one-sentence digests of Wyse's note.⁸ The point is thus regarded as one of some importance, and as settled. But a reexamination of the facts and of Wyse's arguments will, I think, lead to the opposite conclusion, viz. that *ἐλθούργων* is here a guileless statement of fact, to be taken at face value.

⁴ M. I. Finley, *Studies in Land and Credit in Ancient Athens, 500-200 B. C.*, p. 211, n. 34. Another kind of flaw in Wyse's approach is signalized *ibid.*, p. 237, n. 16.

⁵ "He deals unfairly with his opponent, outwits the jurors, and tries every means to help the business with which the speech deals." The quotation is from *De Isaeo* 3.

⁶ See Wyse, *passim*, especially pp. 276, 396, 406, 453, 673-74.

⁷ Wyse, pp. 712-13.

⁸ Forster's and Rousset's notes are quoted below, pp. 166-7 and note 18.

The speeches of the Attic orators reveal a number of stock pleas that they used in appealing for the favor and sympathy of the juries. One of those was for the speaker to cite the liturgies (if any) performed for the state by himself and his family. Where the list of such public services was long and impressive, the speaker would enumerate, often in great detail; where the record of such services was so modest that enumeration would be anti-climactic, the speaker made do with a brief assertion of the performance of liturgies, without further specification.⁹ This being the case, when the speaker says *ἐλγτούργουν* in Isaeus, 11, 50, the burden of proof surely falls upon the modern commentator who would argue the invalidity or insincerity of the assertion.

The setting for the text under examination is this: The speaker is one Theopompus, who in a previous lawsuit had been the victor among several claimants to the estate of Hagnias. As defendant in the present proceedings he has been reviewing the extent and value of his property, to impress the jury with its modesty compared with his opponent's. Now Theopompus' wife had had two brothers, Chaereleos and Macartatus, both childless. First the one, then the other had died, leaving a property at Prospalta. The text then continues (§§ 49-50):

καταλειφθέντος δὲ τοῦ Προσπαλτοῦ χωρίου καὶ γιγνομένου τῆς ἐκείνων ἀδελφῆς, ἐμῆς δὲ γυναικός, ἐπέισθην ὑπ' ἐκείνης εἰσποιήσαι Μακαρτάτῳ τὸν ἕτερον τῶν παίδων· οὐχ ἵνα μὴ¹⁰ λητουργοίην, εἰ προσγένειτό μοι τοῦτο τὸ χωρίον. ὁμοίως γὰρ καὶ εἰσποιήσαντος τοῦτό γ' ὑπῆρχεν· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐλγτούργουν διὰ τοῦτό γ' ἦττον οὐδέν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν εἰσφερόντων ἦν καὶ τῶν τὰ προσταττόμενα ὑμῖν ἅπαντα ποιούντων.

⁹ A parallel passage to 11, 50 in the concluding section of Oration 4 occasions this apt comment from Wyse (p. 396): "Athenian pleaders, aware of the frailties of their audience, knew that extraneous considerations of this sort were not to be neglected, especially in a peroration. What in this case is notable is the orator's moderation; probably his material was meagre, Thrasippus' family not having distinguished themselves by lavish expenditure on choruses and triremes. With what exuberance Isaeus can amplify this topic, even when most irrelevant to the issue, will appear in v. 35 sqq., vii. 37 sqq."

¹⁰ The sense, as all modern editors agree, requires the *μὴ* to be placed here, instead of in the next sentence (before *εἰσποιήσαντος*), where the MSS have it.

I translate as follows, attempting to keep the flavor of the original:

The property at Prospalta being left and devolving to their sister, my wife, I was persuaded by her to give one of our sons in adoption to Macartatus¹¹—not lest I have to perform liturgies if this property should accrue to me. For this was just the same even after I arranged the adoption:¹² I performed liturgies none the less on this account certainly—indeed¹³ I was among the payers of the property-tax and the performers of all your mandates.

Let us now examine Wyse's arguments in order.¹⁴ First, his statement of the problem: "Theopompus has said in § 40 that the property he inherited from his father did not render him liable to *λητουργία*, and in § 44 has reckoned the value of his land and house at 1 t. 10 m., an amount which is universally considered less than the minimum census for these public burdens. What then can he mean by saying 'even without the estate of Macartatus, transferred to my son, I still had to perform public services' (*τοῦτό γ' ὑπῆρχεν* sc. *λητουργεῖν*)?"

Wyse's answer to the question falls into two parts.

I. "Schoemann meets the difficulty by adding in the estate of Hagnias, said in § 44 not to be worth more than 2 t., thus bringing up the property of Theopompus to a sum which certainly constituted an *οὐσία* *λητουργοῦσα*.¹⁵ But the estate of

¹¹ On such adoption to continue the otherwise extinct family of a dead man, see e.g. P. Gide and E. Caillemer in Daremberg-Saglio, I, p. 77; T. Thalheim in Pauly-Wissowa, I, col. 397; K. F. Hermann-T. Thalheim, *Lehrbuch der griechischen Rechtsaltertümer*, pp. 68-9; M. H. E. Meier-G. F. Schömann-J. H. Lipsius, *Das attische Recht und Rechtsverfahren*, pp. 508-9.

¹² Or does he mean "For this (property) continued to belong to me just the same even after I gave (my son) in adoption"? In that case we should expect to find *μοι* with *ὑπῆρχεν*. But the double reiteration of *τοῦτο* makes one wonder whether there is a *double entendre* here. It may be noted that in §§ 44-6 Theopompus emphasizes (twice) that the Prospalta property is his son's, yet he lists it as part of his own *οὐσία*.

¹³ The "progressive" use of *ἀλλά* is instanced in J. D. Denniston, *The Greek Particles*², pp. 21-2.

¹⁴ Wyse, pp. 712-13, the essential parts of which are quoted hereafter.

¹⁵ Wyse cross-refers here to his note to § 40, 5-6. The older studies and handbooks, to which he there refers, concluded that an Athenian

Hagnias is a recent acquisition, and, as Theopompus says (§ 45), 'not yet secure.'

Wyse's objection to Schoemann is surely without foundation in fact or logic. In §§ 45-6 Theopompus injects the remark that his possession of Hagnias' estate "is not yet safe" because lawsuits are still pending against him which, if successful, will have the effect of throwing the award of Hagnias' estate back into court for reconsideration. Since Theopompus is attempting here to minimize the total of his property, this is a skilful piece of rhetoric. But its legal significance is nil: Wyse has here himself fallen victim to Isaeus' innuendo. For the fact is that, whatever the future may bring, Theopompus is now the legal possessor of the estate of Hagnias and as such he includes it when itemizing his property (§ 44, cf. 46).¹⁶ Moreover, disputes over inheritances were often revived in Athens for years on end—sometimes even into a second generation, as in the case of this estate of Hagnias.¹⁷ Under these conditions Wyse's assumption that the successor to an estate could not exercise possessory rights so long as challenges to his title subsisted is a patent absurdity against which fiscal as well as private interests cry out.

It is worth noting in passing that Forster, in adopting Wyse's position, compounds the error. "Theopompus," he writes, "has already stated that his fortune did not render him liable to

was liable to liturgic service if his total wealth (*οὐσία*) exceeded a certain minimum. On the basis of this oration and Demosthenes, 27, 64, the minimum has been variously calculated as

2 talents: V. Thumser, *De civium Atheniensium muneribus*, p. 54

ca. 3 talents: A. Boeckh, *Die Staatshaushaltung der Athener*³, I, pp. 145, 537, 561; II, p. 111, n. 756 (by M. Fränkel)

more than 3 talents: G. F. Schömann-J. H. Lipsius, *Griechische Alterthümer*, I, p. 502; L. Whibley, *Companion to Greek Studies*, p. 495; G. Busolt-H. Swoboda, *Griechische Staatskunde*, p. 839, n. 1.

More recent studies have emphasized that, at least for the major liturgies such as the trierarchy, the liturgists were selected from a fixed number of the richest citizens, without regard to any minimum fortune: cf. U. Kahrstedt, *Staatsgebiet und Staatsangehörige in Athen*, p. 218, nn. 2, 3; H. Strasburger in Pauly-Wissowa, XIII A, col. 112.

¹⁶ At the time of the speech Theopompus had been in possession of the estate for at least a year or two (cf. Wyse, p. 677), and possibly for a very much longer period: cf. Finley, *op. cit.* (note 4), p. 249, n. 28.

¹⁷ Cf. Finley, *op. cit.*, pp. 57, and 249, n. 28.

perform any λειτουργία . . . he is, therefore, here using the term in the wider sense of the duties of a citizen (*e. g.*, the payment of the war-tax and service in the army)."¹⁸ But in that earlier statement (§ 40) to which Forster refers Theopompus was talking about the small estate that he and his brother had inherited from their father (τὰ ὑπάρξαντα πατρῷα); since that time both brothers had increased their financial worth most substantially (§§ 40-50).

II. Wyse continues: "The fact is that Isaeus is fudging. He goes on to say οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐλγούργουν διὰ τοῦτό γ' οὐδὲν ἦττον ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν εἰσφερόντων ἦν καὶ τῶν τὰ προσταττόμενα ὑμῖν ἅπαντα ποιούντων. This is nothing but a *lusus verborum*. Payment of the war-tax (εἰσφορά) may be called performance of a public duty (λειτουργεῖν), but it was not a λειτουργία in the technical sense, which the argument requires [my italics]. . . . The verb λειτουργεῖν is sometimes applied rhetorically even to military service, which was the duty of every able-bodied male citizen."

By his own admission, then, Wyse wants to reverse the sense that the text requires. There is no doubt that *leitourgia* and its related terms are sometimes used rather loosely. Originally *termini technici* for a group of public functions that wealthy Athenians were required to perform at their own expense, these terms came in the fourth century B. C. to be used increasingly in a more generalized sense, designating first *any* service to the community and eventually a service for *anyone's* benefit.¹⁹ A good example of this generalized sense can be quoted from Isaeus himself: ἡγοῦμαι μεγίστην εἶναι τῶν λειτουργιῶν τὸν καθ' ἡμέραν βίον κόσμιον καὶ σώφρονα παρέχειν.²⁰

The difficulty, then, is not that Isaeus does not use *leitourgia*

¹⁸ Forster, p. 424, n. b. Roussel's note, p. 205, n. 3, gives an accurate summary of Wyse's position: "Isée paraît jouer sur les mots et désigner par λειτουργεῖν non pas les liturgies selon le sens ordinaire du mot (triérarchie, chorégie), auxquelles Théopompus ne semble pas avoir été astreint (cf. §§ 40 et 44); mais simplement le paiement des contributions de guerre et le service militaire."

¹⁹ The general semantic history of λειτουργία κτλ. is a subject with which I propose to deal in a separate article.

²⁰ "The greatest of public services is, in my opinion, leading an orderly and temperate daily life." This is fragment 30 in Thalheim's edition, 131 in Sauppe's, 35 in Forster's. Cf. also 4, 29, quoted in note 21.

in the generalized sense. But Wyse's attempt to apply that sense to the text under discussion begs the question. It is true that the *eisphora*, a tax based on capital, was not a *leitourgia*. But Isaeus does not here treat it as if it was; the juxtaposition of the two terms does not equate them.²¹ What Theopompus says in outline, is: "I continued to serve in liturgies, pay *eisphora*, and perform all *prostattomena*." This last is, as Wyse himself states in another place, "a technical term of Athenian politics for 'duties' laid on the rich, especially the war-tax, the trierarchy, and the normal public services (*αἱ ἐγκύκλιοι λειτουργίαι*)."²² Moreover, the same combination of *leitourgia*, *eisphora*, and *prostattomena* is used by Isaeus to summarize the speaker's civic services also in 4, 27 and 7, 39-40, and in the latter instance, at least, he leaves no doubt that genuine liturgy is involved. The parallelism of these texts is too striking to be ignored.

My conclusion from the foregoing considerations²³ is that Wyse's judgment (concurrent in by Roussel and Forster) on the liturgies of Theopompus must be reversed, and Isaeus' Eleventh Speech restored to the roster of legitimate evidence on the history and conditions of compulsory public service in the Athenian city-state.

NAPHTALI LEWIS.

BROOKLYN COLLEGE.

²¹ The mention of *eisphora* and *leitourgiai* side by side as evidences of civic virtue is a commonplace in the Attic orators: see e.g. Antiphon, *First Tetr.*, 2, 12 and 3, 8; Lysias, 7, 31; 19, 29; 20, 23; Isocrates, 15, 145; Isaeus, 5, 45; Demosthenes, 8, 70; 18, 257; 27, 64; 42, 3. The generalized sense of *leitourgia* (cf. note 20) can, of course, include *eisphora*; there is such an instance in Isaeus, 4, 29: οὐτε στρατεῖαν οὐδεμίαν ἐστράτευται οὐτε εἰσφορὰν οὐδεμίαν εἰσενήνοχε . . . οὐτ' ἄλλ' οὐδὲν ὑμῖν λελητούργηκεν.

²² Wyse, p. 398.

²³ An additional consideration may occur to the reader, namely that, since the performance of liturgies was a matter of public record (e.g. *I. G.*, II², 1604-32, 2318, 3025-72), it would have been suicidal for Theopompus to make a claim of liturgic service that could be revealed in rebuttal to be a flat lie or a deliberate deception. This would indeed be a telling argument in favor of the position I have taken in this paper, if it could be substantiated. The difficulty is that most types of public (as distinguished from private) actions, to which class Isaeus' Eleventh Speech belongs, appear to have been conducted without rebuttal speeches: cf. E. Caillemer in Daremberg-Saglio, II, p. 1656; Meier-Schömann-Lipsius, *op. cit.* (note 11), pp. 910-11.

THE EARLIEST RHETORICAL HANDBOOKS.

We generally think of Greek rhetorical theory as having been begun in Sicily by two shadowy figures named Corax and Tisias to fill some practical need of the new democracy and as developed by sophists at Athens during the last few decades of the fifth century. Gorgias serves as a convenient link between the practical rhetoric of Sicily and the sophistry of Athens, though we know that many features of formal rhetoric, both logical and stylistic, were known in Athens before the arrival of Gorgias in 427 B. C. Still, Protagoras and Prodicus, for all their interest in words, are not thought of as rhetoricians and Gorgias, for all his interest in epistemology, is. Succeeding sophists like Thrasymachus, Theodorus, Polus, and Alcidamas mostly continued the interest in rhetoric.

Although some of the sophists made use of the question and answer method of instruction adopted by Socrates¹ their more characteristic educational device, whatever the subject at hand, was the speech, often flamboyant, long or short, in which the sophist undertook to demonstrate his point artistically. Sometimes a myth would be used, sometimes the technique was an indirect one in which all possibilities were enumerated, all but one disposed of, and the last accepted as necessarily valid. Sometimes the audience was asked to choose the form of the sophist's demonstration.² The subject might be literally anything. Examples of sophistic orations are the one in Plato's *Protagoras*, the two extant complete speeches of Gorgias: *Helen* and *Palamedes*, the *Ajax* and *Odysseus* of Antisthenes, and the *Odysseus* of Alcidamas. All of them illustrate methods of speech and make use of logical and stylistic devices of interest to the student of rhetoric, and most of them even pretend to be addressed to a jury in a court of law. Sophistic instruction was largely oral, but such speeches could be copied down and serve as examples of oratory to be studied or imitated or quarried for commonplaces by the sophist's pupils, who thus acquired not only the master's

¹ Cf. John H. Finley, Jr., "Euripides and Thucydides," *H. S. C. P.*, XLIX (1938), p. 56.

² Types of sophistic discourse can be seen in Socrates' encounters with sophists, cf. especially *Protagoras* 320 C.

theory of oratorical partition, but of the development of ideas, of style, and perhaps of delivery and memorization, thus including all of the parts of later rhetoric. We see this system of education in operation in the opening pages of Plato's *Phaedrus*. Lysias has delivered a sophistic oration which Phaedrus has heard and of which he has apparently secured the autograph (228 A 5 ff.) to study with the hope of improving his own technique of speech.

In many speeches of this type—the two by Gorgias, for example—the subject matter was apparently of only incidental importance—a fact which awakened the opposition of Socrates. The technique was the thing: the sophist is purely rhetorician, and his speech is a declamation not unlike those in vogue later at Rome. Speeches of this type are to be distinguished from serious expositions of an idea like Protagoras' speech or the pamphlets in oratorical form by Isocrates. In these latter the subject matter definitely counted very much; in the former it was subordinate to the method of demonstration and expression.

In the corpus of the ten Attic orators only the three tetralogies of Antiphon are certainly to be regarded as having been written to furnish models of oratory.³ They clearly do not refer to specific occasions and are excellent illustrations of argument. In actual court room use they would be considerably developed, partly by introduction of specific facts, partly by development of commonplaces, and probably an orator would prefer to choose material from more than one model in composing an actual speech. There was, thus, no reason why the collection of examples should be a collection of complete speeches. We know that collections of introductions and conclusions were made by Antiphon,⁴ Critias,⁵ Cephalus,⁶ and Thrasymachus,⁷ and the

³ Perhaps this is because with the appearance of judicial handbooks, as described below, the need for complete speeches to illustrate *topoi* and arrangement was past. The speech against the stepmother (Antiphon, I) as well as Lysias VI and IX and the forensic orations of Isocrates have sometimes been regarded as exercises rather than as real speeches, cf. R. C. Jebb, *The Attic Orators* (London, 1893), I, pp. 65, 229, and 281 and II, p. 7.

⁴ Cf. Ludwig Radermacher, "Artium Scriptores," *Wien. Sitzb.*, CCXXVII, 3 (1951), B X 13-15.

⁵ Cf. *ibid.*, B XVII 1.

⁶ Cf. *ibid.*, B XVIII 1.

⁷ Cf. *ibid.*, B IX 1.

Demosthenic corpus⁸ contains a collection of prooemia for political speeches. This last is important, for the collections were by no means restricted to judicial oratory. One of the sources of appeal of such instruction was its applicability to all types of oratory and to political or philosophical discussions. The wealthy pupils of the sophists regarded themselves as the future governors and philosophers of the state and demanded a set of commonplaces appropriate for their manifold interests.

Three passages in ancient authors are important for an understanding of the place of sophistic specimen speeches in Greek intellectual history. The first is the very end of Aristotle's *Sophistical Refutations*. Aristotle compares (183 b 36) the educational technique of Gorgias with the training given by teachers of eristic up until his time. The student was, he says, assigned ready-made speeches to memorize, as though a shoemaker were to try to teach his art by presenting his student with an assortment of shoes. Such a teacher communicates not art but the product of art. Aristotle is trying to create a systematic art of eristic to replace this unscientific approach; the beginning is difficult, he says (183 b 23), but once started the theory of the art will grow in bulk. This is what has happened in rhetoric. Opposed to the unscientific techniques of Gorgias is the theory of rhetoric which has been developed gradually by Tisias, Thrasymachus, Theodorus, and numerous others. Aristotle is here speaking solely of the existence of the theory; he is not saying anything about its exposition in written form.

A second passage treating of the beginnings of rhetorical theory is that in Cicero's *Brutus* 46 ff., which claims to be drawn from Aristotle, presumably from the *Συναγωγή Τεχνῶν*, the lost summary of early rhetorical theory.⁹ Cicero here says "artem et praecepta Sículos Coracem et Tisiam conscripsisse," that is, they wrote down an account of their theory, if we can trust the verb which apparently represents a Greek *συγγράφειν*. Cicero continues:

scriptasque fuisse et paratas a Protagora rerum illustrium disputationes, qui nunc communes appellantur loci;

⁸ Cf. A. Rupprecht, "Die demosthenische Prooemiensammlung," *Philol.*, LXXXII (1927), pp. 365 ff.

⁹ Cf. A. E. Douglas, "The Aristotelian *Συναγωγή Τεχνῶν* after Cicero, *Brutus*, 46-48," *Latomus*, XIV (1955), pp. 536 ff.

quod idem fecisse Gorgiam, quem singularum rerum laudes vituperationesque conscripsisse, quod iudicaret hoc oratoris esse maxime proprium, rem augere posse laudando vituperandoque rursus affligere; huic Antiphontem Rhamnusium similia quaedam habuisse conscripta. . . .

These collections of commonplaces are clearly not to be described as *ars* or *praecepta*, and they are thus not, as Gereke thought,¹⁰ the only form of rhetorical handbook. Cicero resumes "nam (but) Lysiam primo (in Athens or else after Corax and Tisias) profiteri solitum artem esse dicendi; deinde, quod Theodorus esset in arte subtilior, in orationibus autem ieiunior, orationes eum scribere aliis coepisse, se arte¹¹ removisse." *Ars* (τέχνη) therefore means two things: in general the theory of the rhetoricians, whether expounded orally or in writing, and specifically a written exposition thereof. There are, moreover, two traditions among the early rhetoricians: the theoretical, according to both the above accounts including Tisias and Theodorus, and the tradition of the exemplar or collection of commonplaces, according to both accounts including Gorgias. There was, of course, some overlapping. Antiphon had a τέχνη, oral and written, as well as writing exemplars, both whole speeches and collections of commonplaces.¹²

The separate traditions are even more clearly distinguished in Isocrates' *Against the Sophists*. Isocrates, who disapproves of all educators except himself, divides his opponents into three types: the first (§§ 1-8) are the teachers of disputation, the sophists in the usual modern sense of the word. The second (9-13) are the teachers of political discourse. Section twelve makes it clear that these men taught by means of commonplaces or "elements" as Isocrates calls them. The third type (19-20) are "those who lived before our time and dared to write the

¹⁰ Cf. A. Gereke, "Die alte τέχνη ῥητορική und ihre Gegner," *Hermes*, XXXII (1897), p. 348. In reply cf. Peter Hamberger, *Die rednerische Disposition in der alten τέχνη ῥητορική* (Paderborn, 1914); Stanley Wilcox, "The Scope of Early Rhetorical Instruction," *H. S. C. P.*, LIII (1942), pp. 137 f.; and Friedrich Solmsen, rev. of Radermacher, *Gnomon*, XXVI (1954), pp. 214 f.

¹¹ Adopting the textual suggestion of A. E. Douglas, "A Further Note on Cicero, Brutus, 48," *Latomus*, XVI (1957), p. 461.

¹² Cf. Radermacher, *op. cit.* (*supra*, n. 4), B X.

so called arts." These men taught how to conduct law suits and apparently nothing more.

It seems probably that one of the more remarkable features of Isocrates' own school was the way he combined theoretical exposition, the study of examples, and continual practice.¹³ The best picture of the pure theoretical tradition is the passage in the *Phaedrus* of Plato (266 D 5 ff.) in which Phaedrus reminds Socrates of the contents of the "books on the art of words." Socrates then begins with the contents of the prooemium and passes through the traditional parts of the *judicial* speech: the narration, the separate parts of the proof or refutation, and the epilogue. Since many later treatises follow this organization in at least part of their contents, it seems clear that we are to think of these handbooks as consisting of a discussion of each of the parts of the speech in turn. Under proof was discussed the argument from probability and, since Plato inserts here mention of means of amplification, perhaps we are to think of these too as included in the handbooks of this type at this point. Plato's summary is confirmed by Aristotle's statement (*Rhetoric* 1354 b 18 ff.) that handbook writers before his time were concerned with the parts of the speech.

These handbooks were, moreover, devoted entirely to judicial oratory. Stanley Wilcox was perfectly correct in insisting in an article in the *Harvard Studies*¹⁴ that instruction in rhetoric in the fifth and early fourth centuries could not have been restricted to judicial oratory, as had generally been thought; we have seen that the specimen speeches prepared the student for all kinds of oratory, but this does not mean that the rhetorical *τέχναι*, oral or written, had to be so general. That they were not is clear from the explicit testimony of Aristotle (*Rhetoric* 1354 b 26 ff.) and Isocrates (*Adv. Soph.* 19) and from the fact that the parts of the oration as described by Plato are the parts of the judicial speech.

The passages in Plato, Aristotle, and Isocrates seem to me to indicate that written handbooks of rhetorical theory were fairly numerous, though not necessarily that there were many different copies of each different one. Publication in the late fifth century

¹³ Cf. *Antidosis* 180-8, *Epistula*, VI, 7-10, and Jebb, *op. cit.* (*supra*, n. 3), II, p. 44.

¹⁴ *Op. cit.* (*supra*, n. 10), pp. 121 ff.

was not a mass production process, and perhaps such a term should only be used of strictly literary works like dramas or histories or polished orations which were bought and read by the general public for entertainment. Both the collections of exemplars and the theoretical handbooks were produced to fill a practical need and proved ephemeral. They are compared by Professor Jaeger¹⁵ to the Peripatetic writings and probably one could add that they resembled medical and sophistic treatises. All of these belong to the class of *ὑπομνήματα*—writings composed to record a train of thought by a teacher or one of his pupils. If we regard the rhetorical handbooks in this way the judicial orientation of the outlines of theory points clearly to their function. Those who could afford a liberal education for public life attached themselves to a sophist, practiced his commonplaces, and learned almost incidentally the techniques of court oratory. But Greek law required that every citizen should speak in his own behalf in prosecution or defense. A knowledge of judicial oratory might therefore be a real need to anyone among the litigious Athenians. One did not, after all, *have* to speak in the Ecclesia, and no doubt only those who felt capable of self-expression did so. On the other hand, countless circumstances could catch even the innocent in the toils of the law. Where was an inexperienced person to turn? One way was to a logographer, a speech writer like Lysias, whose published orations advertised his wares. But this must have been expensive; Lysias' customers, even probably the invalid in oration twenty-four, seem prosperous. If the prospective litigant could not buy a whole speech and could not afford or had not the time to study with a sophist, he could turn to a rhetorician and learn from him in a single lecture, or by reading a written summary of his lecture, the necessary parts of a speech and the chief features of each part. Such instruction was necessarily cheap. When Lysias gave up theoretical exposition for writing speeches he continued to fulfill a similar function in supplying judicial oratory to those lacking the knack, but in a different and no doubt more profitable fashion. I do not suppose that great sophists like Protagoras or Hippias or Gorgias concerned themselves with this sort of thing; the rhetoricians were people like

¹⁵ Cf. Werner Jaeger, *Demosthenes: The Origin and Growth of his Policy* (Berkeley, 1938), p. 31 and n. 21 thereto.

Tisias, Theodorus, Lysias, and Polus, the second-rate intellectuals of the day. The public for the τέχνη of a rhetorician would, in a more general way, include present and prospective jurymen, and thus most Athenian citizens, who were interested in what was being put over on them in the courts. I have elsewhere argued¹⁶ that the orator Andocides in his earliest speeches shows only a crude knowledge of oratorical techniques. Because of his extensive exile from Athens and perhaps his aristocratic sentiments he was presumably unfamiliar with the conventions and tried to pick up the devices by looking over a handbook which summarized the theory of some rhetorician. The results were not altogether successful.

The various τέχναι varied slightly as one author added to the work of his predecessor.¹⁷ We can say a little about three of the steps in this development on the basis of surviving references.

First would come the theory of Corax and Tisias, the traditional founders of rhetoric in Sicily.¹⁸ Three principal problems exist in connexion with their place in the history of rhetoric: what was the relationship of one to the other; was their work confined to one field of oratory; and of the many oratorical partitions attributed to them which are genuine? Conflicting answers to all of these questions can be found in ancient sources, and the task is mostly one of choosing which authority to follow. The sources¹⁹ are: (1) passing references in good Greek writers

¹⁶ "The Oratory of Andocides," *A. J. P.*, LXXIX (1958), pp. 32 ff.

¹⁷ Thus Aristotle entitled his work (or the work of his research assistants) *Συναγωγή Τεχνῶν*: "A Collection of Arts," meaning that it was necessary to collect the theory of each individual out of the total corpus of writings.

¹⁸ On Corax and Tisias, cf. Aulitzky in *R.-E.*, s. v. "Korax 3" and Stegemann in *R.-E.*, s. v. "Teisias"; Karl Barwick, "Die Gliederung der rhetorischen Τέχνη," *Hermes*, LVII (1922), pp. 1 ff.; Hamberger, *op. cit.* (*supra*, n. 10); D. A. G. Hinks, "Tria Genera Causarum," *C. Q.*, XXX (1936), pp. 170 ff., and "Tisias and Corax and the Invention of Rhetoric," *C. Q.*, XXXIV (1940), pp. 61 ff.; W. Kroll, "Randbemerkungen XVIII," *Rh. M.*, LXVI (1911), pp. 164 ff. and *R.-E.*, Suppl. VII, s. v. "Rhetorik," cols. 1041 f.; Octave Navarre, *Essai sur la rhétorique grecque avant Aristote* (Paris, 1900); Radermacher, *op. cit.* (*supra*, n. 4), B II; Solmsen, *op. cit.* (*supra*, n. 10); A. W. Verrall, "Korax and Tisias," *J. P.*, IX (1880), pp. 197 ff.; Wilcox, *op. cit.* (*supra*, n. 10) and "Corax and the Prolegomena," *A. J. P.*, LXIV (1943), pp. 1 ff.

¹⁹ Cf. Radermacher, *op. cit.* (*supra*, n. 4), B II.

and especially in Plato and Aristotle; (2) quotations from Aristotle's lost *Συναγωγή Τεχνῶν*, especially in Cicero; (3) remarks in later Greek and Latin writers which may or may not come from Aristotle; (4) much more detailed material to be found in the *Prolegomena* of the *Rhetores Graeci*, composed between the third and thirteenth centuries A. D. The latter fall into two classes. One contains a longer historical account, represented by Sopater and numbers 6A and 13 in the Teubner edition by Hugo Rabe. These are clearly late reconstructions based on little if any original source material.²⁰ The second tradition, though it contains considerable variety, is best represented by number four in Rabe's collection and probably goes back to the Sicilian historian Timaeus (ca. 356-260 B. C.).²¹ Number four, briefly summarized, in its historical survey says that Corax was active in Syracuse at the time it became a democracy. He developed a tripartite scheme of oratory to help the citizens learn to speak in the assembly. Tisias was one of Corax' pupils who, to avoid paying for lessons, argued that if he won the dispute with his teacher he need not pay by that decision; if he lost, however, payment would be unjust, since the lessons would be proved worthless. Corax, in reply, reversed the argument.

With this account we must compare what Cicero says (*Brutus* 46), immediately before the words quoted above:

itaque ait Aristoteles, cum sublati in Sicilia tyrannis res privatae longo intervallo iudiciis repeterentur, tum primum, quod esset acuto illa gens et controversa natura, artem et praecepta Siculos Coracem et Tisiam conscripsisse. . . .

Whom do we believe, Aristotle or Timaeus, both at second hand?

Aristotle knows nothing about the rhetorical theories of Corax except that they involved argument from probability. The only passage in which he mentions him by name is *Rhetoric* 1402 a 17 where the traditional example of probability which Plato (*Phaedrus* 273 A 7 ff.) had attributed to Tisias is said to constitute the art of Corax. It is further significant that the *Συναγωγή Τεχνῶν* is said by Cicero (*De Inv.*, II, 6) to have begun with Tisias.²² Neither Plato nor Isocrates ever mentions Corax by

²⁰ Cf. Wilcox, "Corax and the *Prolegomena*" (*supra*, n. 18), p. 10.

²¹ Cf. Ludwig Radermacher, "Timäus und die Ueberlieferung über die Ursprung der Rhetorik," *Rh. M.*, LII (1897), pp. 412 ff.

²² In *Brutus*, 46, therefore, Cicero is perhaps coupling Corax and

name. On the other hand, the Timaeus tradition shows little interest in Tisias; he is simply a pupil of Corax. We may conjecture that Corax did play a political role and thus was of interest to the Sicilian historian. Apparently no written work of Corax survived, if he ever composed one.²³ Tisias, on the other hand, taught a theory of which a written summary was known to Plato and Aristotle. Everything that we know about this theory points to the fact that its concern was with judicial oratory. In *Phaedrus* 267 B 6 Plato inserts mention of it into the middle of the outline of a judicial handbook and in 273 A 7 ff. gives an example of Tisias' method which is clearly drawn from a discussion of judicial arguments. Finally, there is one reference to show that Tisias followed the allied profession of a *λογογράφος*, a paid writer of court speeches, for Pausanias (VI, 17, 8) speaks of a speech which he wrote for a Syracusan woman.

To go back now to the three problems about Corax and Tisias, we may conclude that the relationship between them was not necessarily very close. The story of the trial might show that, and it is emphasized by their differing interests. Corax was probably concerned with speaking in the assembly. Tisias was perhaps influenced by Corax' conception of oratory and his use of argument from probability. He constructed a theory which stands at the head of the long tradition of works with a judicial emphasis and probably was mostly intended to help those called upon to speak in court. As for the divisions of the oration, Rabe's fourth *Prolegomenon* (cf. Walz, VI, p. 13) attributes to Corax a threefold division: introduction, *ἄγών*, conclusion. This is quite suitable for deliberative oratory where a narration is rarely needed.²⁴ The great characteristic of judicial oratory and of the system of organization described by Plato in the *Phaedrus*

Tisias in his own mind, as he does in *De Oratore*, I, 91, and thus misquoting Aristotle. Perhaps Aristotle coupled the two.

²³ There is a puzzling reference to Corax at the end of the dedicatory epistle of the *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum*, which I take to mean, at most, that the author of the epistle, who is not the author of the treatise, thought that the treatise made use of material from a pre-Aristotelian source. There appears to be no real knowledge of Corax here. Quintilian refers to Corax twice (II, 17, 7 and III, 1, 8), always coupled with Tisias. Even in the *Prolegomena* Corax is mostly regarded as an oral teacher.

²⁴ Cf. Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 1417 b 11.

(266-7) is this very narrative. Therefore, because of his judicial emphasis I think it certain that Tisias recognized at least a four-part division.

It is logical to expect that a system of distribution which had progressed from a threefold to a fourfold division might meet with attempts at further extension. And so it was, apparently. The passage from the *Phaedrus* (266 E 5 ff.) refers to subdivisions of the proof made by Theodorus of Byzantium.²⁵ Aristotle (*Rhetoric* 1414 b 13 ff.) refers to similar subdivisions of the narration and speaks of "those around Theodorus," apparently to indicate that he had pupils. He is, in fact, the type of the professional rhetorician whose interests did not extend beyond judicial oratory. It will be remembered that Cicero couples Theodorus with Lysias (*Brutus*, 48). Theodorus was more successful at teaching, Lysias at speech writing.

The earlier theoretical handbooks contained only a discussion of invention and distribution, and the arrangement shown in Plato's description in the *Phaedrus* implies that invention was treated under proof, rather than in a separate section. During the fourth century a discussion of style and an introductory discussion of invention were added, and Aristotle suggests the further addition of delivery (1403 b 19 ff.). The end of the *Rhetoric* and also of the *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum*, usually attributed to Anaximenes, thus represents expanded fifth-century handbooks. The prefixed material, and probably also the concern with more than judicial oratory, is distinctive of the fourth century.

GEORGE A. KENNEDY.

HAVERFORD COLLEGE.

²⁵ On Theodorus, cf. Radermacher, *op. cit.* (*supra*, n. 4) B XII and Engelbert Drerup, "Die Anfänge der rhetorischen Kunstprosa," *Jahr. f. Philol.*, Suppl. XXVII (1901), pp. 219 ff., especially 332 ff.

VENETIC ISOGLOSSES.

In assessing the diagnostic value of isoglosses for the purpose of determining genetic affinity amongst languages, those presumably resulting from common innovation by structural replacement or addition are the only isoglosses that may be safely and seriously considered.¹ Those resulting from innovation by loss or from common retention are of no value for such decisions. This principle implies a circularity: We must discover genetic affinities in order to reconstruct sensitively the intervening earlier linguistic stages, and hence the precise nature and shape of the proto-language; we must determine common innovations in order to discover genetic affinities; we must assume a shape for the proto-language in order to declare which features are common innovations. Since this circularity is not vicious, there is no harm in it; much of scientific reasoning is circular. We must, however, have a clear realization of this aspect of our task.

In a recent paper² M. S. Beeler has discussed very compactly and informatively important isoglosses shared by Venetic with other language groups, particularly with conventional Italic and with Germanic. The purpose of the present brief note is to assay these isoglosses in accordance with the above principle. Since this note is a sort of addendum to Beeler's paper, repetitious discussion of the items may be dispensed with; as a convenience, Beeler's numbering of the items will be retained.

A. Retentions.

Beeler regards (7), the *-r* verbal ending, and (17), the *-to* 3rd sg. middle, as retained; I agree. I also regard the following as of early, and probably common IE, date: (9) *per*; (10) *dono·m*; (13) *-s-* preterite/aorist; and the constructs represented by (21) *doto*, (22) *magetto·n·*, and (23) *vebele·i·*. These types are discussed over and over in the handbooks, and scarcely require recapitulation here.

(8) *op* is surely old, and is now attested in Mycenaean Greek *o-pi*, apart from the preverb vestiges long attested in later Greek.

¹ See also E. P. Hamp, *The Journal of Celtic Studies*, II (1953), pp. 7-9; *I. J. A. L.*, XXIV (1958), pp. 150-3.

² "Venetic and Italic," *Hommages à Max Niedermann* (Bruxelles, 1956), pp. 38-48.

(18) *tole-* 'give' may be regarded as reflecting a traditional syllabic **l* before a vowel; in laryngeal terms this would be an **l̥* which syllabified in position before a prevocalic laryngeal (**X*). In this fashion, we may regard **tlX-V* as a retained sequence. The semantics are too delicate and brittle to judge on.

(20) *kara-(mno-s)*: The suffixation is of course broadly attested. The lexical base is at least Italo-Keltic and Germanic (?), and is therefore a retention of some date at least.

(16) *ke* 'and' is of uncertain background: If the initial goes back to a palatal, there is possibly a cognate in Lycian, which would make the form a retention. If we have a reflex of enclitic **-k^{ue}* or of **-k*,³ we have a widely attested retention. This item, though interesting, seems not to be diagnostic for our purpose.

(24) *-m ~ -n* is ambiguous both in its IE origin and in result. Moreover, it is likely that final position was a position of neutralization for nasals in IE; if so, no conclusion can be drawn from this item.

The equation *e.kvon = equom* shows a retained /kw/ < **k₂u*.

B. Diagnostic innovations.

The following items are innovations, to be sure, but for one reason or another, specified in each case, they are not so conclusive for the placement of Venetic as we might wish.

(6), the nominal plural suffix *-bos*, has the virtue of being a morphological item, a category which seems to be of particular value in making the type of decision in question; but the nature of the structure from which it is derived is such that the result is not free of the suspicion of chance convergence. It is true that Italic alone clearly shares this feature: Keltic shows both forms with palatal vocalism (Gaulish *gobedbi* and Irish) and *-bo(s)* (Gaulish *-bo* and Iberian Keltic *-bos*, on the bronze of Luzaga; see M. Lejeune, *Celtiberica* [Salamanca, 1955]); the picture is further complicated by the fragmentary attestation of both Gaulish and Venetic. Moreover, the fragmentary Messapic *-bas* may also be pertinent; see my remarks on Albanian and Messapic, *Studies presented to Joshua Whatmough*, p. 85. Indo-Iranian shows *-bhiṣ* and *-bhyas*; Armenian has **-bh-*, but the vocalism in the plural is ambiguous. Greek *-φι* was indifferent

³ See E. P. Hamp, "IE Enclitic **-k*," *K. Z.*, LXXIV (1956), pp. 236-8.

to number; Mycenaean *-pi* was likewise independent of number, although it seems to have been favored in the plural (see M. Lejeune, *B. S. L.*, LII [1956], pp. 187-218). Germanic and Balto-Slavic, of course, share endings in *-m-*. It seems, then, that in later IE (and consequently in the parent of Italo-Keltic) there were two endings for the plural, **-bhi(s)* and **-bhos*; whether these were alternates or two contrastive case-endings is a question that is not easily resolved. Therefore, even if we admitted (ignoring the perhaps fatal *argumenta ex silentio*) that in some sense Venetic, Italic, Keltic, and Messapic shared this item as an innovation, it is still not possible to declare whether the innovation is by replacement or by loss. If it is by loss, it is not diagnostic; if by replacement, such an isolated alternate form could easily show agreements by chance convergence. This feature, then, supports no serious argument.

(11) genitive singular in *-ī*. This isogloss would seem to place Venetic squarely within Italo-Keltic, but the affinity cannot be refined beyond that on the evidence of this item alone.

(12), the change of **eu* to *ou*, is a weak phonological link with Italic. The same change happened independently in Keltic, and in Continental Keltic independently of Insular. The phenomena of Balto-Slavic and Indo-Iranian are not relevant, since they involve other structural features and events. Yet since this change is far from unique, it is not decisive.

(15), the change of syllabic **l* to *ol*, is indeed an innovation shared with Italic, and may in fact be significant. But since Germanic and, in part, Balto-Slavic show somewhat similar results (*ul*, etc.) whereby known differences between the overall phonemic structure of the respective vowel systems might readily explain the apparent disagreement as a later restructuring, we do well not to consider this isogloss too seriously. Moreover, bearing in mind the diverse fate of these syllabics in the IE languages and in view of the very circumscribed quantity and nature of our corpus, we may not even have a representative descriptive picture for this structure-point in Venetic.

(14) *fak-* is a lexical-morphological (allomorphic) isogloss which includes Italic, to be sure, but also Phrygian and perhaps Greek. It seems likely, then, that such a formation was, at least for a time in IE, productive in a very limited way. The details are perhaps too difficult to recover to make our decision sure.

The assibilation (19) shown in *iuva·n·tsa·i·* is a minor innovation that does not link Venetic distinctively with the early period of any of the other IE subgroups.

Having thus removed from consideration certain innovations which are unsatisfactory for our purposes, we may now turn to the *conclusive innovations*:

(2) **dh-, *bh- > f-*. This pervasive phonological change is shared with Italic alone. Furthermore, the different medial treatment is significant for the relationship of Venetic to Latin. Beeler remarks (pp. 46-7) that the voiced stops in medial position in Latin and Venetic may well be independent. The stop feature must certainly be independent, as is clearly shown by *louderobos: liberī*. That is to say, the Latin *-b-* presupposes an earlier (bi)labial spirant, the latter in turn from an interdental spirant which gave the Venetic dental; in other words, we cannot avoid positing an intervening stage in the history of Latin at which time the sound in question was still a spirant. But what does *not* seem to be independent, and hence is significant, is the voicing in this position. I have dealt with this feature elsewhere⁴ and need not here repeat my reasoning. I have also given in that place my reasons for not seeing the need to divorce Faliscan from Latin and Venetic on this score, as Beeler suggests (pp. 47, 48).

(5) **gh- > h-* is a phonological isogloss shared, like the last, with Italic, and is no doubt a part of the same general phenomenon.⁵

(1) *dona-* is a denominative verb with a base-plus-suffix lexical combination that is shared notably with Italic.

⁴ A. J. P., LXXV (1954), pp. 183-6. It may perhaps be argued that, while Oscan-Umbrian show a medial phoneme /-f-/, in this position the phoneme had a voiced allophone and that therefore they in fact agree with the Latin-Venetic treatment; this argument is strengthened by the observation that medial *-s-* shows voicing characteristics in these dialects. The evidence, however, points clearly the other way in the case of Oscan, which was removed from later contacts, in which Umbrian increasingly found itself, with other Italic diffusional sources. In the north Calabrian Oscan loans attested in the modern dialects (see G. Rohlfs, *Dizionario dialettale delle Tre Calabrie* [Halle/Milano, puntata I, 1932], pp. 30-1) we find a clear continuation of voiceless medial *-f-*.

⁵ This development has, however, been recently doubted by E. Polomé ("Germanisch und Venetisch," MNHMHΣ XAPIN, II [1957], pp. 86-98), who concludes "Hieraus geht deutlich hervor, dass die Frage der Vertretung des idg. **gh/ĝh* im Venetischen offen bleibt."

(3) *a·i·su-* 'god' is a lexical item shared with Italic, though there are strong suspicions of an Etruscan or other extraneous origin; on Volsc. *esaristrom* 'sacrificium' see now J. Untermann, *I. F.*, LXII (1956), p. 134.

(4) *louderobos* 'liberis' is a lexical item shared specifically with Latin.

(25) *sselboisselboi* is a lexical isogloss shared clearly with Germanic.⁶ (26) *mego* is an isolated (weakly structured) morphological innovation shared likewise with Germanic.⁷

C. Assay of diagnostic innovations.

Not all innovations are of equal weight for the determination of genetic affinity: We know that isolated lexical forms and derivational affixes are readily borrowed by languages whose contact is even rather casual; if such borrowings affect matters whose cultural content is not very specific, we assume that the nature of the contact was in some sense fairly intense.

Thus, of the distinctive innovations rehearsed above, (3) *a·i·su-* might reflect a borrowing (even of very early date) arising from relatively fleeting contacts on Italian soil. (1) *dona-* could likewise be a borrowing, though it is hard to specify to what precise cultural realm it might have referred.

(4) *louderobos* as a lexical item is open to the suspicion of

⁶ E. Polomé (n. 4 in the above-mentioned article) has furnished an excellent discussion of the etymological connexions of this form. As for the initial *ss-*, it may be remarked that even if the initial sibilant was in fact "stark artikuliert," it is unlikely that an allophone would be so expressed in writing; perhaps we must see in this feature more orthographic than linguistic (phonemic/allophonic) significance.

Surely Polomé is right in analyzing **selbho-* as *-bho-* (OPruss. *subs*) affixed to **sel-*, which in turn would match the Hittite pronominal genitive *-l* and the particle *-il(a)* 'ipse' (and ultimately Lat. *tālis, quālis*). Thus the elements involved in this isogloss would really be those of retention, and only the morphological combination would be a shared innovation. Moreover, as Polomé reminds us, the syntax of OHG *selb selbo* shows different case forms juxtaposed.

The more one inspects this isogloss the less cogent it becomes.

⁷ Polomé discusses this briefly in his note 3. It should be pointed out, however, that the agreement with Hittite is incomplete since *uk*, *amuk*, *zik*, and *tuk* ('ego, me, tu, te') all show the *-k* element. As between Hittite, Greek *-γε*, Slavic (*jego*), Lithuanian (*-ga, -gi*), Germanic and Venetic, it seems that we have, in detail, features that are not necessarily shared, nor clearly innovating.

borrowing in principle, but the highly important further consideration of dissimilarity in phonemic substance between the Latin and Venetic forms places the putative time of borrowing well back in time—to a time when on other grounds we must consider the two languages converging as structures. In this instance we thus approach the tautology of a language “borrowing” from itself. This isogloss is thus much more important than most lexical isoglosses.

(25) *sselboisselboi* and (26) *meço* are lexical and morphological particularities of the sort that we have observed better known languages to have borrowed quite readily. On the other hand, these relatively non-cultural and quasi-idiomatic constructions point to a fairly intimate degree of contact and considerable bilingualism. They represent the sort of phenomena that we see in quantity in the Balkans, in the eastern Baltic, and in Brittany between Breton and French.

(2) and (5) are the sort of fine-grained phonological detail that is diffused only as a result of long and intimate symbiosis. Even under such conditions, we can point to many instances where such phonological (allophonic) patterns fail to diffuse until bilingualism finally turns into the death of a language.

D. Conclusion.

Of the isoglosses passed in review, thanks to the valuable preparation furnished by Beeler, the following significant items emerge:

(2), (5), and (4) point unambiguously to the genetic membership of Venetic in the Italic family; (2) and perhaps (4) bind Venetic with Latin-Faliscan.

(25) and (26) point to considerable more recent bilingual contacts between Venetic and Germanic speakers.⁸

ERIC P. HAMP.

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO.

⁸ Since writing this note, after reading Polomé's arguments reproduced and discussed above, I consider, upon reflexion, that these two apparent points of contact may prove to be illusory. It is at any rate gratifying that Polomé concludes that Venetic “keine genügendes Material darbietet um auf eine engere Verwandtschaft zwischen Germanisch und Venetisch zu schliessen.”

WHAT WAS THE *LINEA DIVES*

(MARTIAL, VIII, 78, 7)?

What was the nature of the contrivance by which at Roman shows the distribution of presents among the assembly was effected? Friedländer, on Martial, VIII, 78, 7, suggested that the people perhaps caught the presents from the *linea* by jumping for them ("die etwa im Sprunge erhascht werden konnten"). This suggestion does not, however, accord with the word *cadit* of line 8, or with Statius, *Silvae*, I, 6, 16 and 20 (*cadit* . . . ; *cadunt*), or with *pluebant* (*ibid.* 10); and was rightly rejected by Fabia¹ on this ground (add Seneca, *Ep. Mor.*, 74, 7-10, *inciderunt* . . . ; *desuper iactat* . . . ; *cadentibus*; Josephus, *Ant. Jud.*, XIX, 1, 13, πολλῆς δ' ὀπώρας ἐπιχειομένης τοῖς θεωροῖς; Suetonius, *Dom.*, 4, *deciderat*). Fabia, however, while rejecting Friedländer's suggestion, had no alternative explanation: "à un moment donné on imagina un appareil qui s'appelait *linea*, et dont l'existence nous est révélée par deux témoins contemporains de Domitien [Martial, VIII, 78, 7; Statius, *Silvae*, I, 6, 9] . . . Qu'était-ce au juste que cet appareil? Il faut avouer que nous l'ignorons." Vollmer's commentary on the *Silvae* had no explanation of this point ("die Näschereien fielen von einem über das Amphitheater gespannten Seile unter das Volk"); and Frère² could only refer back to the aforementioned article by Fabia, and remark: "le dispositif reste obscur."

I believe an idea of the contrivance is to be found in a picture from Pompeii, included in Maiuri's *Roman Painting* (Skira, 1953, p. 126), and itself regarded as an enigma. On p. 130, Maiuri refers to it as "a picture of a remarkable and somewhat intriguing order." Apart from a suggestion that it might have represented the flowers and gifts that a hospitable host sometimes let fall on his guests through an opening in the ceiling, he is content to say that "there is little point in looking for an 'explanation' of this curious picture; we do better simply to admire the artist's fine decorative sense" etc.

¹ Daremberg-Saglio, III, ii, s. v. 'missilia.'

² In the Budé edition of the *Silvae* (1944), Vol. I, *Notes complémentaires* to pp. 46 and 49.

I suggest that this picture from Pompeii represents a veritable *linea* of the kind referred to by Statius and Martial. That such *lineae* will have been in use in Pompeii there seems no good reason to doubt. The games-advertisements from there³ refer to *sparsiones*, the word used by Statius, I, 6, 66, in connection with presents (cf. Seneca, *Ep. Mor.*, 74, 6; Suetonius, *Cal.*, 18 and *Dom.*, 4 for the use of *spargere* in this connection); and there seems no reason for thinking that, as hinted by Vollmer (*Silvae*, I, 6, 66), *sparsiones* in those advertisements may have meant *sparsiones odorum*. The fact that *sparsiones* of presents formed a regular part of an aedile's bounty in provincial centres much further afield than Pompeii⁴ leaves little doubt that the *sparsiones* advertised in Pompeii meant what Statius meant by the word;⁵ or that the custom was availed of as a subject by artists, as in the case of so many other items from the public spectacles.⁶

The contrivance, a sort of hammock which could be drawn forwards or backwards by its cords on rings along the two containing side-ropes, corresponds well, it seems to me, with the need for refilling the hammock⁷ after each shaking-out of the *bellaria* had been effected (cf. Seneca, *Ep. Mor.*, 74, 7, *excutere*) by agitation of the side-ropes or tension and relaxation of the cords of the hammock. By means, perhaps, of the kind of windlasses, a part of one of which was discovered in Pompeii,⁸ a number of hammocks, filled and replenished from time to time at conveniently-arranged filling-points, could be drawn along pairs of ropes running between sets of *mali* fixed at suitable points among the seats;⁹ and it is difficult to imagine any other method, consistent with such hints as the literature gives us, by which a mass of objects might be so conveniently distributed over the heads of an audience in a large unroofed building.

The "more or less indeterminate objects" (Maiuri) falling

³ *C. I. L.*, IV, 1179, 1181, 1184.

⁴ Friedländer, *Sittengeschichte*, II, p. 17, note 5, with the inscriptions there cited from Africa.

⁵ So Sergejenko, *Pompeji*², p. 234.

⁶ Friedländer, *op. cit.*, II, p. 53.

⁷ Cf. Statius, I, 6, 80, *dum nova lucra comparantur*, with Vollmer's note; Martial, VIII, 78, 7-8, *nec linea dives/Cessat*.

⁸ Neuburger, *Technik des Altertums*, English tr., p. 209.

⁹ Cf. Schreiber-Anderson, *Atlas of Classical Antiquities*, p. 57 (middle).

out of the hammock¹⁰ include fruit, corresponding to *Silvae*, I, 6, 12 ff. The correspondence with these lines extends to the inclusion of dates and walnuts and the picture shows a piece of fruit cut in half so that the kernal shows. One may also see what, from their shape, might be cakes, pastries, or 'pains de fruits comprimés.'¹¹ As to the dark object in the lower right corner of the picture, I suggest that, in view of the commonness of napkins as Saturnalia-presents, this may be a purple *mappa*. Its shape recalls the fimbriated napkin (cf. Petronius, 32, 2-3) from the Pompeian still-life reproduced in Seyffert-Sandys' *Dictionary of Classical Antiquities*, p. 445. The use of purple in *mappae* is indicated in Petronius, *loc. cit.*; Martial, IV, 46, 17 (with Friedländer's note), and, negatively, in Lampridius, *Alex. Sev.*, 37, 2, where Alexander's moderation in using only white *mantelia* suggests the use by others of purple ones (cf. *ibid.*, 40, 10, where *pura* is contrasted with *purpura*).¹²

I have consulted expert opinion as to the birds perching on the ropes,¹³ and am told that the one on the extreme right is "unmistakably a Guinea Fowl"; that the one in the centre "has the appearance of a Turtle Dove"; and that the bird on the left "looks like a Domestic Pigeon." In the third case, however, the Editors of this Journal consider that the bird is a duck, as do sportsmen to whom I have showed the picture. The guinea fowl among the kinds of birds distributed appears in *Silvae*, I, 6, 78; and considering the great popularity of pigeons (Plin., *N. H.*, X, 110), which might be kept *animi causa*, or (Columella, *De R. R.*, VIII, 8) for fattening and eating, their inclusion among birds for distribution as presents would not be surprising, any more than would that of ducks, mentioned as appearing in pontifical banquets in Republican times (Macrobius, III, 13, 12). Just how the masses of birds were let loose among the spectators¹⁴ in the times before the introduction of throwing *tesserae* for them saved the birds from being torn to pieces by the contending recipients (Martial, VIII, 78, 11 f.; Josephus, *loc. cit.*),

¹⁰ Maiuri, curiously, appears not to have connected the two.

¹¹ Statius, *loc. cit.*, 17-20, with Frère's notes.

¹² Cf., also, Daremberg-Saglio, III, ii, p. 1580.

¹³ Mr. J. D. Macdonald, Principal Scientific Officer, Bird Section, British Museum (Natural History).

¹⁴ Statius, *loc. cit.*, 75 f., with Vollmer's note; Suetonius, *Nero*, 11.

does not appear; but if, from a high part of the building,¹⁵ they were released from shoots with their wings clipped to ensure that, while providing sport, they could actually be captured (as in the case of the curious pigeon-chase mentioned by Strabo, VI, 259), it would be natural that some of them, in their descent, would alight on the ropes, as shown in the picture; for we must suppose that the *linea* was placed lower than the highest rows of seats, where, at Pompeii, as at Rome, the women sat;¹⁶ and that the tumult-provoking *sparsio* naturally did not pertain to them.

The difficulty of conceiving the mechanism of the *linea* in detail may not be small; but is no greater, I submit, than that in which a full understanding of the working of the *velaria* is known to be involved;¹⁷ and I believe that its essential features were as set out above.

J. F. KILLEEN.

UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, GALWAY.

¹⁵ *Per astra*, Statius; 'von Himmel herab,' Vollmer.

¹⁶ Maiuri, *Pompeii*³, p. 28; Della Corte, *Pompeii* (1944), p. 107.

¹⁷ Daremberg-Saglio, V, p. 677.

THE NAME OF SOPHOKLES.

David Lewis has made a good case for taking the normal demotic of the deme Kolonos in Athens in the Fifth Century as ἐκ Κολωνοῦ.¹ Yet the tribute list of the year 443/2 gives the fact that Sophokles was hellenotamias in these words, as restored: [Σ]οφοκλῆς Κολο[νόθεν ἡλλενοταμί]ας ἐν.² In the light of Lewis' argument I should now restore the demotic not as Κολο[νόθεν] but as Κολο[νόθεν]: [Σ]οφοκλῆς Κολο[νόθεν ἡλλενοταμί]ας ἐν.

Lewis thought the name of Sophokles not quite sure because of the damaged state of the stone: "The *phi* now rests on Rangabe's word alone, since no trace of a chisel remains, but since he restored [Σ]οφοκλῆς Κολο[φόνιος], he had no axe to grind in the matter." There is no doubt that the second preserved letter is phi. Wade-Gery, McGregor, and I were sure of it when we published *The Athenian Tribute Lists*. Having read Lewis' comment I again examined the stone in 1958. Every stroke of the letter phi is certain, some of the rounding still showing the original cut of the chisel. There is no evidence of any change in the surface since Rangabé; the water-weathering had done its damage before his time. But, while water-weathering may corrode away the original surface it sometimes intensifies and deepens the original strokes. This is what happened here. One sees the complete circle, most of it deeply marked, and across it the upright which extends above the circle at the top, and only the bottom of which has been corroded away.

No letter in the text stands in less doubt; so speculation about possible restorations of Θ[ε]οκλῆς or [X]ο[ρ]οκλῆς is idle.³ Concerning Sophokles we are left the choice of taking the hellenotamias to be the poet or another man of the same name.

BENJAMIN D. MERITT.

INSTITUTE FOR ADVANCED STUDY,
PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY.

¹ David Malcolm Lewis, *B. S. A.*, L (1955), pp. 12-17.

² Meritt, Wade-Gery, McGregor, *The Athenian Tribute Lists*, II (1949), p. 18 (List 12, line 36).

³ Lewis, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

REVIEWS.

ERIC A. HAVELOCK. *The Liberal Temper in Greek Politics*. New Haven, Yale Univ. Press, 1957. Pp. 443. \$6.00.

In this book Professor Havelock has devoted himself to a difficult "task of restitution," of a "group of forgotten men," the Greek liberals, in an attempt to show the intellectual ancestry of a way of thought independent of Plato and Aristotle, a liberal view, free of moral absolutism, arguing "that political and even moral convictions were negotiable, that the path of duty does not run counter to self interest, and that in cases of doubt it is better to prefer amity above justice" (p. 9). He sees the intellectual conflict of the classical period in a broad perspective that includes all of Western civilization, so that his analysis is relevant not only to historical understanding but to the understanding of contemporary problems as well.

It is not a new idea that the frame of reference for ancient political and social thought, from the fourth century, was very largely the construction of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, nor that the overwhelming influence of these men makes it difficult to keep in proper perspective the efforts of earlier or contemporary thinkers who differed from them in assumptions, methods, and conclusions. Social historians have often been troubled that there is so little documentary evidence as to this earlier social theory, against which Plato and Aristotle were reacting. In this book Havelock has tried to reconstruct in some detail the ideas of their "liberal" adversaries and to show precisely how and why the problems, methods, and solutions of the "liberals" were supplanted, concealed, and absorbed by Plato and Aristotle.

As indicated by the title of his book, Havelock does not set out to show the liberals as members of a school or movement with a single well-integrated program or set of doctrines. In fact, he sees rather broad differences among some of them; Antiphon and Democritus, for example, "represent within the liberal camp diametrically opposed positions" (p. 255). The variety in their opinions is of course a factor which increases the difficulty of defining very precisely the liberals' common ground. They were not revolutionaries, so their position does not have the simple clarity of a rebel manifesto. Indeed, so far as they moved within the Athenian orbit, during the heyday of democracy, they would be swimming with the tide of social opinion. Democritus speaks of democratic society as "the shape (of society) presently prevailing" (fr. 266), and the custom-law which men like Democritus and Protagoras see as growing up naturally as a response to emergent social needs means in Athens the institutions of the *patrios politeia*, fashioned in the tradition of Solon and Cleisthenes. Thus it may be doubted that the liberals of the fifth century were as consciously arrayed against idealism, teleology, or natural law doctrines as Havelock sometimes seems to imply. Though he is fully aware of the necessity of historical perspective and makes a heroic effort to maintain it, he is led to

say, for example, of some lines in Aeschylus, that they are enough "to destroy at a blow the whole Hesiodic perspective and the Platonic metaphysic of history" (p. 58).

Perhaps, despite his apparent wish to avoid this error, Havelock does yield too much to the temptation to treat the various ideas of the liberals as a cohesive "system" and to suggest that it was against this "system" that the efforts of Plato and Aristotle were directed. The liberals are probably "unknown" less because of conspiracy or a deliberate effort to suppress than because of their own heterogeneity and versatility. To be sure, Plato's hostile treatment of the Sophists and his failure to mention Democritus or Antisthenes cannot be regarded as fortuitous. There must have been at least some deliberate suppression. But at the same time the rejection is not so explicit and complete as one would expect in the deliberate attempt to refute a well-defined opposing position. The reason Aristotle, in particular, can gain in sympathy for liberal ideas as he grows older, is that they emerged not from a doctrine or school, but from what Havelock's title itself calls a "temper."

One of the difficulties that stands in the way of agreement with this book springs from the use of the term "liberal" as a central point of reference. Havelock handles the term cautiously and modestly, but not unexceptionably, and on the matter of terminology and technique he seems caught between two fundamental attacks. There are those, pragmatically oriented, who may object that he has gone too far toward making a "school" out of what should be regarded as a "temper" related to specific situations and problems, while others may object that his "liberalism" comprehends too much, that in his zeal to document his case he includes as ingredients of the "temper" ideas that are not basically consistent with the main lines of liberal thought.

Greek liberalism as described by Havelock is at bottom marked by a pragmatic and empirical approach to knowledge, a "historical" (i.e. evolutionary) view of society, a contract theory of the state, a measured commitment to equalitarianism, and a claim for "philanthropy and good will as instinctual principles of social order." These criteria, possibly excepting the last, seem fully satisfactory as applied to ancient or modern liberalism. It is in the particular analysis of some of the liberals' positions that doubts may begin to set in. Thus the author suggests that the Sophistic argument posits a "common mind" or "common judgment" (pp. 201, 247), that liberal democracy implies a "meeting of minds" on the substance of public policy (pp. 236, 313), that liberalism views society as "natural" (p. 401), that it emphasizes fundamental goodwill among men (pp. 343, 349). An interpretation of liberalism that encompasses such notions as these may dismay those students of political theory who view the tradition, from Hobbes and Locke forward, as being based on an interpretation of society and government as artificial creations of men established to fulfill certain functions, as finding the locus of rationality in the individual, and as accepting conflict as the inevitable reason for the existence of the institutions of political authority. The author does not seem always to appreciate that as a political theory liberalism is a theory of authority as well as a theory of freedom. Likewise, some may be disturbed by a use of the liberal

label which must be satisfied to define it as "at least . . . a word of challenge, a banner of faith in the common man, and a plea for hope and philanthropy; a word which has drawn battle lines, rallying friends and identifying enemies." The basic problem obviously lies with the concept and the tradition, and not with the author of a single commentary. However, the present work might be more convincing either if a different term had been devised or if a clearer definition and a more rigid principle of exclusion had been used. Perhaps the author's uncertainty about liberalism and his own bondage to the classical masters can be illustrated in a small way in what appears to be a "teleological slip" in his last-chapter summary of the liberals' attacks on metaphysics. Here he remarks that the liberal position cannot accept any social form as "theoretically final, complete, or correct" because "if such existed, it would represent the completion of man's hedonist drives; but these are *still* evolving" (p. 379, emphasis added).

In the first chapters Havelock analyzes the application of two basically different attitudes to the origin and development of human society. One is the "religious-metaphysical," according to which

there is no history, properly speaking, of civilization, no developmental progress in technology and morals. One looks back to a Golden Age now lost, in which man in his unspoiled nature lived in close company with God, in a Greek version of Eden (p. 31).

On the other hand, the "biological-historical" or "liberal-historical" view was that justice and law are evolved by trial and error as a response to "all-too-human" needs, and

the kind of knowledge required to make political and moral choices cannot be derived from *a priori* forms or changeless principles; it must be drawn empirically from an historical process which is always changing, and applied pragmatically and partially in given situations as they arise (p. 32).

The crucial point of divergence is in viewing man as a product of evolution with moral codes and social institutions which he builds himself as a result of his needs, rather than as a unique creature with a timeless "nature," subject from the beginning to the laws of that nature or of the God who created him. Exemplars of the conception of "History as Regress" (Ch. II) are Hesiod and Plato. Both follow the "Eden myth" in supposing that man was originally innocent and happy, and that technological progress has been accompanied by moral decline. There is only the difference that Plato, in the myth of the *Statesman* and in two accounts of early man in *Laws* III and IV, departs from Hesiod to accept the view that the early life of man was primitive and dangerous. It is not, however, on that account, less innocent morally or less preferable to the modern age in which technological skills (gifts of the gods rather than of human invention) have been turned to evil uses.

A view of "History as Progress" (Ch. III) is seen in the *Prometheus Bound*, Sophocles' *Antigone*, and in the section on prehistory

in Diodorus, Book I. Plato's *Protagoras* and *Republic* II, and Aristotle, *Politics* I show "History as Compromise"—that is, material from the "scientific anthropology" of the day is used but is subjected to alterations and adaptations which bring it into line with the presuppositions (metaphysical, teleological, theistic) of the Athenian philosophers. The myth of the *Protagoras* is interpreted as based on genuine Protagorean material, altered in that "man ceases to be an animal," and his social institutions cease to be seen as emerging in a continuous evolutionary process; both are the outcome of a separate and special creation.

A central group of chapters discusses "The Fragments of the Greek Anthropologists" (Anaximander, Xenophanes, Anaxagoras, Archelaus, and Democritus), "The Political Theory of Democritus," and what the author regards as the principal social doctrines of the major Sophists (deduced mainly from Plato), with a separate chapter on Antiphon.

The name of Euripides may seem to some a curious omission from the ranks of Havelock's liberals. Though his friend Anaxagoras is present, the dramatist is represented only by a brief analysis (pp. 70-3) of Theseus' remarks on the basis of civilization in *Suppliants* 196-218, characterized as "a lecture on the role of providence in human life" (p. 70). Expressions like lines 201-2, "That god who took our planless brutish life and regulated it—'tis him I praise," are taken to show a pietistic editing of an anthropological account of human life in which man's advances are seen as the product of historical growth rather than divine gift. It is equally possible, however, to interpret this passage (in the wider context, which Havelock ignores) as emphasizing the importance of man's devotion to social and moral law, to civilized standards. This would of course involve maintaining a right relationship with the gods. Such an interpretation is certainly in harmony with Havelock's treatment of the "pious" close of the *Antigone* ode, and with his treatment of Aeschylus' *Prometheus*. Indeed, who is the god of the lines quoted, if not Prometheus?

Perhaps Havelock shies away from Euripides partly because of the mythical clothing of his thought; and in general he seems to assume too sharp a break between religious-mythical and secular-scientific thought in this epoch. To comprehend sympathetically the attitude to religion in the early classical period we have to set ourselves back of the modern "warfare between science and religion," and even back of the impiety trials of wartime Athens. It seems accurate and useful to think of early Greek philosophy as a progress from mythical to rational thinking, but the character of Greek religion was such that many conventional ideas could be called into question without the questioner or his audience feeling that religion itself was under attack. Prometheus, as Aeschylus conceives him, rebelled against Zeus and set mankind on its road of self-improvement, but one of his most important gifts was that of divination. Sophocles in the *Antigone* chorus (353 ff.) celebrates man's accomplishments in an essentially humanistic spirit, but the climax is the construction of a civil society in which law and the oath are sanctioned by the gods. So Euripides, while often critical of unthinking religiosity, still holds to the customary mythical framework of

Athenian tragedy, and feels no impulsion always to be on the offensive against religion. In this passage of the *Suppliants*, the tone is humanistic and optimistic, and we need not feel that Theseus' attribution of human progress to a god's gift either was merely conventional and insincere or represented a theistic distortion of a scientific original.

Chapters XI and XII are entitled "The Emasculation of Liberalism in Aristotle's *Ethics*" and "The Rejection of Liberalism in Aristotle's *Politics*." These two books form "the leading source for our knowledge of the liberal doctrines of the fourth century" (p. 296). The discussion of the *Ethics* is devoted almost entirely to the eighth and ninth books, on the topic of friendship. Aristotle felt challenged, according to the author's hypothesis, by the "doctrine of human equality and philanthropy" developed by the liberals, and set out to give a "report" which would seem to embrace it into his own system, but which would so emend and distort it as to remove the uncomfortable overtones of democracy and equalitarian implication. He translates *φιλία* by "amity" when he considers the term a reflection of liberal doctrine; "friendship" has too many of the overtones of the personal attachments of aristocratic society. The natural amity of man with his fellows formed for the liberals a principle of social cohesion. This doctrine has as its basis the ultimate biological relationship of all men, and it naturally opposes all the ideas centering round the natural differences of man and the inherited hierarchical structure of social organization. Though *φιλία* is important in Aristotle's social doctrine, the forms of human attachment which are most significant are those proper to the patriarchal, hierarchical society which he regarded as ideal. Further, since in Aristotle's view man reaches his highest form only in the good man, it is only the good who can experience real friendship, and there is no place for that broad sympathy with mankind as a species made up of one's kindred, which Havelock sees as characteristic of the liberals.

In general, this analysis of Aristotle's reaction to liberal thought is persuasive. It has long seemed remarkable to students of Greek social thought, that coming as late as he did Aristotle still regarded the city-state as the natural and normal highest form of society, and that he shows hardly a glimmer of that ideal of world-brotherhood espoused by his royal pupil Alexander. In the detailed analysis of passages of the *Ethics* and *Politics*, too, there is much that is valuable and challenging. Still, one can see here very clearly the weakness, alluded to above, inherent in the attempt to make Plato and Aristotle testify to the positive content of works of their predecessors and opponents which they never cite explicitly and in fact scarcely refer to at all except obliquely. Havelock weakens his case by claiming too much; this may be illustrated by one simple example. *E.N.*, VIII, i, 6 is headed and translated as follows (p. 301):

Report denatured and reduced to level of commonplace

1. Several controversies have arisen over the topic of amity.
2. One [school] posits it as a similitude, so to speak, and posits that the amicable are 'similars'

3. which is why they say that like is as like and 'birds of a feather' and so on
4. while another [school] says that potters are the opposite with other potters, etc.

Here "one [school]" represents *οἱ μὲν*, "another [school]" is for *οἱ δέ*. After a paragraph of comment, the quotation continues at VIII, i, 7:

Report disguised as a question mark and disposed of dialectically

1. Problems about amity raised in a physical or cosmic context are not relevant.
2. Anthropological problems are relevant, for they are referable to human character and emotions (p. 302).

"Anthropological," for *ἀνθρωπικά* ("human" in Ross) might perhaps seem a rather technical term. The comment on this passage begins:

The preamble (items 1 and 2) to this analysis is noteworthy for the hint it gives that aside from the pre-Socratic speculations about physics (i.e., metaphysics of matter, etc.) there was also a field of anthropological speculation, which came into Aristotle's purview (pp. 302 f.).

This "hint" is hard to detect in the Greek text, or in a different translation. Ross, for example, has

The physical problems we may leave alone (for they do not belong to the present inquiry); let us examine those which are human and involve character and feeling.

Even such a small point makes the reader wary of Havelock's further conjecture:

This puts us in a position to guess, if we choose (and a later testimony will support the guess), that the philanthropic school was not content simply to identify a loose, generic, instinctive emotion in human beings but was prepared to describe its modes of realization in different degrees of intensity: Diverse forms of association, ranging from the loose and unconscious to the close and co-operative, could be brought under a single formula controlled by a single calculus; such would reconcile our basic common humanity with our evident variety of social and personal preferences (p. 303).

In these chapters the author finds many explicit references to doctrines of the liberals in sentences which have usually been taken to express either Aristotle's own view or that of uncritical common sense, sentences which Aristotle frequently analyzes further, often correcting or modifying them before reaching his conclusion. In some cases Aristotle is clearly referring to others than himself, and the vagueness is only in their identity (*δοκεῖ τισι, φασί, οἶονταί, οἱ μὲν . . . οἱ δέ, κτλ.*), but in others he seems more likely to be giving

views which he also shares. To take, once more, a single example, Aristotle writes on the relation of man and wife, ἀνδρὶ δὲ καὶ γυναικὶ φιλία δοκεῖ κατὰ φύσιν ὑπάρχειν . . . διὰ ταῦτα δὲ καὶ τὸ χρήσιμον εἶναι δοκεῖ καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ φιλίᾳ (VIII, xii, 7). Taken in the context, which cannot be quoted in full here, δοκεῖ in both sentences seems to express the author's view, but Havelock makes this into a liberal doctrine, inserted into his argument by Aristotle because of "a last desperate honesty" (p. 325); he translates (pp. 316 f.),

Male and female, 'it is held,' enjoy an amity according to nature . . . whence, 'it is held,' in this type of amity there inheres both utility and pleasure.

(It may be added that Havelock's interpretation of this passage is artificially strengthened somewhat by the fact that omission of a clause has led him to mistranslate κοινότερον, at 1162a 19.)

The author is so confident of being able to distinguish Aristotle's own words from those of the liberals whose views he is "reporting" that he prints one passage from *E. N.* V in parallel columns (pp. 332-7), going through the text to assign bits—clauses, sentences, or sections—alternately to Aristotle and to "the liberals." To many the assignment will appear arbitrary, quite apart from the fact that the text is somewhat altered and jumbled.

The last chapter, somewhat grandiosely entitled "Greek Liberalism: The Full Flower," offers nothing really new, but an exposition in consecutive form of the doctrines the author has found Aristotle reflecting in the *Ethics* and *Politics*.

Havelock specifically disclaims any part in the "warfare abroad . . . against the Greek idealists and their influence on social thinking," most strikingly exemplified, in recent years, by the attack of Popper and the defenses published by Levinson and others. While recognizing Plato and Aristotle as strongly anti-liberal and even authoritarian in their views, he gives them great credit for "a social discovery of immense importance, . . . the perception that a system of university education had now become socially indispensable for the progress of western culture" (p. 20). This is not a book about Plato and Aristotle, primarily, nor about education, and this theme is not developed in any detail. Nevertheless, some may doubt whether the service of the "masters of the Greek idealist tradition" in insisting on the necessity for training as a prerequisite to effective governmental operation can so far outweigh the disservice of their crystallization or reinforcement of authoritarian tendencies, especially if Havelock's own argument is right, as to justify the refusal of "a negative estimate of their over-all contribution to the science of society" (p. 20). But in any case, in spite of his efforts to be fair to them, it is doubtful whether many of their modern partisans will welcome warmly a book which so often speaks of their distortion, disguising, denaturing, logical corruption, trivialization, piecemeal dismemberment, cutting to size, interpolation, dilution, emendation, interpenetration, bringing under teleological control, misapplication, or theft of the theories of their liberal opponents. There seems to be a certain intemperance or exaggeration, which does not add to the

persuasiveness of the book, in speaking of "language lifted bodily from the true anthropologists" (p. 48), or of the "emasculatation of liberalism" (title of chapter XI). It is difficult to catch a culprit red-handed in distortion or perversion of works which themselves no longer survive, and this is the main weakness of Havelock's method. Since he is unable to offer many names or titles, there must be a rather uncomfortable vagueness in an expression like "the anthropologists," especially when it is not explicitly stated that the term refers to what might be called an anthropological approach to social theory. Havelock speaks of "the scientific source on which the dramatist is drawing," when describing Prometheus' account of man's progress (p. 61). There is of course no real evidence at all that Aeschylus had a specific scientific source, and we remember uncomfortably that an accumulation of zeros is still zero. One would not doubt that, to use another phrase from the same page, there was "anthropological speculation current" in Aeschylus' day, but Havelock does not attempt to say precisely to what degree it was formulated into an articulate system. This is not meant to deny, however, that Havelock's cumulative case is a strong one. How else, for example, are we to explain the relation of Platonic to Protagorean material in the *Protagoras* myth? There is also a strong presumption in the fact, which few would contest, that Plato, especially, is consciously taking a position in reaction against some of the ideas of his predecessors, pre-Socratic philosophers and Sophists. He was alarmed and apprehensive about the dangerous influence of their doctrines on the health of society.

In citing passages from ancient writers, Havelock usually breaks them up into the thought-units of which they are composed, "spelling them out," as he says, into their "items." The process makes prose writings look like free verse (often with individually numbered lines), and this is at first somewhat distracting. But in spite of some inconsistencies in the division of "items," in punctuation, and in capitalization, the device is convenient for detailed analysis.

The translation of the many passages cited is on the whole clear, lively, and accurate, though the language chosen often is somewhat tendentious. The fire of Prometheus is "a technological flame" (παντέχρον πυρὸς σέλας, 7), it is "the great resource that taught technology" (διδάσκαλος τέχνης . . . καὶ μέγας πόρος, 110 f.), "'twill teach [man] all technologies" (p. 254); in Popian summary,

One sentence short proclaims the truth unique:

Prometheus gave, what man received, *technique*. (pp. 505-6)

Prometheus' πάντα προῖξέπισταμαι σκεθρῶς τὰ μέλλοντ' is "of things that are to come my science is exact" (pp. 101 f.). Democritus says (fr. 144) that music is νεωτέραν; why translate "a deferred technique" (p. 116)? He says, as cited by Cicero (*Vors.*, 68 A 138), that the ancients were wise in instituting (*sapienter instituisse*) divination; this becomes "Men of an earlier period showed technical skill. . . ." (Our italics throughout.)

Along with his tendency to slant his translations in the direction of his general interpretation goes a tendency to exaggerate the likelihood that extant passages are referring explicitly to, or are

derived from, lost originals in the literature of the liberal tradition. He very frequently uses the word "report" in contexts where it surely cannot be taken quite in its usual specific sense.

A few small points may be added: P. 67: It is odd to omit the first antistrophe of Sophocles' ode on man. P. 108: item 16 (Anaxagoras 59 A 101) is given in abbreviated form, and the translation is based on an editorial conjecture. P. 109: "grow things and herd things and stockpile" misses the idiom in *φέρομεν καὶ ἄγομεν συλλαμβάνοντες*. P. 112: The last two sentences in item 21 (Arche-laous 60 A 4) are transposed; the page-and-line references to Diels-Kranz are misleading; the words *τὸ μὲν βραδυτέρως, τὸ δὲ ταχυτέρως* may or may not mean "in varying degrees of mobility." P. 116, item 30: two words are omitted, and a necessary comma. P. 142 (Dem., fr. 255): Can *προτελεῖν* mean "pay toll to"? "Make loans (or contributions) to" seems more likely. P. 143, Dem., fr. 251: *δυνάστησι*, applied to a form of government distinguished from democracy, is more likely to mean "tyrants" than "an oligarchy."

In spite of the interest of the topic and the enthusiasm of the author, this book is often rather hard to read. On his exposition, especially in the passages of text-analysis, one is tempted to quote the phrase he aptly uses in describing the fragments of Antiphon: "a style oddly compounded of pedantry and passion" (p. 256). This is something of a handicap in a book which is, and must be, mainly an essay in persuasion. With all its shortcomings, however, the book does provide a very stimulating background for the analysis of modern and contemporary liberalism. In addition, it deals interestingly with materials seldom treated seriously for their political implications, and contains good discussions of many particular texts, as well as special points like the concept of *nomos* ("custom-law") or the importance of the gnomie method.

EDWIN L. MINAR, JR.

DAVID W. MINAR.

DEPAUW UNIVERSITY.

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY.

R. E. WYCHERLEY. *Literary and Epigraphical Testimonia. Results of Excavations Conducted by the American School of Classical Studies at Athens, Vol. III.* Princeton, American School of Classical Studies at Athens, 1957. Pp. x + 260; 4 pls. \$10.00.

In the final publication of the Agora, three distinguished volumes, (I) E. B. Harrison's *Portrait Sculpture*, (II) M. Thompson's *Roman-Venetian Coins*, and now (IV) R. H. Howland's *Greek Lamps*, have appeared. R. E. Wycherley's *Testimonia* is the first historical-literary volume in the series. It will be opened with high expectations.

The preface was signed in December 1956, but there are six addenda on p. 225 which cover items, including two new unpublished inscriptions, through the summer of 1957. References to all the

addenda have been duly entered in the text. The title is not intended to imply that papyri are excluded, but they are few and of course literary; the only reference to a papyrus as such in any of the indexes is one to Philemon (T[estimonium] 679, p. 237). Contrastingly, inscriptions are present in hordes: there are more than 650, and they are indexed, as they should be, both by Agora inventory number and by publication (pp. 242-6). It is chiefly from inscriptions, of course, that new knowledge was to be expected, and it is in adding the evidence of inscriptions to what was known before that the volume makes its largest contribution.

The area is the Greek Agora, including parts not excavated, to the north e.g. the Stoa Poikile, to the south the Prytaneion. The Eleusinion has only been touched. These are the three most important unexcavated buildings in Athens. Of the two (undiscovered) Hellenistic gymnasia, the Diogeneion is omitted, the Ptolemaion included, pp. 142-4. So much has been found in the Agora that one easily forgets there are these five structures still undone.

The book is generous, on the whole, in its inclusiveness. The Prytaneion, still unlocated, may be outside the Agora altogether, and both gymnasia. (The uncertainty about what to include affected the Index: the Ptolemaion, partially restored in T456 and T461, but present complete in T460 and mentioned under T463, is omitted from the Index altogether. It can be got at under "Gymnasium," but under Gymnasium T456-463 are not referred to except as 'p. 214,' nor under Ptolemy.—Ptolemy Euergetes is omitted altogether under T458 and in the Index, though present under T245.) The Roman Agora is included only incidentally, but the compiler does not hesitate to discuss it in an interesting page (190) on the area as a whole; and he goes far afield for an inscription about the Mother of the Gods, T513. Years of wide searching have gone into the gathering of the material, and I doubt whether much is omitted. J. H. Oliver, *A. J. A.*, LXII (1958), p. 335, adds a reference to the Prytaneion in Herodotus VI, 103. The Nymphaion somehow slipped out: *Hesperia*, X (1941), p. 38; XXIV (1955), p. 59.

The compiler is candid about the arbitrariness of the decisions, but no sensible person will criticize him for what the volume as a whole does or does not include. The fact is, in any case, that in the main the exact boundaries of the Agora have not been determined, or even whether under the designation ἀγορά the area always continued to have official boundaries; or what its precise legal status was at any time. In the late sixth century B. C. there was a systematic demarcation, part of the survey that fixed as a center the altar of the Twelve Gods. H. A. Thompson, *Hesp.*, Suppl. IV (1940), pp. 107-11 and addenda, p. v, first made this out; apparently it follows the survey and herms of Hipparchus, T305. From this period in any case come three boundary-stones, one of them found *in situ*; and they all use the term ἀγορά (T713). The Index, s. v. Agora (!), gives no help.

In the fourth century B. C. the term used in a series of boundary stones, which I suppose represent a new period of surveying, is Κεραμεικός. Wycherley has an essay on this subject, pp. 221-4, but it is not systematic and does not follow a chronological order. A third entity, and one which doubtless had definite boundaries, was the deme called

officially *Κεραμεῖς* (demitic, ἐκ *Κεραμείων*). As a deme, it was of medium size, to judge by the number of demesmen known, and by its bouleutic representation, which in the late third century B.C. was at least six. The tribe was Akamantis. Whether the deme Kerameis included what was loosely called 'the Agora' is unknown. Part at least of Kolonos Agoraios was evidently in the deme Melite (T246). There may also have been a trittys *Κεραμείων*. The usual term for the whole region, undoubtedly including the Agora and much if not all of the deme Kerameis, was *Κεραμεικός*. A closer study of all this is needed.

Topography is the objective of the volume, not, primarily, archaeology nor history nor anything else; only brief synthetic accounts of buildings, giving mainly summaries of the testimonia, preface the successive collections of texts. In judging whether or not to include a given item of which the content is of doubtful value, Wycherley has sensibly preferred to err on the side of generosity, and to let the reader judge. Later Classical works which misinterpret earlier are occasionally present, sometimes with only cautious qualifications of their value; but a great many are excluded. Being often earlier, inscriptional should have preceded, not followed, the literary testimonia. Literary sources of all periods are usually treated with tenderness. The Aristotelian *Const. Ath.* is rejected, but only gently, where actually it is grievously wrong (but cf. pp. 5-6). "It is ironical" that Thucydides on Enneakrounos "gives more trouble than any other passage on Athenian topography," but "one can trust Thucydides to have ascertained the truth as far as possible" (p. 2).

Wherever the facts are plain the statement ought to be sharp. To write e.g. of the Altar of the Twelve Gods that the identification is "almost certain" (my italics), when the inscription T378 was actually found *in situ*, so that according to E. Vanderpool the identification is "now securely fixed" (*Hesperia*, XVIII [1949], p. 132—a reference not cited under T378)—is not good scholarship; and moreover it gives a toe-hold to the next theorist who comes along with a desire to astound everyone by a "brilliant" theory which makes something into something else.

With the real, complex, hard problems, it is not quite the same. Nearly all problems are helped by having the evidence laid out, although none is solved: the alleged absence of archives until the fourth century (pp. 3, 17); Royal Stoa vs. Stoa of Zeus; *axones* and *kyrbeis*; Enneakrounos; the Stoa of the Herms; the *dikasteria* (testimonia on the courts are not formally collected but are reserved for a future publication; but there are excellent up-to-date essays on pp. 144-9). In this matter the compiler's hesitations made him wise. It was not Wycherley's place to formulate theories, but only to provide references and a word of summary. This he has done. If toward sick theories he is sometimes generous to a fault, still pre-excavation conjectures are rigidly excluded ("it is a sobering experience to observe how fundamentally mistaken most of them were" [p. vi]).

As a whole the Introduction, which surveys the entire body of the sources from the earliest to the latest, is learned and sound. It is neither spiced nor spoiled by the author's own theories. The pages

(15-19) on the topographical value of the *Fundorte* of inscriptions are the most original; having worked some on the data, I can report that Wycherley's usual open good sense shows at its best. When more detailed studies are made, they will begin here.

It is the fashion now to think much, or at least to say much, about "organization." How should hundreds of references, dealing with all the variety of matters germane to a Greek agora, be organized? One shudders at what the "organizers" would do. Wycherley has really let the material organize itself (p. v), i.e. he chose to do the obvious. (I) The Stoas, (II) Shrines, (III) Public Buildings and Offices, (IV) Market, (V) Honorary Statues, plus only a little (VI) Miscellaneous: these are all the chapters. The scheme is utterly simple, intelligible without effort, a masterpiece in the ordering of masses of items. There is no grand and bothersome logic, no elaborate progress from one chapter to the next. Ample repetitions and cross-references take care of items with multiple relevancies.

Within the chapters, Wycherley is again rationally irrational. Without regard to chronology or anything else, he follows the alphabetic order in the chapters on Shrines, on 'Public Buildings,' and on Statues. Almost always the reader can turn quickly to what he wants in these chapters. But for IV, the testimonia on the Market, the order, nowhere stated, is: General, Foods, Flowers and Wreaths, Wearing Materials, Women (Agora of), Kerkopes (Agora of), Perfumes, Artefacts, Books, Horses, and Persons. These are my own headings; the book has nothing but 40 specific topics, Flour, Bread, Opson, etc.

A consequence of all this is that the one writing of unique value is much split up. Pausanias is still supreme. In a sense the book is really Pausanias in the midst of a cloud of less informative items; and the passages of Pausanias are scattered throughout all the chapters. In the Index of Authors (p. 236), however, and in a special Plate (IV), the order of Pausanias' route through the Agora is traced. Moreover Wycherley adds a little to the classic Vanderpool article (*Hesperia*, XVIII [1949], pp. 129-37) in T245 and T378, and his Introduction has two valuable critical pages (pp. 10-12).

About the arrangement of the material, there is one complaint. The Table of Contents has only a few big broad headings. Thus "II. Shrines" is the only guidance for 78 pages containing 284 testimonia on 18 main cults with 54 headings (counting each epithet) in all. The order of cults is alphabetical, but a list would be helpful in the Table of Contents, because e.g. the Phosphoroi are under Artemis with no cross-reference under P, so that they can be found only through the Index of Subjects. Worse is "III. Public Buildings and Offices," also in alphabetic order, where the reader has to guess that the Dikasteria are not under that title, or under Courts, or under Heliastic, but under Law Courts; worse still, the Desmoterion (under that title) is tucked in with them; worst of all, there is no entry "Desmoterion" in the Index of Subjects (although "Prison" is there). Running heads help the floundering reader a little, but anyone who plans to use the volume much will make and insert his own table of contents, much expanded.

There is a second reason for a detailed table of contents. Unless it is done here, the full contents of the volume cannot be laid out

anywhere so as to be seen at a glance. The cults of the Agora, for instance, make up a list which is important and interesting in itself, from Athena and Zeus, who have the most epithets and connections, through Theseus and Eleos, who got much attention, to such little people as the Hero on the Roof. It is notable that a conjecture of Wilamowitz made in 1880 is confirmed: the altar of the Twelve Gods became the altar of Pity. When, as here, an area has been definitively published, the book ought to say so: M. Crosby, *Hesperia*, Suppl. VIII (1949), pp. 82-103 (the Twelve Gods); H. A. Thompson, *Hesperia*, XXI (1952), pp. 47-82 (Eleos). Discussion of the cult and the reconstruction: G. Zuntz, *Cl. Med.*, XIV (1953), pp. 71-85 (topography not altogether sound); R. E. Wycherley, *C. Q.*, N. S., IV (1954), pp. 143-50.

A student of cults could wish that the chapter itself, "II. Shrines," though it includes mere statues of gods and of heroes, might have included even more, so as to make up a systematic and inclusive list of the cults in the Agora, all in the one chapter. There should be entries for cross-references not just to certain deities but to every one of them, e.g. to Agathe Tyche, T376, T542; Ajax and the Aianteion, pp. 90-3; Demokratia, T696, T248; Enyo T117; Epitegios, Hero, T147, T150; Herakles T117; Iatros, Hero, p. 113 (not in Index), T340, T347, T498; Pherrephatte, pp. 85, 113, T323; other cults in the Eleusinion and/or associated with Demeter and Kore; Roma, T131; Strategos, Hero, T579; and whatever altars there were in the dikasteria. On the other hand, surely Harmodios and Aristogeiton (pp. 93-8) belong among "Statues," not among "Shrines"; they receive only *ἐναγίσματα*. Of the two later pairs of statues permitted to be set up near them, Antigonos and Demetrios were at least temporarily deified (T696); then came Brutus and Cassius. The epithet Agoraios was given to only two deities, Zeus and Hermes; perhaps it was "civic" and relatively late in origin. On the other hand, Kourotrophos (add to Index, which has Kourotrophos only under Ge), a deity who according to the State Calendar received (small) sacrifices so regularly that for this reason alone she would seem ancient, is not known to have had a place of cult in the Agora; doubtless she was taken care of properly in her precinct higher up, near the foot of the Akropolis. The sacrifice in the State Calendar to the Charites which is cited as T132 (add that the price shows they received a goat), is not for the Charites of the sanctuary belonging to the Demos and Charites, T125-131, but was offered rather with a different group of deities, listed for sacrifices at the Eleusinia. T132 should therefore be omitted. But add sacrifices to Demokratia on 12 Boedromion: (*I. G.*, II², 1496, line 131; Plut., *De Gloria Ath.*, 7; L. Deubner, *Att. Feste*, p. 39; W. S. Ferguson, *Studies Capps*, p. 150, n. 26), which surely would be offered in the Agora as well as on the Akropolis.

Non-verbal testimonia are excluded, so that a few structures get no mention. It is worse with Honorary Statues. The dates and the persons selected are of both archaeological and historical interest. In the book as a whole, Wycherley mentions about 57 historical persons as receiving honorary statues, but again, on his own principles, some who lack headings in Ch. V ought to have them, with cross-references: Gorgippos T700; Iphicrates 173, T693, T702;

Satyros, King of Thrace T700. The distribution of these in periods is of some interest. Honorary portrait statues are uncommon before the fourth century, but that is the century in which the largest number of persons portrayed actually flourished: there are 17. For the third century, 14. The rest are scattered with no more than five to any one century, from Epimenides to Ulpus Eubiotus with his children. The periods when the statues were made are another subject, the times the statues lasted are yet a third. But the book does not give the whole story. Of course the statues unattested by verbal testimonia are omitted. Thus *Agora I* (Harrison), No. 1, an Herodotos of Roman date and unknown *Standort*, is not in. But none of the Harrison portrait statues are included, in fact *Agora I* is not even mentioned. Harrison, p. 7, discusses the various subjects of portraits. There was a herm, Roman, of Anakreon; in Athens somewhere, three statues of Dexippos, three of his father. Demetrios of Phaleron once had many statues. Harrison publishes no fewer than 55 heads (of whom 15 are women, whereas Wycherley has only two). And so from *Agora III* all these—mostly dozens of *kosmetai*, priests, and other officials of the Roman period—are left out, Moiragenes (No. 25, pp. 35-7; in her Index *s. v.*, for 735-37 read 7, 35-37) and the rest, verbal testimonia and all. It was a hardy policy to adopt, and probably sensible, even if it meant the abandonment of the idea of a true corpus of literary and epigraphical testimonia.

There was enough to do. The sheer accumulation of material is tremendous. There are in all no fewer than 731 testimonia. Most are presented fully, in the original. It is important for the reader to know exactly what the compiler thinks the original means: a capital feature of the book is therefore the translation of all the Testimonia into English. The work seems careful and exact. In T679 there is no "thief," only *τινὰ*; and for T710 the Index, *s. v.* Solon, laws of, has Solon's "laws" on bronze, whereas the Greek shows it is a statue of Solon himself which is bronze (cf. T80). The translation is correct, but the indexing was hasty. Similarly the Index *s. v.* Alexander speaks of "statues" of him, but there is no evidence of more than one (T521): the plural comes from "statues of Philip and Alexander," i. e. one of each. Elsewhere I shall try to show that the *kyrbeis-axones* problem is capable of solution; in any case *κύρβεις* should not be "pillars." Under T248 for 996 read 696. On p. 203 (T611) a comma, elevated, is misleading.

Wycherley is scrupulous about the exact provenience of every inscribed fragment. The scheme of reference in Plate II, however, is not that of the old (lettered) section, or 'sector,' with its own coördinates, but a superior map of the entire area, with a grid that includes all in one scheme. Some map with the old scheme overlaid is needed.

In a relevant sense, the Agora was the heart of Athens, and matters of interest, both familiar and unfamiliar, crowd these pages. For one reader at least, what emerges as of most interest is the still largely unexcavated Eleusinion: pp. 16 (add to Index), 74-85; 222 (p. 122, given in Index, seems to be a mistake for 222); and add now *C. P.*, LIII (1958), pp. 174-5. For the identification, E. Vanderpool, *Hesperia*, XVIII (1949), p. 134. The Eleusinion was a region in itself, large and well-fenced—rather than walled, since it seems

to have had its own boundary stones (p. 84). The Boule of 500 or of 600 could meet in it. Yet it contained also two temples, altars, a kitchen, sacristy (?) or temple, treasury (?), tombs (Immarados, and doubtless others), inscribed stelai, dozens of inscribed dedications, statues, and great numbers of the characteristic *kernoi*, of which five deposits have been found. On the other hand, the Agora as a market (Ch. IV), whatever way it is looked at, appears in this book to be secondary: the comparatively few Testimonia, although several are exciting, leave that impression.

All in all, the defects are comparatively slight, and it comes close to being a superb book, indispensable and useful for a wide range of interests. The printer, J. J. Augustin of Glückstadt, has a beautiful rounded Greek font; the paper (though not the binding) is light and behaves well; the two-columned pages are clean, easy to read; and the three detailed Plates are by J. Travlos. The donor (J. D. Rockefeller, Jr.), the officials of the Agora Excavations, the many who helped (p. vii), and most of all R. E. Wycherley, deserve praise and thanks.

Fifty years ago, Mitchell Carroll urged the need for a medium-sized handbook in this field (*C. W.*, III [1909], p. 23). We have had one and, practically, lost it. Ida Thallon Hill's *Ancient City of Athens* has gone out of print, I am told, "indefinitely." A revised edition would be welcome. Among the dozen reviews I have seen, only the following have content: *A. J. A.*, LVIII (1954), p. 345; *C. J.*, XLIX (1953/4), pp. 285-6; *Gnomon*, XXVI (1954), pp. 132-4; *J. H. S.*, LXXV (1955), pp. 186-7—although H. Plommer seems to have printed only the querulous half of his review—; *Phoenix*, IX (1955), pp. 35-8. Among corrections which ought to be made, but seem to have gone unnoticed, are the perplexing numbers of some of the notes on Ch. XV, "The Parthenon and Propylaia" (pp. 152-66), which contain important unpublished material. The numbers of the notes on pp. 240-2 should be changed as follows: P. 240: change the number of note '5' to 9, note '6' to 5; p. 241: change the number of note '7' to 6, note '8' to 7; p. 242: change the number of note '9' to 8. And Pausanias should get an entry in the Index.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

STERLING DOW.

GAETANO DE SANCTIS. *Storia dei Romani*. Volume IV: La Fondazione dell'Impero. Parte II: Vita e pensiero nell'età delle grandi conquiste, Tomo II. Firenze, "La Nuova Italia," 1957. Pp. viii + 125. 1300 lire.

The present fascicle was published in December, 1957, fifty years after the first volume and eight months after the author's death at the age of eighty-six. Volume IV, Part 3 will follow, containing an account of the period from Pydna to the capture of Numantia. Miss Taylor has already described in this Journal (LXXVI [1955], p. 86) the circumstances in which De Sanctis set aside and then after a

long interval resumed his *Storia dei Romani*, and the various difficulties under which these last sections were completed. The obstacles and handicaps which were overcome may increase our respect and gratitude, but there is not the slightest need for making allowances or for indulgent piety. This is a vigorous, original, and highly valuable piece of work, fluently and vividly written.

The fascicle deals with private law in the period of the great conquests, roughly down to 133. The sections on finance and economics, which were to be included, evidently were not completed and will not appear; it is scarcely necessary to say that this is a considerable loss and disappointment. There are five chapters: the law of actions, family law, the will and succession, property, and obligations. These headings are of course quite familiar to anyone who has ever studied Roman Law, and the topics taken up under each are equally so. This might not seem to promise much that was new, and novelty in expounding and interpreting law is not the author's chief concern. It is, rather, to present private law as an integral and important part of the general cultural development of the third and especially second centuries, and in this De Sanctis has few direct predecessors among either historians or students of law. In fact, he hardly ever has occasion to refer to one of his fellow-historians. Few of them, even those who following Mommsen stress and demonstrate the importance of law, incorporate much private law in their reconstructions of any period; the early Republic is somewhat an exception, partly because dearth of other materials stimulates interest in all sections of the Twelve Tables. One may recall that in the *Cambridge Ancient History*, where collaboration made possible an unusually comprehensive survey, the chapter on Roman Law in the Republic is the last in the last volume devoted to that period (IX, ch. 21), though doubtless it would be wrong to conclude that it was an afterthought or that the editors did not know what else to do with it; in any event, it was written by a distinguished Professor of Civil Law, not by a historian. As for the jurists, though their approach increasingly tends to be historical, they quite reasonably concern themselves primarily with the internal development of law without assuming responsibility for cultural, social, and economic history as a whole. Finally, the sources for the law of the third and second centuries are so meagre that the period is usually combined with the preceding or with that which follows, as in M. Kaser's excellent account in the *Handbuch* (1955). For all these reasons De Sanctis was undertaking a formidable task and one which he could have avoided without violating precedent. Few will doubt that he did right to include private law in his *Storia dei Romani*, and in this section of it, for certainly it is one of the most imposing and original cultural achievements of the Romans, reflecting directly their life and mentality.

In outline De Sanctis' reconstruction is naturally similar to that found in other recent works. The period covered, the mid-second century in particular, was one of accelerated change and marks the transition from the increasingly inadequate, archaic law of agrarian Rome to classical or at any rate pre-classical law. The basic causes for the developments in law lay in the conquests of Rome, in the rapid and profound transformation of Roman society and economy,

and in the closer and more extensive contacts with other peoples, above all with the Greeks and Greek civilization. The principal instrument of change was the formulary procedure now extended to civil law, with the increased freedom this gave to the praetor and jurists.

The sketch would be valuable simply as a concise, up-to-date summary which has no counterpart for this period. Its value is increased by the generous citation of sources and of modern works up to about 1955. But its chief contribution and interest of course are found in the perspective from which De Sanctis views legal institutions and forms and in his judgments and observations on particular points. A few examples may be noted. Comparing literature, art, and religion he concludes that private law, along with the empire itself, was the greatest and most enduring achievement of the Romans in this period (p. 125); this will astonish no one. Though he emphasized the influence of Greek thought on Roman in other areas and refers to it on occasion in connection with law, he regards the development of private law as essentially autonomous and organic with little direct, specific borrowing. The lucid treatment of the family (pp. 36-50) touches on many matters of wide historical importance. Perhaps something more might have been said about the consequences of the proprietary incapacity of a *filius familias* (p. 60); in general the survival of *patria potestas* gives rise to reservations about Roman practical sense and the resourcefulness of their jurists. De Sanctis is convincing in choosing to emphasize *patria potestas* rather than individualistic liberalism in the freedom of the Roman testator to dispose of his estate (p. 56). Many would regard the transformation of patriarchal marriage into a free, dissoluble union of equals, with the resultant greater freedom and independence of women, as among the most impressive and congenial accomplishments of Roman jurisprudence. De Sanctis is troubled by the dissolution of family ties (pp. 44-6, 50). His sketch of slavery (pp. 83-97) does not gloss over its repellent features or the failure of Republican law to provide any protection for slaves. He joins those who in antiquity and in modern times have seen unfortunate results arising from the large-scale integration of freedmen in the citizen-body (p. 97).

Despite the solidity and excellence of this reconstruction, our evidence for private law in the third and second centuries makes any reconstruction often hazardous and insecure; it is one of the contributions of such a work as this to give form and significance to the problems that exist. The sources are scanty and relatively late, and the information they provide is disconnected and imprecise. For example, the exact content and dates of several *leges* which are cited in our sources as modifying private law remain uncertain. Even the *lex Aebutia*, which introduced the formulary procedure, is only approximately dated (it may not be as early as De Sanctis believes, p. 28), and we have less information than we should like about its background and effects. Chronology is a constant problem. It is doubtful, for instance, whether the *color insaniae* was employed in the second century (p. 67). Such questions are of little concern to those investigating developed classical law of the empire, but for an historical account of the preceding period they are obviously

essential. Further study of existing sources will doubtless provide substantial results, along with much speculation, but new evidence such as the tablets from Herculaneum are furnishing for a later period would be even more helpful.

In summary, this important contribution to the cultural history of the Republic is worthy of its author and of the work of which it is a part.

J. F. GILLIAM.

STATE UNIVERSITY OF IOWA.

WILLIAM BEARE. *Latin Verse and European Song. A Study in Accent and Rhythm.* London, Methuen, 1957. Pp. 296.

Beare undertakes to treat two large subjects, but we should hasten to add that he does not limit himself either to verse or to Europe. One of his twenty-six chapters considers accent and ictus in rhythmic Latin prose, another, Hebrew verse. There are various references to Syriac, Arabic, Hindu, Sanskrit, Iranian, Indian, Chinese, Oriental music, Akkadian (p. 109; from the *Radio Times*), and Babylonian (pp. 112, 222). The various subjects of this vast galaxy have little in common except almost universal uncertainty. They add little or no enlightenment to the problems of Latin verse. Under "Acknowledgements" he states:

This book was begun as an attempt to answer the argument of Professor Philip Whaley Harsh . . . the central question, however, is one which has perplexed me during most of my working life. The statistical method seems to me to yield no clear conclusion, depending as it does on the outlook of the author.

In general, Beare briefly discusses a few of the vital questions of Early Latin metrics, but his book consists primarily of statements of views. His own are summarized as follows (p. 167):

I will now state my own views concerning Plautine metre. It was a free adaptation of Greek metre which strictly obeyed quantity in the sense that a short is never substituted for a long, and that the final foot in many types of verse is kept pure. But the treatment of all feet (except the last) as alike by frequent substitution of a long (or two shorts) where the Dipody Law demanded a single short, coupled with the care to distinguish the second last from the last foot and the careful handling of the caesura and the diaeresis, indicates in my opinion that the Latin writer was particularly concerned to get the number of feet right. Brevis Breuians seems to me to have been essentially a metrical convenience, used by the Republican dramatists but not employed elsewhere, even by 'popular' writers like Phaedrus. It may have begun with the metrical 'rise' which was allowed to begin with a short, obviously demanding to be taken with the following syllable, which was

therefore deemed short as well. This licence was then extended to the 'dip.'

The most fundamental weakness of this work lies in its lack of clarity on basic concepts, especially accent. Beare says (p. 44; cf. p. 37): "The word 'accent' is used in English to include both the pitch-accent and the stress-accent; but whatever the connection between these two, they are conceptually at any rate, quite distinct . . ." No. Accent involves pitch, stress, and duration. For living languages this has been proved by objective recordings.¹ The relative importance of these factors varies greatly from one language to another. In ancient Greek, pitch was dominant. In English, although stress is dominant, pitch and duration are also present. It is convenient to refer to Greek verse as quantitative and to English as accentual. This does not necessarily mean that quantity plays no role in English rhythm, for accent in English normally governs quantity. Again Beare (p. 28; cf. pp. 40-1) assumes that language is accented in verse as it is in ordinary speech. As far as quantity is concerned the opposite can be demonstrated: That the second syllable of *tace* was exactly twice as long as the first in ordinary speech is not likely, and it is obviously not true that the second syllable of *tace* was exactly the same length as the first syllable of *iunctus*, or that *coniunx* in normal speech was pronounced in exactly the same length of time as *tace*. Natural quantities are modified in the enunciation of verse. Accent too may be.

In regard to accent in English verse Beare (p. 17) says: "Though in delivery of English verse much liberty is left to the reciter, he is by no means free to distort the accentuation of a word of more than one syllable; if the verse is such that it forces him to do so, then it is bad verse." Somewhat reluctantly, however, Beare (p. 41) may accept "a slight secondary stress" on the final syllable of "accentually dactylic" English words. Again (p. 26, cf. pp. 58, 108), Beare states: "Nevertheless clash is not altogether avoidable; and when it occurs, the music wins." Beare (p. 99) also recognizes some divergence from prose enunciation in that in French verse mute *e* is usually counted.

Beare (p. 28) misquotes the first line of Milton's *Paradise Lost*:

Of that first disobedience, and the fruit . . .

He then says that a natural stress falls on "first" ("an emphatic monosyllable"), and intimates that [the false] "that" is unstressed. Such cavalier treatment of the very difficult problem of emphasis yields no sound result.

Beare (p. 134) says of Seneca ". . . and if he ends the line with a cretic word, he precedes it by elision. . . ." This is not correct. The matter is complicated; one authority says ". . . the final cretic that begins with a consonant is rare in Seneca except in verses which have a monosyllable before the cretic. . . ." ²

¹ In general, see L. Laurand, *Rev. Phil.*, XII (1938), pp. 133-48.

² Michael Coffey ("Seneca Tragedies . . . 1922-1955," *Lustrum* 1957/2, p. 171) in his summary of the work of Strzelecki, *De Senecae trimetro iambico quaestiones selectae* (Cracow, 1938).

Beare (p. 157) says: "Quintilian tells us that the accent of a Latin word *never* falls on the final syllable." But Beare knows very well that it does, for he has cited numerous examples (p. 54). Quintilian is laying down general rules; there are various exceptions, and just a few lines above (I, 5, 28) he has said "*evenit ut metri quoque condicio mutet accentum.*"³ Beare (p. 56; cf. p. 196) cites this statement and makes short shrift of it. But there it remains.

Almost half of the book deals with Late and Medieval Latin. In his chapter, "The Verse of the People," he writes (p. 184):

... numerous cases where the word-accent, if allowed to affect the rhythm, would be a positive embarrassment. Thus in B. [= *C. E. L.*] 103.5:

parentes amauit, n[ostram] duxit] coniugem,

the first word has apparently to be scanned as an anapaest, ~ ~ -, although the second syllable is both long and accented. In B. 108.5:

rerum bonarum fuit haec ornata suis,

the fifth foot was apparently *-nata*, the final syllable *-ta* being treated as long though naturally short and adjacent to the accented syllable. In B. 130.2:

id illi di faciant semper uiuo et mortuo,

the first foot is apparently *id illi*, with shortening of the long (and accented) first syllable of *illi*.

Now if we must scan these lines, in the first example Buecheler's suggestion (emend to *parentem*) seems the most plausible one—indeed, from the rest of the inscription, the obvious one. In the third example, naturally Beare is embarrassed by the shortening of the first syllable of *illi*; he has already told us that Brevis Brevians was a metrical phenomenon and that it disappeared early (p. 167). By the way, why was it ever used? Words with iambic scansion are extremely convenient in iambic and trochaic verse. And if Brevis Brevians was wholly metrical and if *ille* was always accented on the first syllable, how are we to explain the development of *ille*, *iste*, etc., in the Romance Languages?

Again, Beare quotes from Bede (p. 207; cf. p. 12, 225): "... the iambic metre is the model on which is formed that admirable hymn

rex aeterne domine,
rerum creator omnium,
qui eras ante saecula
semper cum patre filius."

Beare then inserts the word "o" in the first line and arranges the verses after a metrical pattern (iambic). He assumes that the second

³ See also *Sacerdos*, VI, 448, 20 ff. Keil (cited by Beare, pp. 60-1, 65). In spite of this, Beare later (p. 175) states: "No Roman seems conscious that words might be differently pronounced according to the metre in which they were written, or their position in the line, or whether they were in verse or in prose."

and fourth lines (and by emendation the first line) have an "iambic" first foot (spondees, as in iambic dimeter). So Beare finds a great deal of "clash" in popular and medieval poetry because he foists upon it the precise metrical analysis proper to Early and Classical Latin; and since he finds clash, he concludes that accent was not a governing principle even in Medieval Latin. He says (p. 288):⁴ "Thus in medieval, as in classical, verse we are mocked by the dilemma that, if metre is a guide to pronunciation, in the sense that the movement of the verse is founded on and therefore reflects the accent of actual speech, then Latin had no fixed accent." The alternative must be considered: that Medieval Latin verse had no fixed meter (or at least did not follow the exact laws of Classical Latin verse).

Beare scoffs at secondary accent even in Late Latin where Romance philologists accept it (pp. 216-18). Again, he seems to reject certain philological dicta when he states (p. 233): "... Greek never ceased to be a living language; it is spoken to the present day . . . Latin, on the other hand, ceased at quite an early period to be a living language, spoken by the ordinary people; perhaps by A. D. 500. . . ."

In general Beare is unsympathetic with philological problems and insensitive to nice linguistic distinctions. Not only does he use the single alternative of pitch or stress. Clash for him is clash, with no general distinction between clash on short syllables and clash on long (although of course he knows that Plautus and Terence do not allow *genere* with clash [on the penult] but frequently use *argentum* with clash). So he treats all the meters of Plautus alike in regard to clash, insisting on its frequency in anapests. So he treats Seneca with Plautus and Terence. He tends to find special characteristics in the language of those living in Africa (p. 245, etc.). He is inaccurate when he states (p. 211): "The majority of German, English and American scholars prefer the second view. According to this, Latin had had from earliest times a strong stress-accent, and consequently a natural tendency to accentual verse." Concerning Latin of the third century B. C. and later, few if any of these scholars believe Latin had a *strong* stress-accent; they do believe that the element of stress during this period was more conspicuous than it was in Classical Greek. In dealing with his opponents, Beare does not distinguish between objectively established facts (statistics) and attempts—often admittedly desperate—to explain these facts.

Again and again Beare (p. 159, cf. pp. 89, 116, 212, 241, 289) complains bitterly of "our instinctive desire to find in Latin verse a rhythm which seems intelligible." The desire of the reviewer, how-

⁴ Cf. p. 250: "As the quantitative structure weakens—at least in the types of composition intended for the people—it is replaced not by accentual verse but by mere syllable-counting, the line ending with a cadence which might often be regarded as either quantitative or accentual."

For a more satisfactory approach to the very complicated problems of medieval versification, see now: Dag Norberg, *Introduction à l'étude de la versification latine médiévale* (Acta Univ. Stock., *Studia Lat. Stock.*, V [Stockholm, 1958]), especially pp. 5, 186.

ever, is not for this, which seems to the reviewer very easily achieved, but for an explanation of the marked divergencies of dialogue Latin meters from the Greek originals: the complete absence of lines like *Epitrepontes* 50 K³, the exclusion of the pyrrhic caesura of a tribrach foot in iambic verse, the avoidance of clash on proceleusmatic feet, the elimination of clash on the penult of a tribrach word, the marked reduction of clash on iambic words,⁵ and the stricter regard for caesura in Latin and the almost complete absence of lines in senarii having a spondaic or iambic word occupying the third foot. In the third foot, Plautus uses the same types of words which Menander uses, even those which preclude the penthemimeral caesura or the hephthemimeral or both at once, except those combinations which in Latin would involve clash of ictus and accent. These and these only are normally avoided. They are common in Menander. A sample hundred verses from the *Epitrepontes* show fifteen or twenty such combinations; a sample hundred from Plautus, one. We know from published statistics that these samples are typical.⁶

PHILIP WHALEY HARSH.

STANFORD UNIVERSITY.

GEORGES MÉAUTIS. *Sophocle: Essai sur le héros tragique*. Paris, Éditions Albin Michel, 1957. Pp. 295.

The principal thesis may be stated as follows: The Sophoclean tragedy is the story of the *pathos* of a hero (or heroine). This hero is a superior person, whose services to others have been great. He encounters their ingratitude, is hurt or destroyed in the most cruel circumstances of derision and misunderstanding, goes through the dark night of loneliness and an agonizing phase of self-doubt, but is at last true to himself and qualifies for the quasi-immortality which Greek belief bestowed on its heroes and heroines.

Such a thesis, which I hope has been fairly stated, does not in truth constitute the whole content of the monograph, but is a unifying theme for seven chapters, in each of which one of the extant tragedies is retold by way of paraphrase from beginning to end. The analogy with the story of the passion of Christ is acknowledged, indeed emphasized. There is also an obvious analogy with what might for convenience be called the *eniautos-daimon* theory of Murray, but there is a difference too, in that there is emphasis not only on the routine of suffering endured by the spirit, but also on the secular character of the hero, his superiority in mind, heart, and every kind of stature. Thus Méautis, though anticipated on one side by Murray, on the other by Whitman, can still claim originality for his thesis; a thesis which, it may be said at once, is valuable, and adds to our

⁵ Beare (p. 163) says that the great majority of iambic words retain their final long syllables. In initial or interior positions in the verse, exactly the opposite is true.

⁶ Cf. Drexler, *Gnomon*, XXIII (1951), p. 169.

understanding of Sophocles; but one which also demands its sacrifices in the way of omission and exaggeration, which oversimplifies, and, like other original theories, can not be accepted entire.

To begin with the thesis: The hero has great exploits to his credit. Often, this is not true. It is not true of either Antigone or Electra. It is not the whole truth about Ajax, either, whose tragedy consists in part at least in the fact that for all his great endowments he has failed where his father succeeded. Is it not, rather, that all these heroes, even Ajax, even Heracles and Deianeira, pass their final *peira* and demonstrate triumphantly that they are true to themselves? Sometimes, this seems to be what Méautis means. It is a question of high or heroic character. And it is here that in the full analysis Méautis has achieved an intimate and difficult *rapprochement* with his author. Briefly, he seems to accept the following: In the world of Sophoclean persons (which Méautis too often thinks of as the real world) there are some people who are simply superior to the bulk of mankind (this less noble bulk being divided into the well-meaning and the ill-meaning). Regardless of the record, these superior people are entitled to expect better treatment than the ignoble. Only so can one explain the persistent effort to "sell" Ajax to the reader while degrading Tecmessa. There is, then, a freemasonry of the elect—if this sounds too much like the Baron de Charlus, I regret it—and they are choice souls who recognize choice souls: Philoctetes and Neoptolemus, Oedipus and Theseus, Teucer and Odysseus when the latter "makes the grade." To me, the reviewer, all this is much less attractive than it seems to be to Méautis. By the same token, he is in this way probably closer to Sophocles than I. For it is best to admit that Sophocles was a good bit of a Bourbon; only thus can one account for some of the ethical implications in his plots.

Yet this moral and political aspect is only one aspect of Sophocles. Even here, there are limitations. Méautis tries, as so many critics of Sophocles do, to confine Sophoclean tragedy within a single formula. Odysseus, for instance, with his common sense and *sophrosyne*, can not be a hero of Sophoclean tragedy (p. 46). Excellent. Others (including myself) have said this. The only thing wrong with it is, it doesn't work. Sophocles did in fact write at least four tragedies about Odysseus (early Sophocles is still Sophocles) and this not only shows that Méautis has ignored the bulky though distracted evidence of the fragments; it also shows that he has drawn the lines of definition too tight. In truth, the pattern-story he outlines (his "thesis") is only one way of elaborating the sequence of deception and recognition, which could be done quite differently, whether as in *Electra*, which is briefly dealt with perhaps because it does not altogether fit into the monograph, or as in some of the more romantic lost plays, *The Kamikoi*, for instance, or *Tyro*.

Méautis writes so handsomely, so persuasively, that the reader is likely to go along with him too far—until he looks again at the Greek text. Then, sometimes, what's absent is seen to be assumed, what's there is ignored. I will give two instances where congenial propositions encounter some trouble in the text. The hero is rewarded in the end with cult amounting to resurrection. Where, then, in *The Women of Trachis*, is Heracles so rewarded? Why, in Pindar's

First Nemean, to be sure, which the audience knew well and remembered (??—see pp. 290-1). This is supposed to offset Hyllus' last word of nihilism—which, by the way, does not in turn have to represent the considered or permanent belief of Sophocles. Or again; the hero is mocked. Méautis sees the Chorus of Elders who stand by while Antigone is led to entombment as a derisive gang of ghouls (pp. 210-11) comparable to the Roman soldiers who mocked Christ. This is striking, original, above all, refreshing. The general concept is perhaps a stroke of genius, and for its detail he has Antigone's οἶμοι γελῶμαι (839) to lean on. But all will not quite serve to bear out his complete picture in the detail he wishes. The Chorus began this scene with tears they could not stop (802-3, noted, pp. 209-10, but overpassed). They are, they avow, swept away from their own principles (κατὰς θεσμῶν / ἔξω φέρομαι, 801-2). Swept by what? Pity, surely. It will not do for sneers and derision (p. 211). The Elders are merely made to do so poor a job as consolers (this, I think, Méautis rightly means in the almost parallel case in *Oedipus Tyrannus*, see p. 128) that they might as well be mocking her, and so the mockery subsists as a *theme* (which should suffice) though the will to it is absent.

Méautis has little to say about the poetry of Sophocles, except to commend a well-chosen word here and there. He does not seem interested in rhetoric as structure, and virtually ignores the stasimons, alike in the implications of their imagery and the exasperating problems of sense they pose. His valuable contribution is mostly confined to a study of the Sophoclean hero and his story in the seven extant plays; a significant area, though by no means the whole of Sophocles; but to this aspect he has applied much understanding and invention, and all can learn from him with profit.

RICHMOND LATTIMORE.

BRYN MAWR COLLEGE.

DONALD LEMEN CLARK. *Rhetoric in Greco-Roman Education*. New York, Columbia Univ. Press, 1957. Pp. xii + 285.

Professor Clark has here skilfully gathered together the essential materials from the pertinent sources; the result is a clear and lively account of the doctrinal principles and educational methods employed by the ancient teachers in the schools of grammar and rhetoric. He tells us also which of those precepts and methods he has from his own long and successful experience found to be valid for the present-day teacher of rhetoric and composition, and this gives the book special value. It was written for *teachers*, and does not profess to extend the bounds of our knowledge of ancient rhetoric, or to provide a historical treatment of the subject. Its concern with education is in spirit Isocratean, and so is Clark's view of the function of rhetoric in a liberal training, as a discipline that can "organize and systematize acquired learning" and "vitalize and fructify the human spirit." Rhetoric is defined broadly as the art of discourse, including

all the arts of prose, whether written or spoken. Teachers of Public Speaking in this country in growing number likewise draw inspiration from classical rhetoric; the witness they bear to the vitality of many of the ancient precepts regarding the spoken word is here impressively supplemented by testimony as well in the sphere of English composition and creative writing. Although critical of certain aspects of ancient oratory, rhetoric, and education, Clark maintains the ancient ideal of the service oratory can render in achieving the ends of justice, and of the place rhetoric deserves to hold in education for honorable living. And he would have the teacher of rhetoric lead the fight for freedom of thought and discussion in the quest for informed opinion in a democratic society.

The book comprises seven chapters and a Conclusion. Chapter I considers the views of the ancient writers on whether the art of discourse can be taught, and includes a section, "Who Taught the Poets?" "What the Ancients Meant by Rhetoric" (Ch. II) deals with the ethical theory of Plato, the scientific outlook of Aristotle, and the educational-practical view of Isocrates. Chapter III describes the stages of instruction in the schools, and IV studies the five departments of rhetoric (under Style, the Theophrastian "virtues"—purity, clarity, ornamentation, and appropriateness—and the three traditional Types), the speech and its divisions, and "The Speech Situation," this involving the three *genera dicendi*. Chapter V treats Imitation, its value, the questions whom to imitate and how, and the exercises—paraphrase, translation, and learning by heart. Chapter VI is concerned with the *progymnasmata*—fable, narrative, moral essay, proverb, and the rest. "Declamation" (Ch. VII) takes up the *suasoriae* and *controversiae*, and the Epilogue is a brief essay on the place and function of rhetoric in school and society.

The present reviewer found the chapter on Imitation particularly rewarding—and also the sundry observations arising out of Clark's special knowledge of the Renaissance. He regrets, however, that wit and laughter receive no treatment in the book, and that Memory and Delivery are dealt with only sketchily. An opinion on the *prescriptive* nature of the ancient rules on voice and gesture would have been welcome in the light of present theory; an influential school today teaches that "full realization of the content of the words at the moment of delivery" (*Rem tene*), attended by a "lively sense of communication" (J. A. Winans) will, without recourse to mechanical methods, do most to ensure the appropriate manifestation of the thought in voice and gesture.

Out of Clark's experience come certain interesting opinions relative to the teaching of rhetoric and composition. He favors school deliberations on themes in American history; greater use by teachers of the exercises of imitation, and of the prelection (recommended by Quintilian) as groundwork for imitation; (like H. H. Hudson and others) a revived use of the traditional theory of Invention, and (like W. S. Howell and others) of the *status*-system; wider and fuller instruction in logic in our schools; the selection of teachers in foreign-language departments who would employ translation as a tool for the mastery of *English*; and imitation of the teaching methods of Socrates, as exemplified in Plato's *Phaedrus*, a model lesson in rhetoric. On the other hand, he believes that the

controversiae are less well suited than the *progymnasmata* to modern educational procedures; that the precepts of classical rhetoric offer little or no help in classes in playwriting and storywriting; and that it is inadvisable to use Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, though the most important of philosophical treatises, as a *practical* textbook in college classes—a judgment with which we must link his choice of Cicero's *Partitiones Oratoriae* (though it had no great influence on later rhetoric) as the ancient treatise most useful for the instruction of young students in this field.

A few details: "Flaminius" (pp. 244, 261, 280) should read "Flaminius"; *memoria* was already of interest to the sophists, but we cannot assume that Aristotle would have made it one of the departments of rhetoric (p. 69); the three *suasoriae* referred to at the bottom of p. 220 are to be found in the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* at 3.2.2 and 3.5.8, not 3.2.8—and three additional *suasoriae* from Roman history are given in 3.2.2; the first and last of the three Types of Issue described in the last-named treatise (at 1.11.18, not 1.11.13) are not "general" and "judicial" (p. 73), but "conjectural" and "juridical"—and I do not agree that its *status*-system is unduly complicated; on investigation it will perhaps prove more accurate to say (see p. 89) that not alone Quintilian, but also the *Rhetorica ad Herennium*, Bk. IV, has dominated subsequent theories of the figures of speech, and that the influence of Cicero, the minor rhetoricians, and the grammarians has not been inconsiderable—certainly the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* exerted the greater influence during the later Middle Ages; "Dionysius" [Cato] (pp. 61, 279) first intruded into the title of the *Disticha Catonis* in the sixteenth century—see the edition by Marcus Boas (Amsterdam, 1952), pp. liii f. and his articles listed on p. lxxxii; on Longinus' analysis of Sappho, Frag. 31 (p. 160), the reader may wish to see the comments by Denys Page, *Alcaeus and Sappho*, p. 27; along with the effects, good and bad, wrought by the schools on Silver Latin literature (pp. 21 f.), the part they played in forming the great literature of the Golden Age might have been indicated; Clark considers the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* "dull" (p. 10), an impeachment I find unacceptable—and indeed he himself cites the book often and from it excerpts interesting material; the title *De rhetori* (pp. 180, 279) of the Aldine collection (1523) of Greek treatises on rhetoric translated into Latin is surely a typographical error; a number of useful books and articles could be added to the section of the Bibliography entitled "Secondary Works." Finally, with the commendable purpose of passing fair and constructive judgment on declamation (pp. 250 ff.), Clark, even while devoting several pages to the exposition of absurdities which characterized this school-exercise in operation, vigorously takes to task certain critics to whom he attributes a one-sided position. The least of these would demur to the charge; he, too, took cognizance of certain benefits that did indeed derive from declamation as practiced in the first century; see *Studies in Speech and Drama in Honor of A. M. Drummond*, p. 299.

HARRY CAPLAN.

CORNELL UNIVERSITY.

LOUIS HARMAND. Le patronat sur les collectivités publiques des origines au Bas-Empire: un aspect social et politique du monde romain. Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1957. Pp. 552. 2000 fr. (*Publications de la Faculté des Lettres de l'Université de Clermont*, deuxième série, fasc. 2.)

The important subject here discussed has never before received an extensive treatment. Harmand omits patronage over *collegia* as covered by Waltzing, but for the rest his analysis of the epigraphic and literary evidence is full and generally persuasive.

In the Republic (pp. 13-148) Harmand essays to define the enrichment of *patrocinium* by borrowings from *hospitium* in Italy and from *proxenia* in Greece. Particularly where a conquering general became a patron of a conquered people, the relationship was an important force in consolidating Roman expansion; in the Late Republic this type of bond was a potent vehicle for ambitious leaders. Here Premierstein has served as guide, but Syme is ignored; on Cicero, Harmand might well have consulted Lepore's recent study.

The treatment of the Early Empire (pp. 151-417) is the heart of the book. Harmand begins by worrying unduly the problem why the emperors, after Augustus, were rarely patrons; he eventually determines that for the ruler the title *pater patriae* was as useful and that the subjects preferred an aggressive spokesman before the emperor and central administration. Then come a most useful catalog of patrons for both Early and Late Empire (pp. 188-284), an analysis of the reasons why a city chose a particular man as patron, and a discussion of the advantages which it drew from its patron—financial aid, buildings, games, judicial assistance, etc. On the Late Empire (pp. 421-84) Harmand is much briefer, in part because his complementary thesis, a commentary on Libanius *On the Patronages*, concentrates on the fourth century; I have noted this work recently in the *American Historical Review*.

The present study is careful, clear, and if anything too discursive; its principal defect is a tendency to formal cataloging rather than penetrating analysis. As the author justly comments at both beginning and end, patronage was a relationship of men, not an abstract political theorem, and as a personal tie between the more and the less powerful it played a considerable part in making the Roman system of government operate successfully. This aspect is not much treated in Harmand's pages. The tie, too, was not as purely humanitarian as the author makes it in the Early Empire, "un merveilleux régulateur de l'équilibre social" (p. 385); and I much doubt that "le patron devient littéralement l'esclave de ses clients" (p. 361). When a city chose in the golden age of the Empire a patron, often of local origin, we can see clearly the benefits it derived; on the other hand the advantages gained by the patron are not so obvious. They were, however, surely not always limited to pure marks of honor such as statues, seats in the theater, and so on. One needs to keep in mind Verres in the Late Republic and the patrons of the *vici* in the Late Empire; as Abbott and Johnson observed, the glowing testimonials to local leaders in the Early Empire often disguise records of personal profit at public expense.

The bibliography (pp. 489-98) is well selected, but the works cited in the notes themselves are chiefly French and at some points not the best or the most modern treatments. A list of *errata* is far from correcting all the misprints and transpositions of whole lines. Two indices cover persons and places. Among minor observations I may note: to date the beginning of the Late Empire in A. D. 280 is curiously imprecise (p. 421); that a community chose a resident exile as patron to spite the emperor is unbelievable (p. 290); Harmand merely notes the apparent absence of patrons in Egypt down to the fourth century (p. 293); his interpretation of the early emperors as loosening the ties between central and local governments (p. 152) goes too far.

CHESTER G. STARR.

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS.

HATTO H. SCHMITT. *Rom und Rhodos. Geschichte ihrer politischen Beziehungen seit der ersten Berührung bis zum Aufgehen des Inselstaates im römischen Weltreich.* Munich, C. H. Beck, 1957. Pp. xv + 223. (*Münchener Beiträge zur Papyrusforschung und antiken Rechtsgeschichte*, Heft 40.)

This work describes the relations between Rome and Rhodes during the period when those relations were a matter of really great consequence to the Mediterranean world, that is, in the period before 164 B. C.: thereafter their significance paled and that, of course, is the reason why Schmitt's final, sixth, chapter gives little more than a summary of the dealings between the two states in the Late Republic and Early Empire. It may be said at once that Schmitt's is a conscientious and workmanlike effort, and moreover an effort which was well worth undertaking since, as all readers of *Parola del Passato* (to mention no other periodical) will be aware, a good deal of research has been done on Rhodes in recent years and no connected history or synthesis of the widely scattered material has been attempted since Hiller von Gaertringen's article on *Rhodos* appeared in the fifth Supplementband of Pauly Wissowa almost thirty years ago.

Any study of this subject must start from the much questioned assertion of Polybius (XXX, 5, 6, = 167 B. C.): "The policy of the Rhodians was of so practical a sort that they had not signed an alliance with the Romans although they had participated in their most illustrious and finest deeds for almost one hundred and forty years." In other words, Polybius is saying that from ca. 305 B. C. (cf. G. De Sanctis in *Riv. di Fil.*, XIII [1935], p. 72) the Rhodians cooperated closely with the Romans, but were reluctant to sign a formal alliance with them until 167 B. C. Polybius' assertion has, of course, been seriously challenged, notably by Holleaux over half a century ago, who insisted that in fact the association of Rhodes with Rome did not begin until ca. 200 B. C. (201 B. C. is the date of the first embassy from Rhodes to Rome recorded in the extant text of Livy: XXXI, 2, 1). Accordingly Holleaux proposed

to emend Polybius' text to read forty years instead of one hundred and forty, and most scholars since then have been content to follow his lead. Schmitt contests this, arguing that what Polybius really means is that *amicitia*, even though no formal alliance, existed between Rhodes and Rome from 305 B. C. on, as in fact Livy (XLV, 25, 9) and Dio (fr. 68, 3 Boiss.; cf. Zon., IX, 24, 6) imply. Polybius does indeed exaggerate when he says that the Rhodians participated in Rome's finest and most illustrious deeds, but Polybius himself is not responsible for this exaggeration: he derived it from his source Zenon (p. 14). Although sceptical of this essay in *Quellenforschung*, the present reviewer agrees that Schmitt is right in accepting Polybius' text as it stands. On *a priori* grounds Rhodian relations with Rome as early as 340 B. C. seem entirely likely, as even Beloch, a convinced advocate of the lower dating, was obliged to admit (*Gr. Gesch.*, IV, 1, p. 290, n. 2). True, Roman contacts with the Greek world before 340 B. C. may have been recently exaggerated (e. g. by Pareti), but such contacts unquestionably did exist: in this connection Schmitt's remarks on pp. 42 f. are worth noting, even if not everyone will accept his view that the terms of the Carthaginian Treaty of 348 B. C. presuppose the existence of a Roman navy. Moreover discoveries since the war have proved that Parthenope (= Pizzofalcone at Naples) was a very early foundation, even though the alleged Rhodian role in the colony (Strabo, XIV, 2, 10, p. 654; cf. Step. Byz., s. v. "Parthenope") cannot be demonstrated from the archaeological finds.

The subsequent course of Roman-Rhodian relations, passing as they did through phases of close friendship, then coolness and even worse, is described by Schmitt with careful citation of the evidence, which for the third century B. C. particularly is very jejune and scattered. It is most convenient to have all this material between two covers, and if there are few novelties, there is an abundance of good sense. His account is naturally better on some things than on others: e. g. the parts dealing with Rhodian intervention in Lycian affairs are not as incisive as those dealing with Rhodian mediation in the First Macedonian War. But as a whole the work is very well balanced and sane. The narrative style is a little pedestrian perhaps, the change from Rhodian friendship to enmity with Rome being related in the same even, matter-of-fact way as everything else. Some readers might have preferred the contrast to be painted in sharper colours. Schmitt could no doubt retort that *peripeteia* belongs to Greek tragedy rather than to a monograph which aims, and can fairly claim, to be *wissenschaftlich*. Certainly no reader can complain that the relevant facts are not given, and given objectively. The reasons why Rhodes fell in Roman esteem emerge clearly enough.

One small cavil: it is difficult to see on what principle works are included in the *Literaturverzeichnis* on pp. xiii-xv. Recent publications by Walbank and Oost are omitted from it (although not from the footnotes throughout the volume). One would have thought them as worthy of inclusion as, say, Gelzer's *Über die Arbeitsweise des Polybius*. De Sanctis' *Storia dei Romani* appears as *Storia di Roma* on p. 40: otherwise, however, the book is refreshingly free from slips.

E. T. SALMON.

McMASTER UNIVERSITY, HAMILTON, ONTARIO.

L. A. MORITZ. *Grain-Mills and Flour in Classical Antiquity*. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1958. Pp. xxvii + 230; 16 pls. 50 s.

The author presents a clear though still conjectural scheme of development of grain-mills from elementary crushing appliances to the introduction of water-driven machinery. On the line of progress two main points emerge. First, the application of leverage. It was probably in sixth-century Greece that a mill was invented where the upper stone was pushed to and fro by the operator by means of a handle. Later the rotary mill was invented which made possible the use of animal force. A donkey (or a horse), harnessed to the rod of the appliance and walking round and round, drew the upper stone around. The earliest reference to a donkey-mill is in Plautus (*Asin.*, 708). The author rightly opposes the popular idea that revolving mills were worked by slaves.

The most important invention, however, was the water-mill, which made both human and animal effort unnecessary. The author is sketchy on this topic. His free rendering of the famous epigram of Antipater of Thessalonica (*Anth. Pal.*, IX, 418) does not do justice to the technical exactness of the piece: Water moves a wheel which turns a shaft. The latter by means of "radiating cogs turns round hollow weights of millstones." The gear thus transfers a vertical rotation into the horizontal motion of the perforated millstones.

Antipater describes a newly installed piece of machinery. The invention itself may have preceded this installation by centuries. A millstone in the Tiflis Museum is said to be from an Uratran site. Cf. G. Tsereteli, *The Uratran Monuments in the Georgian Museum* (1939), p. 63 and pl. xxii. This dating, however, is far from certain. Cf. B. P. Piotrovski, *Istoria i kultura Uratru* (1944), p. 196. Yet, the hydrographic conditions of the Mediterranean countries make it probable that the water-mill was invented in the Anatolian region.

It seems that this new motive force, though increasingly favored in the Roman Empire, began to be generally used only in the fourth century. The volume of the Mediterranean rivers was, of course, low, and the water of aqueducts was needed for the population of cities. Further, a water-mill was preferably mounted on anchored boats, in a stream. This installation saved on construction costs, and the mobility of the boats made it possible to use the strongest current of the low-velocity rivers. (I do not know why B. Gille, in the *Oxford History of Technology*, II, p. 607, ascribes the invention of floating mills to Belisarius and his engineers.) But such mills impeded navigation and obstructed the general use of the river. Classical Roman law stressed the primacy of public interests with regard to waterways. The creation of "feudal" privileges and, thus, of private properties on water channels changed the legal situation. Cf. the very instructive observations of C. Sicard, *Les Moulins de Toulouse au Moyen-Âge* (1953), pp. 38 and 55.

The second part of the book deals with flour. It bears upon the quality of bread, the staple food of the Mediterranean peoples. The author well explains the nutritional and economic advantages of "white" wheaten bread. A study of wheat and barley consumption in classical antiquity would be instructive. Everybody knows that

the Five Thousand were fed by five barley loaves as the Fourth Gospel (6:9) states. Palestine, however, was a poor country. For this reason it is interesting that a Greek novelist considered the "wheaten bread" in an Egyptian inn worthy of mention (Heliod., *Aeth.*, II, 22).

ELIAS J. BICKERMAN.

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY.

H. MICHELL. *The Economics of Ancient Greece*. Second edition. New York, Barnes and Noble, 1957. Pp. xi + 427. \$8.50.

This book (appearing now in a second edition), by the Professor Emeritus of Political Economy in McMaster University, is not an economic history of ancient Greece. Rather, it is a useful and enlightening discussion of various aspects of the economy of Greece, fortunately by a scholar who, while a specialist in another field of study, possesses competence in and enthusiasm for classical studies. It is good to have a second edition of this book, for it makes its contribution to one valuable aspect of that wider knowledge of the Greeks which is essential, if we are really to understand them. Let anyone think that Greek economics are crude and undeveloped as compared with the discipline of contemporary economics—and, therefore, not worthy of our interest—I mention at random a very few of the "modern" notes in Greek economics which are to be found in Professor Michell's book: convoys; "means test"; settlement of international balances of trade; sickness, accident, and old-age pensions.

The second edition of the book differs from the first mainly in that nine pages of Appendices (pp. 416-24) and three pages of Supplementary Bibliography (pp. 425-7) have been added to the work. The Appendices contain notes on a variety of matters of interest, but do not add appreciably to the value of the book. Likewise, the Supplementary Bibliography contains a useful collection of titles, from which, however, so far as I can find, very little, if anything at all, has been incorporated in the notes which appear in the Appendices. Nor, again, have more than very slight changes been made in the 415 pages of the book which appeared in the first edition.

It is not inappropriate that this review of a book on economic matters should close with an observation concerning a matter of economics. The first edition of this book, appearing in 1940, contained 415 pages and sold for \$4.00. The second edition, appearing in 1957, contains 427 pages—of which 415 pages are reproduced from the plates of the first edition by "photographic reprint, corrected," hence without the labor costs that would have been entailed by fresh composition of the text—and is priced at \$8.50. To this reviewer the price seems excessive.

JOHN DAY.

BARNARD COLLEGE, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY.

WILHELM HENGESBERG. *De ornatu rhetorico quem Basilus Magnus in diversis homiliarum generibus adhibuit.* Bonn, 1957. Pp. 320. (*Dissertatio inauguralis Universitatis Fridericiae Guilelmiae Rhenanae.*)

The theme of this dissertation is contained in the words of the title "in diversis homiliarum generibus." Briefly stated it is that Basil's use of rhetorical ornament varies with the subject of his homily and the audience to which it is addressed. Hengenberg groups the homilies in five classes, of which Class I shows the least use of ornament, and Class V the most. As might have been expected, the exegetical homilies show the fewest figures of rhetoric and the encomia of the martyrs and the exhortations show the largest number. If there is nothing startling in this conclusion, it at least may serve to correct a common opinion that Basil was wholly under the influence of contemporary stylistic trends. It is true, he can turn as neat a jingle as any orator of the Second Sophistic, but he does have a feeling for propriety, and on occasion his discourse can be simple, straightforward, and lucid.

The arrangement of the homilies in five classes depends largely on Hengenberg's feeling for "vis rhetorica" in a given oration. He deliberately avoids statistics such as were provided by Campbell in his dissertation on *The Influence of the Second Sophistic on the Style of the Sermons of St. Basil the Great* (Washington, D. C., 1922). He is right in distrusting statistics alone as a measure of style, but when the force of his argument depends, for example, on the relative frequency of rhetorical questions in several homilies, a more liberal use of Campbell's statistical method would have made his conclusions more persuasive.

HARRY M. HUBBELL.

YALE UNIVERSITY.

FRIEDHELM LEFHERZ. *Studien zu Gregor von Nazianz: Mythologie, Überlieferung, Scholiasten.* Bonn, 1958. Pp. 311; 3 folding tables. Paper, DM. 4.50. To be ordered from the author, Richrather Str. 9, Düsseldorf-Wersten.

This Bonn dissertation grew out of a study of the use of classical mythology in Gregory of Nazianzen's prose and poetry. Finding that the condition of the published texts of Gregory's works made a comprehensive study impossible at the present time—the only available editions are sometimes inadequate—the author confined himself to a study of certain legends, and devoted the major part of his work to critical bibliographical and textual studies which will be of great service to all future students of Gregory's works and to classical and patristic scholars concerned with the use of Greek rhetoric and literary motifs by the patristic writers.

Study of a selection of mythological passages (on the invention of shipbuilding, and on Melampus, Komaitho, Iambe, Zamolxis, and Abaris) shows how Gregory employed mythology for ethical and

didactic purposes, using classical motifs and biblical material for similar ends. Gregory had an extraordinarily wide knowledge of Greek mythology, and employed it skilfully in a variety of ways.

The remainder of the dissertation offers practical aids which are not available elsewhere in one volume: a detailed bibliography of modern works on Gregory and on related topics; a critical account of the published editions of Gregory's works (including a list of the writings not published in the *Patrologia Graeca*), with a summary of the investigations by various scholars which are currently in progress; a descriptive study of the scholiasts who commented on Gregory's orations and letters; and an account of the commentaries on Gregory's poems, from the sixth to the eighteenth centuries. There are indices of the manuscripts cited, of the incipits of Gregory's works which are discussed, and of the scholiasts and other ancient writers who are mentioned.

For financial reasons only a third of the original dissertation could be published. It is to be hoped that the author will find means to make available the remainder of his important researches.

GLANVILLE DOWNEY.

DUMBARTON OAKS, WASHINGTON, D. C.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

(It is impossible to review all books submitted to the JOURNAL, but all pertaining to the classical field are listed under BOOKS RECEIVED. Contributions sent for review or notice are not returnable.)

Actas del Primer Congreso Español de Estudios Clasicos (Madrid, 15-19 Abril de 1956). Madrid, 1958. Pp. xxi + 620. (*Publicaciones de la Sociedad Española de Estudios Clasicos*, II.)

Bennett (Emmett L., Jr.). The Olive Oil Tablets of Pylos. Texts of Inscriptions Found, 1955. Universidad de Salamanca, Seminario de Filologia Clasica, 1958. Pp. 75. (*Suplementos a "Minos"*, Núm. 2.)

Bompaire (J.). Lucien écrivain. Imitation et création. Paris, *E. de Boccard*, 1958. Pp. 794. (*Bibliothèque des Écoles Françaises d'Athènes et de Rome*, Fasc. 190.)

Brisson (Jean-Paul). Autonomisme et Christianisme dans l'Afrique romaine de Septime Sévère à l'invasion vandale. Paris, *E. de Boccard*, 1958. Pp. ii + 456.

Canivet (Pierre, S. J.). Histoire d'une entreprise apologétique au Ve siècle. Paris, *Bloud & Gay*, 1958. Pp. xxiv + 384; tables. (*Bibliothèque de l'Histoire de l'Église*.)

Canivet (Pierre, S. J.). Théodoret de Cyr, Thérapeutique des maladies helléniques, I, II. Texte critique, introduction, traduction et notes. Paris, *Éditions du Cerf*, 1958. Pp. 522. (*Sources Chrétiennes*, No. 57.)

Ehrenberg (Victor). L'Atene di Aristofane. Traduzione di Guido Libertini e Anny Calma. Originally: The People of Aristophanes (1951²). Firenze, "*La Nuova Italia*," 1957. Pp. xii + 588; 19 pls. (*Biblioteca di Cultura*, 43.)

Étienne (Robert). Le culte impérial dans la péninsule Ibérique d'Auguste à Dioclétien. Paris, *E. de Boccard*, 1958. Pp. xii + 614; 16 pls.; maps. (*Bibliothèque des Écoles Françaises d'Athènes et de Rome*, Fasc. 191.)

Flower (Barbara) and Rosenbaum (Elisabeth). *Opus Epistolarum Des. Erasmi Roterodami denuo recognitum et auctum per P. S. Allen, Tome XII: Indices.* Oxford, *Clarendon Press*, 1958. Pp. iv+189. \$6.75.

Gentili (Bruno). *Bacchilide Studi.* Urbino, *Stabilimento Tipografico Edit. Urbinato*, 1958. Pp. 141. (*Pubblicazioni dell'Università di Urbino, Serie di Lettere e Filosofia*, VI.)

Glover (T. R.). *The Ancient World: A Beginning.* Reprint of 1935 edition. Baltimore, *Penguin Books*, 1958. Pp. 350.

Haarhoff: *Roman Life and Letters.* Studies Presented to T. J. Haarhoff, Professor of Classics at the University of Witwatersrand 1922-1957. Cape Town, A. A. Balkema, 1959. Pp. 178; frontispiece. (*Acta Classica*, I: *Proceedings of the Classical Association of South Africa.*)

Hanson (John Arthur). *Roman Theater-Temples.* Princeton, *Princeton Univ. Press*, 1959. Pp. 112.

Harvard Studies in Classical Philology, LXIII. Dedicated to Werner Jaeger on his Seventieth Birthday. Edited by a Committee of the Classical Instructors of Harvard University. Cambridge, *Harvard Univ. Press*, 1958. Pp. 528; frontispiece.

Harvard Studies in Comparative Literature, XXIII: On Translation. I: Translators on Translating; II: Approaches to the Problem; III: A Critical Bibliography of Works on Translation. Cambridge, *Harvard Univ. Press*, 1959. Pp. xi+293.

Heil (Günter) and de Gandillac (Maurice). *Denys l'Aréopagite, La hiérarchie céleste.* Introduction par René Roques. Étude et texte critiques par Günter Heil. Traduction et notes par Maurice de Gandillac. Paris, *Éditions du Cerf*, 1958. Pp. xcv+225. (*Sources Chrétiennes*, 58.)

Hill (Archibald A.). *Introduction to Linguistic Structures: From Sound to Sentence in English.* New York, *Harcourt, Brace and Co.*, 1958. Pp. xi+496.

Lejeune (Michel). *Mémoires de philologie Mycénienne. Première Série (1955-1957).* Paris, *Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique*, 1958. Pp. 402.

Neuhauser (Walter). *Patronus und Orator. Eine Geschichte der Begriffe von ihren Anfängen bis in die augusteische Zeit.* Innsbruck, *Universitätsverlag Wagner*, 1959. Pp. 210. (*Commentationes Aenipontanae*, XIV.)

Pellegrino (Michele). *L'inno del simposio di S. Metodio Martire.* Introduzione, testo critico e commento. Torino, 1958. Pp. 127. (*Università di Torino, Pubblicazioni della Facoltà di Lettere e Filosofia*, X, 1.)

Rapisarda (Carmelo A.). *Orientii Commonitorium, Carmina Orientio Tributa.* Testo critico. *Università di Catania, Centro di Studi sull'Antico Cristianesimo*, 1958. Pp. 188; frontispiece.

Romanelli (Pietro). *Storia delle province romane dell'Africa.* Rome, "*L'Erma*" di Bretschneider, 1959. Pp. x+720; map.

Ruch (Michel). *L'Hortensius de Cicéron. Histoire et reconstitution.* Paris, *Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres"*, 1958. Pp. 181.

Sakellariou (Michel B.). *La migration grecque en Ionie.* Athens, 1958. Pp. xx+568; maps. (*Collection de l'Institut Français d'Athènes*, 17.)

Schuster (Maurice). *Catulli Veronensis Liber.* Editionem stereotypam correctiorem editionis secundae curavit W. Eisenhut. Leipzig, B. G. Teubner, 1958. Pp. xviii+163. 6.20 DM. (*Bibliotheca Scriptorum Graecorum et Romanorum Teubneriana.*)

Sodano (A. R.). *Porfirio, Lettera ad Anebo.* Naples, *L'Arte Tipografica*, 1958. Pp. liii+77.

Sturm (Fritz). *Abalienatio. Essai d'explication de la définition des topiques (Cic., Top. 5, 28).* Milan, *Dott. A. Giuffrè*, [1957]. Pp. 230. (Thèse de Doctorat présentée à la Faculté de Droit de l'Université de Lausanne.)

Svennung (J.). Anredeformen. Vergleichende Forschungen zur indirekten Anrede in der dritten person und zum nominativ für den vokativ. Uppsala, *Almqvist & Wiksells Boktryckeri AB*; Wiesbaden, *Otto Harrassowitz*, 1958. Pp. xl + 495. (*Skrifter utgivna av K. Humanistiska Vetenskapssamfundet i Uppsala*, 42.)

Szymusiak (Jan-M., S. J.). Athanase d'Alexandrie, Apologie à l'empereur Constance; Apologie pour sa fuite. Introduction, texte critique, traduction, et notes. Paris, *Éditions du Cerf*, 1958. Pp. 192. (*Sources Chrétiennes*, 56.)

Thouvenot (Raymond). Maisons de Volubilis: le palais dit de Gordien et la maison à la mosaïque de Vénus. Rabat, 1958. Pp. 86; 9 figs.; 24 pls. (*Publications du Service des Antiquités du Maroc*, Fasc. 12.)

Tilander (Gunnar). Mélanges d'étymologie Cynégétique. Lund, 1958. Pp. 329. (*Cynegetica*, V.)

Torraca (Luigi). Aristotele: De Motu Animalium. Naples, *Libreria Scientifica Editrice*, 1958. Pp. 70. (*Collana di Studi Greci diretta da Vittorio de Falco*, XXX.)

Tugendhat (Ernst). TI KATA TINOS. Eine Untersuchung zu Struktur und Ursprung aristotelischer Grundbegriffe. Freiburg / München, *Verlag Karl Alber*, 1958. Pp. x + 160.

Untersteiner (Mario). Parmenide. Testimonianze et frammenti. Introduzione, traduzione et commento. Firenze, "La Nuova Italia," 1958. Pp. ccx + 185. (*Biblioteca di Studi Superiori, Filosofia Antica*, XXXVIII.)

Vaillant (A.). L'homélie d'Épiphané sur l'ensevelissement du Christ. Texte vieux-slave, texte grec et traduction française. Zagreb, 1958. Pp. 201. (*Radovi Staroslavenskog Instituta*, Knjiga 3.)

Van Groningen (B. A.). La composition littéraire archaïque grecque. Procédés et réalisations. Amsterdam, N. V. *Noord-Hollandsche Uitgevers Maatschappij*, 1958. Pp. 394. (*Verhandelingen der Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen, Afd. Letterkunde*, Nieuwe Reeks, Deel LXV, No. 2.)

Vasiliiu (Vergil D.). Mărturia Poeziei. Paris, *Fundatia Regală Universitară Carol I*, 1957. Pp. 105.

Vogt (Ernestus). Procli Hymni. Accedunt hymnorum fragmenta, epigrammata, scholia, fontium et locorum similium apparatus, indices. Wiesbaden, *Otto Harrassowitz*, 1957. Pp. 100. (*Klassisch-Philologische Studien*, Heft 18.)

Vogt (Joseph). Struktur der antiken Sklavenkriege. Wiesbaden, *Verlag der Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur in Mainz in Kommission bei Franz Steiner Verlag*, 1957. Pp. 57. DM. 4.80.

Wenger (Antoine). Jean Chrysostome, Huit catéchèses baptismales inédites. Introduction, texte critique, traduction et notes. Paris, *Éditions du Cerf*, 1957. Pp. 281. (*Sources Chrétiennes*, 50.)

Will (Édouard). Doriens et Ioniens. Essai sur la valeur du critère ethnique appliqué à l'étude de l'histoire et de la civilisation grecques. Paris, *Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres"*, 1956. Pp. 102. (*Publications de la Faculté des Lettres de l'Université de Strasbourg*, 132.)

Wistrand (Erik). Die Chronologie der Punic des Silius Italicus. Beiträge zur Interpretation der Flavischen Literatur. Göteborg, 1956. Pp. 65. (*Acta Universitatis Gothoburgensis*, LXII.)

Wycheley (R. E.). The Athenian Agora: Results of Excavations Conducted by the American School of Classical Studies at Athens, Volume III: Literary and Epigraphical Testimonia. Princeton, *American School of Classical Studies at Athens*, 1957. Pp. vii + 259; 4 pls.

Yale Classical Studies, Volume XV. Edited for the Department of Classics by Harry M. Hubbell. New Haven, *Yale Univ. Press*; London, *Oxford Univ. Press*, 1957. Pp. 193; 9 pls.

Zafropulo (Jean). Diogène d'Apollonie. Paris, *Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres"*, 1956. Pp. 207. (*Collection Budé*.)